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Chapter 1
General Introduction
I have striven not to laugh at human actions, not to weep at them, 
nor to hate them, but to understand them.
–Spinoza  
1
General Introduction 13
From birth, infants’ earliest meaningful experiences consist of observing, processing, 
and forming expectations about the actions of their caregivers. Within the first months 
of life, infants rapidly refine and expand their capacities for perceiving and performing 
goal-directed actions. Infants’ growing ability to process meaningful, goal-directed 
behavior shapes their understanding of the world, and lays the foundation for higher-
order cognitive abilities later in life. 
As adults, we automatically interpret the movements of other people in terms of 
actions1. For instance, we describe someone as ‘drinking coffee’ as we observe their 
hand reach towards a steaming mug. We would not describe this action in terms of 
perceptual information, such as ‘moving arm toward cup, then lifting cup to mouth’. 
Interpreting human behavior in terms of goal-directed actions is a key step in allowing 
us to infer the intentions and mental states of other people (e.g., in need of caffeine). 
Researchers typically describe this phenomenon as action understanding, which is 
commonly defined as explicit knowledge about the goals and intentions that motivate 
other people’s actions (Kilner, 2011; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). However, the 
underlying mechanisms we use to achieve this understanding and their development 
are still a topic of intense study and debate in the cognitive sciences (Gergely & Csibra, 
2008; Ruffman, Taumoepeau, & Perkins, 2012; Uithol & Paulus, 2014; Woodward, 2005).
Actions are complex: we encounter an immense amount of perceptual information 
from objects, other people, and our own bodies as we move through our environment 
to attain our goals. Actions are also usually embedded within continuous sequences 
that extend over time, without clear cues to mark distinct event boundaries or end-
points. To illustrate, an ordinary action like making a peanut butter and jelly sandwich 
consists of many steps: slicing a loaf of bread, opening the peanut butter jar, grasping 
a butter knife, and so forth. This sequence contains perceptual information from the 
motion trajectory of the actor’s hand, conceptual information about the actor’s current 
physical and mental state, and even broader social or cultural information about the 
context in which this sandwich came into being (for instance, a sandwich-maker in the 
Netherlands would never combine peanut butter and jelly).
How do young infants, with limited world knowledge and experiences under their 
belts, detect the relevant action events within other people’s continuous behavior? 
What neurocognitive mechanisms give rise to the ability to learn about novel action 
sequences from mere observation? How do we organize our behavior in response to 
newly acquired knowledge about the actions we observe? These questions inspired 
1 Definitions are provided in the glossary section for terms appearing in italics
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the research presented in the current thesis, which investigated mechanisms of action 
prediction during observation of continuous action sequences in infants, young tod-
dlers, and adults.  
In this general introduction, I will first briefly review the current evidence for action 
prediction and understanding in infants and adults. I will then turn to two distinct, yet 
converging, groups of theories that aim to explain the underlying mechanisms. The 
first focuses on the role of observational experiences for action prediction, whereas the 
second attributes primary importance to the motor system. Finally, I will introduce the 
specific research questions that were the focus of the experiments presented in this 
thesis. 
Action prediction and action understanding: From perceptual 
predictions to conceptual understanding
Action understanding is the means by which human behavior becomes predictable 
and meaningful to others, and it is fundamental for coordinated interaction and com-
munication between people (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006).  The complexity 
of human actions renders it challenging for researchers to reach a single, operational 
definition of what it means to ‘understand’ an action (for a detailed discussion, see 
Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering, & Haselager, 2011). However, both adults and infants 
reliably demonstrate distinct, measurable behaviors during action observation. These 
behaviors reveal an underlying capacity for recognizing and responding to the actions 
of other people. In particular, action prediction refers to the ability to anticipate another 
person’s actions (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). Action prediction is commonly measured 
in behavior as anticipatory gaze shifts towards the location of an action’s endpoint or 
outcome (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). When acting ourselves, we automatically shift 
our gaze to future locations, and these predictive gaze shifts are critical for accurate 
motor control (Shadmehr, Smith, & Krakauer, 2010; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). For 
instance, a basketball player will look to the goal basket just before making his shot. 
Similarly, an observer also anticipates the course of another person’s action before it 
unfolds. This was demonstrated empirically in a seminal study on action observation 
in adults (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003), and was subsequently replicated in infants 
(Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006). While observing an actor reach for a ball 
and place it into a bucket, both adults and 12-month-old infants made predictive gaze 
shifts to the final goal location (the bucket) before the actor’s hand arrived there. These 
gaze shifts mirrored those which were made when the adults performed those same 
actions themselves. 
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Action prediction requires the observer to anticipate what will occur next, prior to 
the outcome or knowledge of the future trajectory of the action. Perceptually, predic-
tion serves an important function by allowing the observer to efficiently process the 
incoming sensory stream. Without this ability, the observer’s eyes would lag behind 
the events as they unfold, due to the delay between the time it takes to program an 
eye movement and the moment the saccade is initiated (Gredebäck, Johnson, & von 
Hofsten, 2010). Anticipating observed events ensures that gaze is targeted towards 
upcoming events the moment they occur and that the observer perceives the relevant 
aspects of the action (Von Hofsten & Rosander, 1996). Visual anticipations are thus critical 
for maintaining a smooth, coherent perception of external events in the world. Without 
them, perception would be fragmented and incoherent (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). 
From early on, infants make visual anticipations while observing many types of goal-
directed actions (Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Kanakogi & 
Itakura, 2011; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). For instance, in Hunnius & Bekkering 
(2010), 6-month-old infants were shown simple actions which were either familiar 
(‘functional’) or strange (‘nonfunctional’): bringing a cup or a phone to either the mouth 
or the ear. Like adults, these young infants anticipated the final location of the familiar 
(e.g., cup to mouth) actions before the hand arrived there. They also anticipated the 
strange actions (e.g., cup to ear), but with less frequency. This finding showed that 
these infants already possessed an expectation about how the familiar actions should 
unfold, and relied primarily on this knowledge to proactively anticipate the action’s 
outcome. Predictive eye movements serve as an indirect measure of the observer’s 
prior expectations, and therefore their knowledge, about a particular action. 
An essential source of prior knowledge that shapes our predictions is the larger context 
in which an action occurs (Kilner, 2011). One particularly important example is the 
social context that characterizes the interactions between people. Adults often cook 
with a partner, infants play together with their parents and siblings, and so forth. Action 
prediction in a joint action situation introduces the additional demands of tracking the 
actions and goals of multiple people (Sebanz et al., 2009). Joint actions also contain so-
cial information, from cues such as mutual eye gaze, verbal dialogue, and other forms of 
communicative interaction (Manera, Becchio, Schouten, Bara, & Verfaillie, 2011). These 
cues form a social context that influences the predictions an observer might make. For 
instance, toddlers will demonstrate different expectations about what two actors will 
subsequently do based on their previous communicative interaction (Fawcett & Grede-
bäck, 2013). In the current literature on joint action, social context is typically defined as 
the nature of the common goal between two people (Bratman, 1992; Searle, 1990). For 
instance, two actors can act in parallel but have separate, independent goals, or they 
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can act together with a common, shared goal. An observer who is aware of this social 
context can formulate different hypotheses about what these actors will subsequently 
do and what their respective goals are. 
The research described in this section thus far demonstrates that infants and adults use 
multiple sources of information to anticipate a range of action events such as reaching 
to grasp (Southgate et al., 2009), moving an object from one location to another (Falck-
Ytter et al., 2006; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Rosander & von Hofsten, 2011), and the 
actions of two co-actors in a social interaction (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013). This work 
has largely focused on familiar, discrete actions with clear boundaries at their onset and 
offset. Action sequences, in contrast—such as the peanut butter and jelly sandwich 
example—do not feature such clear cues to mark the boundaries between the various 
steps. How do observers process and anticipate continuous action sequences? Without 
cues from prior knowledge or other information, how does an inexperienced observer, 
such as an infant, learn the relations between the various steps and how to anticipate 
the next element of the sequence? One possible mechanism is the human ability to 
learn statistical regularities, as I will describe in the following section. 
Statistical learning: Detecting patterns in continuous sensory 
input 
Action sequences share common features with other forms of perceptual sequences, 
such as language streams: they contain inherent patterns and regularities that impart 
structure to the overall activity (Newtson & Engquist, 1976). Within typical goal-directed 
action sequences, certain events or outcomes are statistically likely and therefore 
predictable. For instance, scooping peanut butter from a jar is frequently followed by 
spreading the peanut butter on a slice of bread. In contrast, spreading peanut butter on 
bread is followed by turning on the oven with lower frequency. Statistical regularities 
within human behavior provide a rich source of information that observers can often 
use for predicting what will happen next.  
From early in infancy, humans are sensitive to a vast array of statistical regularities in 
the environment. This sensitivity results in statistical learning (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 
1996), currently considered to be a fundamental learning mechanism in human 
cognition. In a groundbreaking study, Saffran et al. (1996) tested whether infants 
could segment artificial sound streams into distinct, word-like chunks, based only on 
information from the transitional probabilities between individual sounds. Like action, 
language is essentially a continuous sequence with little or no auditory cues to indi-
cate word boundaries. However, natural language contains sequential regularities that 
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make syllables within words more predictable than syllables across word boundaries, 
making it possible for infants to learn words by picking up on these regularities. In 
their study, Saffran et al. (1996) presented 8-month-old infants with two minutes of a 
continuous auditory stream consisting of monotone, nonsense syllables (e.g., “bidaku-
padotigolabubidaku…”). The stream, however, featured a statistical structure that was 
defined by the transitional probabilities between the syllables. The sequence consisted 
of three-syllable nonsense ‘words’ (e.g., “bi-da-ku” and “pa-do-ti”) which always occur-
red together in the same order and thus had a deterministic (i.e., 100% as in bi-da) 
transitional probability. The transitional probabilities between the final syllable of one 
word and the first syllable of the next word were lower (i.e., 33% as in ku-pa); these 
were called ‘part-words’ (e.g., “ku-pa-do”). After hearing just two minutes of this syllable 
stream, infants were tested on their ability to distinguish between ‘words’ and ‘part-
words’. Infants showed longer listening times for the part-words relative to the words, 
revealing that they could discriminate between them. These findings were the first 
to show that young infants are sensitive to transitional probabilities within auditory 
sequences. Statistical learning has since been proposed as a candidate mechanism for 
infants’ segmentation of speech into constituent words based on statistical regularities. 
Detecting patterns across multiple domains 
Building upon this discovery, researchers have since shown that humans possess 
powerful statistical learning skills in both the visual and auditory domains. Kirkham, 
Slemmer, & Johnson (2002) adapted the procedure of Saffran et al. (1996) into a visual 
sequence segmentation paradigm and showed that infants, from as young as two 
months of age, could discriminate between familiar and novel shape sequences based 
on the transitional probabilities between them. Infants can also visually anticipate the 
correct location of where a shape will appear based on learned spatial associations 
(Haith, Hazan, & Goodman, 1988; Romberg & Saffran, 2013), even in the presence of 
competing visual distractors (Tummeltshammer & Kirkham, 2013). Statistical learning 
can account for infants’ abilities to segment visual sequences, learn object-location 
associations, and become sensitive to grammatical structure (Marcus et al., 1999; Saf-
fran et al., 1996). More broadly, these findings suggest that humans possess functional 
learning mechanisms from early in infancy, designed to detect structure and patterns 
across a variety of stimuli in multiple sensory domains (Conway & Pisoni, 2008; Kirkham, 
Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Shafto, Conway, Field, & Houston, 2012).
Evidence for visual statistical learning led researchers to question whether humans are 
similarly sensitive to statistical regularities in action sequences. In another influential 
experiment, Baldwin and colleagues asked whether adults segment action sequences 
into chunks according to the transitional probabilities within them (Baldwin, Andersson, 
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Saffran, & Meyer, 2008). In a paradigm inspired by previous segmentation experiments, 
they constructed a nonsense action stream consisting of smaller ‘motion-elements’. 
These were single action events, such as ‘clinking a bottle’ or ‘poking an object’, which 
were presented in a series of 3-step sequences. At test, adults were presented with 
“actions” (the original 3-step sequences) and “part-actions” (sequences which spanned 
“action” boundaries). Adults could discriminate between the ‘actions’ and ‘part-actions’, 
revealing an ability to segment action sequences as they do for auditory and visual 
sequences. Subsequent research has shown that infants from seven months of age 
possess similar segmentation skills: they can segment familiar action sequences such 
as an adult sweeping a kitchen (Baldwin, Baird, & Saylor, 2001). They can also segment 
abstract movement sequences based on statistical structure alone, in the absence of 
prior knowledge or experience with the particular actions observed (Stahl, Romberg, 
Roseberry, Golinkoff, & Hirsh-Pasek, 2014). These findings reveal similarities in segmen-
tation skills across perceptual and action modalities and across development (Baird & 
Baldwin, 2001). 
Building upon this work, Ahlheim and colleagues (Ahlheim, Stadler, & Schubotz, 2014) 
used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to further probe the role of statistical 
structure during ongoing processing of abstract action sequences. Unlike the previous 
studies, which measured sensitivity to action segments following observation, neural 
responses to the statistical regularities were measured during online observation of a 
continuous action sequence. Findings revealed that neural activation (i.e., enhanced 
BOLD signal) in brain regions that are traditionally associated with action observation 
correlated with the statistical properties of an action step (specifically, the posterior 
temporal, inferior parietal and premotor cortices). In addition, the strength the BOLD 
signal in the hippocampus also correlated with participants’ subjective judgements 
about the likelihood of a certain transition in a post-observation test. This study pro-
vided the first direct evidence for sensitivity to statistical regularities between actions 
during ongoing processing. Further, it showed that neural activity is modulated by 
the statistical likelihood of an action, which could mean that it reflects the strength of 
an observer’s prediction. In sum, statistical regularities are potentially a rice source of 
information that observers can make use of during everyday action processing. 
Perceiving and predicting sequential structure
Evidence for sensitivity to statistical information in action sequences is consistent with 
global theoretical accounts of brain function. One such account is the predictive coding 
framework, which claims that all brain function is predictive in nature (for a review, see 
Clark, 2013). The core assumption of predictive coding is that the brain attempts to 
minimize surprising sensory inputs, resulting in more efficient processing. Traditionally, 
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predictive coding is applied to lower-level perceptual domains such as vision, but more 
recently researchers have extended this framework to the domain of social cognition. 
For instance, according to predictive coding, the brain generates an internal model 
of the world based on both the immediate sensory cues available (such as the visual 
signal of a motion contour) and prior knowledge stored in our memory system (such 
as the likelihood of observing a pouring action given the presence of a hand, a glass, 
and a bottle of wine). Most of the time, our predictions closely match the incoming 
sensory input from the world; however, occasionally they do not (imagine the strange 
sensation of tasting accidentally salted coffee when expecting to taste a sweetened 
beverage). When there is a perceived mismatch—a prediction error—our perceptual 
system updates its internal event model. 
The concept of predictive coding has recently been extended to the action domain 
(Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007a; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). One 
such example is Event Segmentation Theory (EST), which proposes that our perception 
of everyday events is in fact a consequence (i.e., ‘side effect) of predictive coding in the 
brain (Zacks, 2004; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, & Braver, 2007). EST proposes that predictions 
errors lie at the core of the human brain’s ability to parse streams of everyday activity 
into meaningful events. According to EST, perception consists of alternating states 
between long periods of stability in which prediction errors are low, and brief periods 
of change in which prediction errors increase. Stable periods are experienced as events, 
whereas periods of change are experienced as event boundaries. Evidence for EST in 
adults indicates that event segmentation is an automatic, and perhaps vital, feature 
of normal, everyday perception (Zacks et al., 2001; Zacks et al., 2007). One experiment 
recently tested this theory in infants. The hypothesis was that occluding information 
occurring at an event boundary would prevent the event from being encoded in 
long-term memory, whereas occluding moments that occur within an event should 
not. In other words, obstructing moments of change, in which prediction errors can 
occur, from view should hinder the ability to form coherent, stable event models that 
can be later retrieved from memory. Their results supported this hypothesis: infants 
demonstrated impaired memory for cartoon events when occluders (solid ellipses that 
obstructed view of the screen) were inserted at event boundaries, relative to when they 
observed events with occluders that were inserted at other, non-boundary moments 
(Sonne, Kingo, & Krøjgaard, 2016).
EST provides a useful explanation for how sequential actions can be segmented and 
organized in our cognitive system. Importantly, a core assumption of the model is that 
perceptual predictions are combined with prior knowledge that is gained through past 
experiences. As described earlier (see Detecting patterns in action sequences), evidence 
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suggests that the brain is sensitive to statistical regularities in action sequences after 
acquiring prior visual experiences with them. This raises the possibility that statistical 
structure is a core source of information to guide expectations about how observed 
sequential actions unfold. However, a remaining question that previous work has not 
yet addressed—and an acknowledged limitation in EST (Kurby & Zacks, 2008)—is that 
we do not only passively perceive other people’s actions. Rather, we are actors oursel-
ves and our own motor system also shapes the predictions we generate as we observe 
others, as I will describe in the next section.  
The motor system: Internal predictive models for action 
processing
Perceiving actions and performing them are closely coupled. As described long ago by 
Williams James, “every mental representation of a movement awakens in some degree 
the actual movement which is the object” (p. 526, James, 1890). Current theories of 
motor control (e.g., Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001) and action understanding (Gallese, 
Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Kilner et al., 2007a) propose that action perception 
is guided by the same mechanisms for the actions we observe and those we perform 
ourselves. Evidence in support of this notion has revealed the existence of a network 
of brain regions that have been collectively labeled the action-observation network 
(AON; Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004; Schubotz, Wurm, Wittmann, & 
von Cramon, 2014). These cortical regions (which include frontal premotor, parietal, and 
temporo-occipital cortex; for a meta-analysis see Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010) 
are active when we perform motor acts but also when we observe the goal-directed 
actions of others.
The properties of the AON, together with the discovery of mirror neurons in the macaque 
brain (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti, Camarda, & Fogassi, 1988), have invited speculation 
that action prediction arises from activity in these cortical regions when we observe 
actions performed by other people. Specifically, the motor system, via predictive coding, 
generates a forward prediction about the next incoming sensory input, and uses this 
prediction to guide our own actions and our analysis of the actions we observe (Kilner 
et al., 2007). Though specific characteristics and function of a human AON remain 
hotly debated, evidence for overlapping patterns during perception and execution of 
goal-directed actions from early in development continues to grow (for contrasting 
perspectives see e.g., Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009 and Hickok, 2009; for a review see 
Ferrari & Rizzolatti, 2014).
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Perception-action links in the motor system
How do these perceptual-motor links initially arise? That is, how do infants initially 
form new links between sensory information from observed actions they have never 
performed before and their own internal motor programs? Several theoretical ac-
counts in the literature offer potential solutions to this question. One explanation is 
that perceptual-motor links have phylogenetic origins and therefore are likely to be 
present at birth, which draws on controversial evidence for neonatal imitation to 
support this claim (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Alternatively, the As-
sociative Sequence Learning (ASL) model proposes that action-observation links arise 
through early experience-dependent, Hebbian-like links between our actions and the 
sensory percept arising from their movements (Catmur et al., 2009; Heyes, 2001). Like 
statistical learning, ASL proposes that perceptual-motor links in the motor system are 
rooted in experience-based learning of the regularities between perceptual and motor 
events. Still other models attempt to explain the origins of the human ability to process 
observed actions within the motor system from a neoconstructivist perspective (for 
a review, see Quadrelli & Turati, 2016). Although the origins and development of new 
perceptual-motor links remain up for debate, it remains increasingly clear that infants’ 
early sensorimotor experiences and their motor system plays an important role in their 
emerging abilities to process and predict observed actions.
The consequences of our actions are one example of sensorimotor experiences that 
lead to new action-observation links in our motor system. Goal-directed actions—tying 
our shoelaces, pouring hot coffee, flicking a lamp switch—result in sensory conse-
quences, or action-effects. These effects play an important role in how we perceive and 
anticipate actions. Ideomotor principle, a long-standing theory of voluntary behavior, 
claims that actions are in fact represented in terms of their effects (for a review, see 
Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). As we repeatedly observe our own actions paired with 
certain effects, our motor system creates a bi-directional link between the desired ef-
fect and the motor command that was used to generate it (Klein, Hauf, & Aschersleben, 
2006; Paulus, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 2012; Verschoor, Weidema, Biro, & Hommel, 
2010). After these associations are established, our motor system prospectively controls 
actions by activating the code originally used to produce the desired effect. Paulus 
et al. (2012) recently showed that bi-directional action-effect associations can also be 
established for actions that are only observed. In an EEG experiment, young infants 
observed a novel pairing between an action and an auditory effect. After learning 
these action-effect associations, their motor system subsequently became activated in 
response to the sound alone. This study extended the ideomotor principle from self-
produced to observed actions, by showing that observational experiences alone can 
result in sensorimotor learning in the motor system.  These findings also demonstrate 
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that action-effects are important signals that enable infants to acquire new associations 
between external events in the environment and their own internal motor programs. 
An integrated account: Respective contributions of visual and 
motor experiences to action perception
In sum, there are two dominant types of accounts aiming to explain how humans 
perceive and come to predict other people’s goal-directed actions. The first type has fo-
cused on the role of visual experiences in shaping how our perceptual system extracts 
information from the environment, and how we subsequently use this information to 
predict upcoming events (e.g., Baird & Baldwin, 2001; Zacks, 2004). The second type 
has focused on the role of the motor system in applying internal models to incoming 
sensory data, resulting in motor predictions about upcoming actions (for a review, see 
Zentgraf, Munzert, Bischoff, & Newman-Norlund, 2011). These two lines of research 
have provided several possible explanations and candidate mechanisms for how 
humans come to predict and understand other people’s actions. However, they have, 
thus far, proceeded largely independently, or have been portrayed as orthogonal to 
one another, which has impeded progress in coming to an integrated understanding 
of action perception (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014).
The current thesis aims to bridge these lines of research by focusing on the interaction 
between visual statistical learning and the role of the motor system in action prediction. 
Specifically, I asked the following questions: How do humans detect relevant action 
events and develop expectations about continuous behavior? Do visual statistical 
learning abilities help observers build the initial knowledge needed to generate ac-
tion predictions? What is the benefit, if any, of motor system involvement for learning 
through observation? These questions are critical for making progress in understanding 
the mechanisms that underlie action prediction, which provides the foundation for 
functioning adaptively in our social world.
Outline of the thesis
In the current thesis, I investigated the role of statistical structure in action prediction 
during observation of continuous action sequences. I began at the behavioral level by 
developing a novel eye-tracking paradigm to measure infant and adults’ visual predic-
tions of upcoming actions based on statistical learning. Chapters 2 and 3 present fin-
dings from two experiments that investigated whether infants (Chapter 2) and adults 
(Chapter 3) could anticipate upcoming actions during online learning and whether 
they could subsequently translate this new knowledge into their own actions. The 
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paradigm I implemented in these two chapters formed the basis for the subsequent 
experiments. 
In Chapter 4, I took advantage of the natural emergence of new motor capabilities 
in infancy to investigate whether infants’ statistical learning abilities are influenced by 
their own developing motor capabilities. Chapters 5 and 6 focused on the effects of 
statistical learning on neural activity during observation of action sequences. Chapter 
5 investigated event-related potential (ERP) responses in younger infants to violations 
of a previously observed statistical structure. Chapter 6 complements Chapter 5 
by investigating the interplay between statistical learning and the motor system. In 
an EEG experiment, following the results of Chapter 2, I asked whether knowledge 
from observation alone can translate into motor predictions in toddlers. To this end, 
I measured mu rhythm suppression over motor regions of the infant brain that cor-
responded to action predictions based on statistical structure. In Chapter 6, I propose 
a novel relation between visual statistical learning skills and the infant motor system 
and consider its implications for the role of the motor system in prediction of observed 
actions. Chapter 7 extended the questions that were explored in the previous chap-
ters by moving beyond action sequences performed by an individual actor to focus on 
statistical learning across multiple actors in a social interaction context.
Finally, Chapter 8 provides a synthesis of the empirical findings from these studies and 
discusses how the findings collectively contribute to a better understanding of how 
statistical learning abilities contribute to action prediction in the developing infant and 
adult brain. This discussion raises new questions and provides suggestions for future 
research based on the outcomes of the thesis. 
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Abstract
The current eye-tracking study investigated whether toddlers use statistical information 
to make anticipatory eye movements while observing continuous action sequences. 
In two conditions, 19-month-old participants watched either a person performing an 
action sequence (Agent condition) or a self-propelled visual event sequence (Ghost 
condition). Both sequences featured a statistical structure in which certain action pairs 
occurred with deterministic transitional probabilities. Toddlers learned the transitional 
probabilities between the action steps of the deterministic action pairs and made pre-
dictive fixations to the location of the next action in the Agent condition, but not the 
Ghost condition. These findings suggest that young toddlers gain unique information 
from the statistical structure contained within action sequences, and can successfully 
predict upcoming action steps based on this acquired knowledge. Further, predictive 
gaze behavior was correlated with reproduction of sequential actions following expo-
sure to statistical regularities. This study extends prior developmental work by showing 
that statistical learning can guide the emergence of anticipatory eye movements 
during observation of continuous action sequences. 
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Introduction
Action sequences are continuous, complex streams of movement. Underlying this intri-
cate flow of information, actions contain statistical regularities that provide information 
about the structure of observed behavior. For instance, a typical experience for an 
infant might be observing a parent bake a pie by first gathering ingredients, preparing 
dough, mixing the filling, and placing it in the oven. This action sequence includes many 
movements with unique kinematics, a temporal structure, and contextual information. 
A complex challenge for infants is to efficiently process this diverse and continuous 
flow of motion, recognize and predict the sub-steps that define the overarching action, 
and reach an understanding of the overall goal of the behavior. 
Recent developmental studies have demonstrated that action prediction—the ability 
to perform predictive gaze shifts during action observation—is mediated by infants’ 
motor capabilities and their ability to associate actions with their effects  (Falck-Ytter 
et al., 2006; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014; Jovanovic, Király, Elsner, Gergely, & Prinz, 2007; 
Paulus, Hunnius, et al., 2011; Reid et al., 2009; Stapel, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 
2010; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000). One outstanding question is whether statistical 
learning skills also support action prediction early in development. Statistical learning, 
defined as sensitivity to statistical regularities in the environment, has been shown to 
be a powerful learning tool that emerges early in development (Ruffman et al., 2012; 
Saffran et al., 1996). Infants’ and toddlers’ statistical learning skills were initially inves-
tigated in the auditory domain, and recently researchers have shown that statistical 
learning also allows infants to extract structure from visual input as well (Kirkham et 
al., 2002). The present study aimed to determine whether toddlers can discover the 
statistical regularities in action sequences and accurately predict upcoming actions 
and their effects during online observation.
Statistical learning: sensitivity to sequential structure 
The transitional probabilities (TPs) that define the order of events in a sequence deter-
mine how predictable an upcoming event is relative to other possible events. Previous 
research has demonstrated that young infants and children are sensitive to probabi-
listic information in different sensory domains, including in the action domain (e.g., 
Amso & Davidow, 2012; Buchsbaum, Gopnik, Griffiths, & Shafto, 2011; Canfield & Haith, 
1991). These statistical learning paradigms typically feature a learning phase containing 
sequences with a consistent structure such that certain elements always occur in a 
predictable sequential order. Infants and toddlers subsequently demonstrate a novelty 
response by looking longer to test sequences that deviate from the structure observed 
in the learning phase (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2001; Saylor, Baldwin, Baird, & LaBounty, 2007). 
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For example, in a study by Baldwin and colleagues (2001), 10-month-olds were familia-
rized to videos of daily actions such as sweeping. In a subsequent test phase, they wat-
ched versions of these videos in which pauses were inserted during the actor’s motion 
(‘interrupting’ videos), or at natural breakpoints in the action stream (‘intact’ videos). 
Infants increased visual attention to the interrupting videos, which was interpreted as 
evidence that they perceived a violation in the expected structure. Additional research 
has shown that, rather than being restricted to highly familiar events, infants can also 
learn the structure of novel, abstract sequences (e.g., the dancing of a starfish) in which 
the only cues for segmentation are the TPs between dynamic events (Stahl et al., 2014). 
Research on the role of statistical structure in action processing has until recently 
focused on segmentation abilities via reactive measures of learning. The current experi-
ment investigated whether toddlers can anticipate upcoming actions or events during 
online learning of sequential actions using their statistical learning skills. Recently, 
Romberg and Saffran (2012) and Tummeltshammer and Kirkham (2013) demonstrated 
that infants can learn to make anticipatory fixations to the location where a visual shape 
will appear following an auditory or visual cue. Although this work suggests that infants 
can learn visual spatiotemporal relations and predict upcoming locations, it is unknown 
whether they can anticipate an action or visual event independently of its location. In 
the current study, toddlers could not simply learn object-location or audiovisual as-
sociations, but needed to learn the predictable transitions between successive actions 
or events to correctly anticipate what would occur next. Though visual SL abilities are 
generally considered to be domain-general (e.g., Kirkham et al., 2002), prior research 
has also shown that SL is subject to some constraints and facilitative effects depending 
on the nature and complexity of the observed input (e.g., Krogh, Vlach, & Johnson, 
2013). In the current study, we hypothesized that toddlers would more readily learn 
statistical structure contained within observed action sequences relative to (non-
action) ghost sequences. In addition to general perceptual and attentional processes, 
perceiving human action engages unique cognitive mechanisms (Schubotz, 2007) that 
may extend to how statistical regularities in action sequences are learned, as we discuss 
in the following section. 
Relations between action prediction and execution in development
A growing body of evidence suggests that action prediction is constrained by infants’ 
developing action repertoire. The ability to predict action outcomes relates to deve-
loping motor capabilities or experiences (Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Kanakogi 
& Itakura, 2011; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010; Stapel, Hunnius, Meyer, & Bekkering, 
2016). These developmental findings are consistent with embodied accounts of action 
observation, which propose that action prediction arises from activated representati-
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ons in the observer’s own motor system (Adams et al., 2013; Elsner, D’Ausilio, Grede-
bäck, Falck-Ytter, & Fadiga, 2013; Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). 
According to these embodied accounts, observing actions engages the observer’s 
own motor system and provides an additive learning benefit beyond other forms of 
observational learning.  
The ‘ghost display’ method is a technique for isolating the unique role of action, relative 
to other visual information (coined by Fawcett, Skinner, & Goldsmith, 2002). In ghost 
displays, objects move on their own without an agent performing motor acts, thus 
preserving critical components of the events such as motion and object cues without 
the action cue provided by a hand or person (for a review, see Hopper, 2010). Young 
children are more successful at learning and imitating when observing actions compa-
red to ghost displays (Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2015; Thompson & Russell, 
2004). In the current experiment, we adopted the ghost-display method to examine 
whether action observation uniquely facilitates prediction of sequential actions. 
Actions and their effects
Actions result in sensory consequences, such as the sound of a whistle when we blow 
it. According to the action-effect principle (Prinz, 1997), action effects are central to 
action prediction and planning (Elsner et al., 2002). Empirical evidence has shown that 
effects influence infants’ processing of observed actions and their goals (Jovanovic et 
al., 2007). Twelve-month-olds, for instance, will imitate an action followed by an effect 
more frequently than other observed actions (Klein et al., 2006), particularly when they 
observe an agent cause the effect relative to a non-social animation that precedes the 
same effect (Danish & Russell, 2007). This suggests that toddlers may be more likely to 
make predictions via exposure to statistical regularities particularly in the case when an 
agent produces an action with a sensory effect. We test this hypothesis by manipulating 
whether or not deterministic pairs result in an action-effect within each condition 
(Agent and Ghost).
In a recent study, two-year-olds observed probabilistic relations between actions and 
effects and subsequently performed only the actions that were more likely to produce 
the effect (Meltzoff, Waismeyer, & Gopnik, 2012). The authors explicitly demonstrated 
the actions in isolated sequences in a live setting and encouraged toddlers to try to 
reproduce the effect. In everyday situations, learning opportunities are not always 
so explicit and sometimes action outcomes are not necessarily very salient. Would 
young children similarly reproduce action contingencies implicitly embedded within 
continuous sequences? Here, we investigated toddler’s action reproduction following 
implicit learning as an additional exploratory measure in the current experiment. 
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The current study 
Our central question was whether toddlers spontaneously exploit statistical informa-
tion in continuous action sequences to predict upcoming actions. We focused on 
three central components of action processing: (a) the role of observing actions vs. 
visual events (Agent and Ghost conditions; between-subjects), (b) the influence of 
action effects vs. lack of effects (Effect and No-effect pairs; within-subjects), and (c) the 
correlation between predictive behaviors during observation and subsequent action 
production. For (a) and (b), we measured predictive gaze during learning using an an-
ticipatory fixation paradigm, a well-established measure of visual predictions (Hunnius 
& Bekkering, 2010; Romberg & Saffran, 2013; Tummeltshammer & Kirkham, 2013). For 
(c), we analyzed the action sequences that toddlers produced post-observation and 
correlated these with their predictive looking during learning. 
Methods
Participants
Eighty-six toddlers participated in this study. Twenty-seven toddlers were excluded due 
to insufficient gaze data (see Analysis), excessive fussiness or failure of the eye-tracker. 
Fifty-nine toddlers remained in the final sample (mean age = 19.1 months, range: 18.5-
20.5 months, SD = .82, 23 females): 31 in the Agent and 28 in the Ghost condition. Writ-
ten consent was acquired from all parents, and families received a small gift or 10 Euros 
for participation. Participants were recruited from a database of families that reflects 
the demographics of the surrounding region (primarily Caucasian and middle-class).
Stimuli 
Toddlers observed a full-screen (1280x1024 pixels) film of a sequence featuring a multi-
object toy. This toy contained six unique objects, with distinct manual affordances, and 
a central star-shaped light (Figure 2-1a). Movies were filmed with a Sony HandyCam 
video camera and edited using Adobe Premiere Pro Cs5 software. The same toy was 
presented to toddlers during play sessions.
Eye movements were recorded using a Tobii T60 eye-tracker (Tobii, Stockholm, Swe-
den) with a 17” monitor (distance from screen: 63cm; visual angle: 148.9°). Stimuli were 
presented with Tobii ClearView AVI presentation software and sounds were played 
through external speakers.
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Figure 2-1. A: Selected frames illustrating each action in the Agent condition; B: Schematic illus-
trating the sequence structure. Gray rectangles below the objects depict the timeline; the action-
effect overlapped in time with the second action of the Effect pair. Pairs and random events could 
be followed by any of the six possible events. TP = transitional probability.
Sequence
We created four pseudo-randomized sequences of 96 individual events using the pro-
gram Mix (van Casteren & Davis, 2006). These sequences contained two deterministic 
pairs (TP = 1.0). The remaining sequence events occurred randomly (TP = .167 or 1/6; 
Figure 2-1b). For clarity, we will refer to the second events of the deterministic pairs as 
targets, as these were the events that became predictable as the sequence unfolded. 
One deterministic pair caused a central star on the toy to light up (Effect pair), and the 
second pair had no effect (No-effect pair). The effect occurred at a natural mid-point of 
the target action or event. For example, during open, the light turned on the moment 
the yellow door was fully open and turned off after it closed. The objects corresponding 
to Effect and No-effect pairs were counterbalanced across toddlers.
Importantly, both targets could also occur at random elsewhere in the sequence (Fi-
gure 2-1b). In these instances, the action-effect did not occur. This was to ensure that 
the Effect pair target was not independently associated with the effect. It also allowed 
us to measure whether toddlers made visual predictions to the same target in different 
probabilistic contexts. Additional constraints were imposed such that no single event 
could occur more than three times consecutively. All events occurred 12 times (except 
for targets, which appeared 12 times within pairs and 12 times at random). Thus, par-
ticipants viewed 24 deterministic pairs (12 each of Effect and No-effect pairs) and 48 
random unpaired events in the total sequence of 96 individual events.
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Sequences were divided into four blocks, with the viewing orientation rotated during 
each block to ensure that the toddler could not predict the next action or event from 
its location on the screen. Each block lasted approximately 90s and consisted of 24 
events. Brief animations were presented in the center of the screen between blocks to 
engage and maintain attention. At the beginning of a block, a still frame was presented 
(4s) to allow toddlers to reorient to the new perspective. Engaging music was played 
throughout the films, which did not correspond in any way to the unfolding action 
sequence.
Agent Condition
In the Agent condition, an actor manipulated the objects on the toy in a continuous 
sequence. For each action, the actor’s hand entered the screen near the goal object 
(thus immediately cueing which object was to be acted on), performed the action, 
and exited the screen again (3s). Between actions, the hand was off-screen and only 
the toy was visible (1s). The timing of the actions was controlled such that the flow of 
movement appeared natural and continuous. 
Figure 2-2. Example frames illustrating the predictive time window; arrows indicate the frames in 
which the agent’s hand appears or disappears (Agent condition, top) and in which the spotlight 
focuses on the moving object (Ghost condition; bottom).
Ghost Condition
In the Ghost condition, the objects appeared to move on their own with a spotlight 
that focused on the current event (Figure 2-2; bottom). The spotlight gradually illumi-
nated each object before the object began to move and then faded again after the 
object finished moving. Between ghost events, there was always a period in which it 
was ambiguous where the spotlight would next begin to appear— and thus which 
object would subsequently move—to match the period in which the actor’s hand 
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was off-screen in the Agent condition. Like the hand, the spotlight also cued which 
object would move next. Neither the hand nor the spotlight moved across the screen 
between events but rather faded (spotlight) or left the screen (hand) in the same place. 
The spotlight was intended to match the saliency of the hand in the Agent condition 
as closely as possible, though there naturally remained perceptual differences between 
the two displays. Care was taken to ensure that its intensity and focus was equal for 
each object. Importantly, the statistical structure, order and timing of events were 
identical in both conditions.
Procedure 
Toddlers were seated on their parent’s lap throughout all phases of the experiment. 
First, toddlers were familiarized with the toy and allowed to explore it for one minute. 
The initial orientation of the toy relative to the child was counterbalanced between 
participants. Parents were asked not to influence their child’s behavior throughout the 
testing session.
Caregivers and toddlers then moved to a chair approximately 63cm from the Tobii pre-
sentation screen. A nine-point calibration sequence was repeated until valid calibration 
data was acquired for at least eight calibration points. Following calibration, toddlers 
were shown the stimulus sequence until the presentation ended or the child became 
too fussy to continue the experiment. Caregivers were instructed to look aside during 
the calibration phase and not to influence their child throughout the session.
After the stimulus presentation, toddlers and caregivers returned to the table for a ‘play’ 
session in which the toddler could freely engage with the toy for two minutes or until 
they lost interest. The experimenter sat opposite them and pressed a hidden button to 
activate the light if the toddler performed the Effect pair, taking care to remain neutral. 
A camera facing the toddler recorded this session and behavior was later coded offline.
Eye Movement Data Processing
To ensure sufficient exposure to learn the sequences, we required individual fixation 
time across the entire experiment to be greater than one SD below the mean in each 
condition for inclusion in analysis. This resulted in the exclusion of 8 toddlers in the 
Agent condition and 10 in the Ghost condition (as noted in the Participants section). 
These participants yielded gaze data for less than 15% of the demonstration (mean 
looking times = 50.05s, SD = 34.10), corresponding to an average of 1.8 observations of 
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each deterministic pair (i.e., less than one instance, on average, to demonstrate learning 
following the first exposure to the deterministic pair). Toddlers with looking times gre-
ater than one SD below the mean were included in analyses. 
Eye movement data was exported from Tobii ClearView analysis software and separa-
ted into discrete fixations using a custom software program with a temporal filter of 
100ms and a spatial filter of 30 pixels. Fixation data was imported into Matlab for further 
analysis. Regions of interest (ROI) were defined around each object (250 x 250 pixels), 
and a smaller ROI (130 x 130 pixels) was defined around the light due to its smaller size 
relative to the objects. 
For the Agent condition, a fixation was considered predictive if it occurred in the time 
window from the moment the agent’s hand appeared to perform the first action of 
a pair (entering the screen closest to the corresponding object and thus cueing the 
upcoming action) until the frame before it reappeared to perform the second action 
(Figure 2-2). This corresponds to the time in which the observer had enough infor-
mation to predict the subsequent action before it occurred. For the Ghost condition, 
this time window was defined as from the first frame in which the spotlight began to 
highlight the first moving object (i.e., event) until the frame before it shifted to focus on 
the second moving object of a pair. Predictive time windows in both conditions were 
identical in length. 
Results
To assess potential lower-level differences in visual attention between conditions, we 
first compared total looking times and number of predictive fixations made between 
conditions. Looking times did not differ between conditions, t(56) = 1.47, p = .15. Tod-
dlers watched the stimulus videos for approximately 186.14 seconds (SD = 54.22) in 
the Agent condition and 165.01 seconds (SD = 55.41) in the Ghost condition. Toddlers 
in the two conditions did not differ in the average number of actions or events they 
watched, t(57) = 1.11, p = .27 (MAgent = 92.16 actions, SD = 12.26, MGhost = 87.96 events, SD 
= 16.67). There were no differences in the number of predictive fixations toddlers made 
throughout the experiment, t(57) = 1.57, p = .12 (MAgent = 307.65, SD = 103.08, MGhost = 
266.36, SD = 98.71), indicating that toddlers in one condition were not biased towards 
making more fixations during predictive time windows than in the other condition.
Learning over Trials
If toddlers learned the pair structure, we expected that predictive gaze fixations to 
the target object of each pair (labeled Correct predictions) would increase over trials 
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as they repeatedly observed the deterministic relation between the two events of 
each pair. Proportions of correct fixations to target objects were calculated out of the 
total fixations to all ROIs, always excluding the object of the current action or event. 
Fixations to the light effect were considered correct predictions for the Effect pair and 
were included in the total fixations count (i.e., the denominator) for the Effect pair only 
(Equation 1). Fixation proportions for the No-Effect pair never included looks to the 
light effect (Equation 2). 
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The 12 trials from each pair (Effect and No-effect) were collapsed into three time bins, 
with four trials in each bin. As an additional measure, we examined Correct predictions 
that excluded looks to the light effect for both pairs (Equation 2) to assess whether the 
pattern was similar when only assessing fixations to the target objects. 
Proportions of correct predictions for each pair (Equation 1 for the Effect pair; Equation 
2 for the No-effect pair) were entered into a linear, model-based Generalized Estima-
ting Equation (GEE) with an unstructured Working Correlation Matrix. GEEs are ideal 
to measure change over time for factors that are missing data for some entries (i.e., 
not all infants had data points for both pairs for each time bin; the number of missing 
data points did not differ between conditions in any time bin, ps > .37; Zeger, Liang, & 
Albert, 1988). Pair and Time Bin were entered as within-subjects repeated measures and 
Condition was a between-subjects measure. Findings revealed significant main effects 
of Condition, χ2(1) = 22.40, p < .001, Time Bin, χ2(2) = 10.66, p = .005, and Pair, χ2 (1) = 
16.99, p < .001, a significant interaction between Condition and Time Bin, χ2(2) = 11.52, 
p = .003, and no other interactions (ps > .43).
Pairwise comparisons were conducted to probe the Condition by Time Bin interaction 
(Bonferroni-corrected critical p = .008, given the comparison between conditions for 
each time period [3] and comparisons between time points within each condition [2]). 
These revealed an upward learning curve in the Agent condition (Figure 2-3), such 
that the proportion of correct fixations increased from the first to the last bin (mean 
difference = .15 [SEM = .03], p < .001). No such increase in correct fixations occurred in 
2 Note that the interaction between Condition and Pair was not statistically significant in our first analy-
sis (Correct vs. Incorrect). This is likely due to the fact that the first analysis included both correct and 
incorrect fixations, whereas the Learning over Trials analysis examines correct fixations only.
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the Ghost condition (ps > .81). The two conditions did not differ from one another in 
the first time bin (mean difference = -.01 [SEM = .03], p = .75). A significant difference 
emerged for the middle (mean difference = .10 [SEM = .03], p = .002) and last time bin 
(mean difference = .15 [SEM = .03], p < .001).
Figure 2-3. Toddlers’ correct proportion scores (Equations 1-2) across pairs as a function of time. 
Bars represent standard errors.
A secondary analysis was conducted excluding looks to the light effect for the Effect 
pair (Equation 2 for both pairs) which revealed a similar pattern: there were no differen-
ces between conditions during the first time bin (p = .36) but a significant difference 
emerged during the third time bin (p = .001).
Predicting target objects: correct vs. incorrect 
If toddlers’ learned to predict upcoming sequence events, we expected them to look 
more to target objects than to the remaining objects during the first action of each 
pair. Incorrect proportions were defined as the average number of fixations to the four 
remaining objects, excluding the object of the current or upcoming event, out of the 
total number of fixations (Equations 3-4). Comparing correct and incorrect proportions 
measured toddlers’ preference for looking toward the correct target object, relative to 
other objects, before an object was acted upon. 
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preference for looking toward the correct target object, relative to other objects, before an 
object was acted upon.  
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𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂= # 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒 4 𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙/4𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 #𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙     ( 4 ) 
An ANOVA with Prediction (Correct, Incorrect) and Pair (Effect, No-effect) as 
within-subjects factors and Condition (Agent, Ghost) as a between-subjects factor revealed 
significant main effects of Pair, F(1,54) = 8.08, p = .006, µp2 = .13, and Condition, F(1,54) = 
5.95, p = .018, µp2 = .09, and a significant Condition by Prediction interaction, F(1,54) = 
98.50, p = .018, µp2 = .10. Planned comparisons to follow up on this interaction effect 
(Bonferroni-corrected critical p-value of .025) revealed that Correct proportions were 
significantly greater than Incorrect proportions for toddlers in the Agent conditions (p = .003) 
whereas there was no difference for toddlers in the Ghost condition (p = .63; see Table 2-1; 
Figure 2-4, left).   
As before, we performed secondary analyses in which we excluded the light effect in 
calculations for the Effect pair to more evenly match comparisons made between the two 
pairs (Equations 2 and 4 for both pairs). The same patterns emerged, with a significant 
interaction between Condition (Agent, Ghost) and Prediction F(1,54) = 9.00, p = .004, ηp2 = 
.14.  
Table 2-1. 
Main dependent measures separated by condition. 
      Agent   Ghost 
 DV Pair  Factor Mean SD   Mean SD 
Correct vs. Incorrect 
EffectObject + Light CorrectObject + Light 0.31* 0.19   0.24* 0.14 
 IncorrectObject + Light 0.17 0.05  0.19 0.03 
No-effect Correct 0.22* 0.22  0.13* 0.14 
  Incorrect 0.19 0.05   0.22 0.03 
EffectObject  CorrectObject 0.20* 0.16  0.11* 0.09 
 IncorrectObject 0.20 0.04  0.22 0.02 
 ( 3 ) 
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EffectObject  CorrectObject 0.20* 0.16  0.11* 0.09 
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An ANOVA with Prediction (Correct, Incorrect) and Pair (Effect, No-effect) as within-
subjects factors and Condition (Agent, Ghost) as a between-subjects factor revealed 
significant main effects of Pair, F(1,54) = 8.08, p = .006, µp2 = .13, and Condition, F(1,54) 
= 5.95, p = .018, µp2 = .09, and a significant Condition by Prediction interaction, F(1,54) 
= 98.50, p = .018, µp2 = .10. Planned comparisons to follow up on this interaction effect 
(Bonferroni-corrected critical p-value of .025) revealed that Correct proportions were 
significantly greater than Incorrect proportions for toddlers in the Agent conditions (p = 
.003) whereas there was no difference for toddlers in the Ghost condition (p = .63; see 
Table 2-1; Figure 2-4, left).  
As before, we performed secondary analyses in which we excluded the light effect in calcu-
lations for the Effect pair to more evenly match comparisons made between the two pairs 
(Equations 2 and 4 for both pairs). The same patterns emerged, with a significant interaction 
between Condition (Agent, Ghost) and Prediction F(1,54) = 9.00, p = .004, ηp2 = .14. 
Table 2-1. Main dependent measures separated by condition.
      Agent   Ghost
 DV Pair  Factor Mean SD   Mean SD
Correct vs. Incorrect EffectObject + Light CorrectObject + Light 0.31* 0.19   0.24* 0.14
IncorrectObject + Light 0.17 0.05 0.19 0.03
No-effect Correct 0.22* 0.22 0.13* 0.14
  Incorrect 0.19 0.05   0.22 0.03
EffectObject CorrectObject 0.20* 0.16 0.11* 0.09
IncorrectObject 0.20 0.04 0.22 0.02
Deterministic vs. Random Effect Deterministic trials 0.20*  0.16 0.11* 0.09
Random trials 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.11
No-effect Deterministic trials 0.22* 0.22 0.13* 0.14
  Random trials 0.12 0.10   0.12 0.16
Action Performance Effect # pairs performed 0.73 0.87 0.50 0.61
No-effect # pairs performed 0.42 0.64   0.40 0.68
Total # actions performed 25.19 14.71 21.65 7.04
Note. *p < .025 (difference between Agent and Ghost conditions). Fewer participants contributed action per-
formance data, as some toddlers became too fussy to complete the play session following action observation.
Learning statistical context: deterministic vs. random transitions
Targets occurred both within deterministic pairs and at random outside of these pairs 
(see Methods). For example, open occurred within a deterministic transition and was 
100% predictable after bend had occurred. Open also occurred after other events, 
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but featured low predictability (16.7%) at the onset of these (e.g., slide, push, open, or 
spin). We defined random transitions as the events that preceded the targets when 
they occurred randomly (Equation 6) outside of their corresponding deterministic 
pair (i.e., a measure of ‘chance’, as defined in Tummeltshammer & Kirkham, 2013). We 
discarded trials in which the same action repeated itself (for example: push followed 
by push) as it was impossible to determine whether fixations during these trials were 
anticipations or the toddlers simply not moving their eyes. Analyzing the difference 
between deterministic (Equation 5; same as Correct, Equation 2) and random (Equation 
6) transitions enabled us to compare fixations to the same target objects in different 
statistical contexts. In these analyses, looks to the light effect were excluded entirely.
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(see Methods). For example, open occurred within a deterministic transition and was 100% 
predictable after bend had occurred. Open also occurred after other events, but featured low 
predictability (16.7%) at the onset of these (e.g., slide, push, open, or spin). We defined 
random transitions as the events that preceded the targets when they occurred randomly 
(Equation 6) outside of their corresponding deterministic pair (i.e., a measure of ‘chance’, as 
defined in Tummeltshammer & Kirkham, 2013). We discarded trials in which the same 
action repeated itself (for example: push followed by push) as it was impossible to determine 
wheth r fixations during thes  trials were a ticipations or the toddlers simply not moving 
their eyes. Analyzing the difference between deterministic (Equation 5; same as Correct, 
Equation 2) and random (Equation 6) transitions enabled us to compare fixations to the same 
target objects i  different statistical contexts. In thes  analyses, looks to the light ffect were 
excluded entirely. 
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𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   ( 6 ) 
An ANOVA with Transition (Deterministic, Random) and Pair (Effect, No-effect) as 
within-subject factors and Condition (Agent, Ghost) as a between-subjects factor revealed a 
marginally significant main effect of Transition, F(1,47) = 4.06, p = .05 p2 = .08) and a 
 ( 5 )
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𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   ( 6 ) 
An ANOVA with Transition (Deterministic, Random) and Pair (Effect, No-effect) as 
within-subject factors and Condition (Agent, Ghost) as a between-subjects factor revealed a 
marginally significant main effect of Transition, F(1,47) = 4.06, p = .05 p2 = .08) and a 
 ( 6 )
An ANOVA with Transition (Deterministic, Random) and Pair (Effect, No-effect) as within-
subject factors and ondition (Agent, Ghost) as a b t -s j ts f t r r v l  a 
marginally significant main effect of Transition, F(1,47) = 4.06, p = .05, p2 = .08) and 
a marginally sign ficant Co dition by T i  interaction, F(1,47) = 3.65,  6, p2 
= .07 (Figure 2-4, right). Planned comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected critical p-value 
calculated as .025) revealed that more correct predictive fixations were made during 
the deterministic than random transitions in the Agent condition (p = .006; see Table 
2-1). No such pattern was seen in the Ghost condition (p = .94).
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Figure 2-4. Proportions of predictive fixations during action observation. Left: correct vs. incorrect 
(Equations 1-4, including the light in proportion scores for the Effect pair). Right: deterministic vs. 
random transitions (Equations 5-6). Bars represent standard errors. *p < .025, †p = .06
Behavior Coding
Behavior during the familiarization phase and during the first two minutes of the play 
session following the video session was coded for any instance in which the child made 
physical contact with one of the objects on the stimulus. A success was noted whenever 
the toddler made contact with an object and completed the action before removing 
his or her hand or visibly pausing (e.g., opening and closing the yellow door). An at-
tempt was noted any time the child made contact with an object and completed part 
of the action before removing his or her hand or made an overt effort to manipulate 
an object in some way without success (e.g., opening the yellow door, but leaving it 
open). If the child only placed his or her hand on an object without attending to it or at-
tempting to manipulate it (i.e., no attempt to perform an ‘action’), these instances were 
considered invalid and were excluded from analyses. We counted the number of Effect 
and No-effect pairs that each toddler reproduced and the total number of actions they 
produced during the familiarization and post-observation phases. Fifty percent of the 
total participants were coded by a second coder. There was strong agreement between 
the two coders, Cohen’s κ = .729, p < .001.
During the post-observation play session, 51% of the toddlers in this study performed 
at least one of the deterministic action pairs (Table 2-1). Toddlers in the Agent condition 
were not simply more active than in the Ghost condition overall: the total number of 
actions performed (the sum of successes and attempts) did not differ between conditi-
ons, t(44) = .99, p = .33. There were no differences between conditions in the frequency 
of performing either pair (Effect pair: t(44) = 1.01, p = .32; No-effect pair: t(44) = .12, p 
= .91). Across conditions, there were no differences in the number of times toddlers 
produced the Effect and No-effect pairs, t(45) = 1.40, p = .17, r = -.09. 
Correlations between the proportions of correct fixations and the number of action 
pairs that toddlers produced were conducted separately for Effect and No-effect pairs. 
For the Effect pair, correct predictive fixations (Equation 1) were correlated with action 
performance in the Agent condition (r = .37, N = 26, p = .03, one-tailed). This relation 
was not significant for toddlers in the Ghost condition (r = .17, N = 20, p = .20). There 
was no significant difference between these two correlations, however (Fisher r-to-z 
transformation, Z = .68, p = .25; Kenny, 1989). For the No-effect pair, there were no 
significant correlations between gaze behavior (Equation 3) and action performance in 
either condition (ps > .30). 
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To assess the possibility that toddlers who were better at detecting the sequence re-
gularities were simply more active to begin with, we assessed toddlers’ baseline activity 
during the familiarization phase prior to action observation. Baseline activity (defined 
as the mean number of actions performed per minute) did not correlate toddlers’ pro-
portions of correct fixations for either the Effect pair (including or excluding the effect) 
or the No-effect pair (ps > .62). 
Discussion
In a novel eye-tracking paradigm, we investigated the role of statistical learning in 
action prediction and performance in young toddlers. Previous research has shown 
that statistical learning extends into the action domain and facilitates segmentation 
of actions into meaningful subunits. Here, we examined whether toddlers correctly 
predicted upcoming events of an action or ghost event sequence via observation of 
deterministic transitional probabilities between sequential events. 
We evaluated three related measures of statistical learning that targeted different 
underlying questions regarding toddlers’ improvement over trials and their overall 
predictive looking performance. All three measures demonstrated a similar pattern of 
results, with toddlers in the Agent condition demonstrating learning of the statistical 
structure in the sequence whereas those in the Ghost condition did not. Specifically, 
we found that only toddlers in the Agent condition showed a linear increase in their 
correct predictions for deterministic pairs over the course of the experiment. These 
toddlers also anticipated correct locations more frequently than incorrect locations 
during deterministic pairs, and made a greater rate of anticipatory fixations to target 
objects during deterministic trials than random trials. Toddlers in the Ghost condition, 
in contrast, did not differentiate between correct and incorrect locations and did 
not look to target objects more during deterministic transitions than during random 
transitions. Finally, for toddlers in the Agent condition, rates of correct predictions also 
correlated with their own spontaneous action performance following action observa-
tion. Our findings thus provide new evidence that on-line statistical learning directly 
contributes to predictive gaze behaviors during toddlers’ observation of continuous 
action sequences.
Learning from observing an agent’s actions vs. visual events
Toddlers who observed an actor were more accurate in predicting actions compared to 
those who observed a ghost sequence, despite being exposed to identical sequential 
information and demonstrating similar visual attention. This finding complements pre-
vious developmental work concerning the relative importance of agentive cues when 
Toddlers’ action prediction: statistical learning of continuous action sequences 41
young children are initially forming representations about objects and events in their 
environments (Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010). Hopper and colleagues showed 
that, for preschool children, learning to use a complex tool via observation was less 
effective in a ghost condition during which a tool’s function was observed without 
any human action, compared with a condition in which a person demonstrated the 
actions with a tool. These authors posited that, when a task is novel and challenging, 
young children need to watch an agent performing all the steps in an action sequence 
in order to imitate the entire behavior. Our results extend this notion by showing that 
observing an actor facilitates toddlers’ abilities to use their statistical learning skills for 
action prediction. 
Social cues help infants notice statistical properties of objects in noisy visual scenes 
(Wu, Gopnik, Richardson, & Kirkham, 2011). With limited attention and cognitive re-
sources, social cues likely serve as an adaptive filter to help toddlers and infants select 
relevant information from the environment. Although general attention to the displays 
did not differ between conditions, it is possible that the presence of a social agent, as 
depicted by the hand, selectively directed anticipatory attention toward the sequential 
patterns in the ongoing actions. 
The reason why cues such as hands and faces selectively guide infants’ attention is 
an open question. In our paradigm, there were no pedagogical, facial, or other bodily 
cues present; observation of the actor’s hand alone drove the effect observed between 
conditions. One possible explanation for this effect echoes current embodied accounts 
of the unique role of the motor system during action observation (Hunnius & Bekke-
ring, 2014; Woodward & Gerson, 2014). Infants become better at predicting actions as 
they acquire motor experience with the observed movements, suggesting that motor 
activity during observation facilitates their predictions (Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Stapel 
et al., 2016). Compelling evidence from adult research has shown that motor activation 
is causally related to action prediction (Elsner et al., 2013) and similar evidence has been 
found in infancy (Marshall, Young, & Meltzoff, 2011; van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, 
& Bekkering, 2008). Our findings are consistent with the idea that the motor system 
facilitates action predictions during observation. Though we did not directly test motor 
activity here, it is a theoretically grounded possibility that we are currently pursuing in 
follow-up studies.
An alternative explanation for the different patterns found in the Agent versus Ghost 
conditions relies on low-level perceptual accounts. For example, the toddlers need 
not represent anything about actions or agents if the saliency of the events differed 
between conditions as a function of the use of a hand versus a spotlight. Although 
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we accounted for looking time and number of fixations, it is possible that some uni-
dentifiable difference in saliency existed between conditions. If this were the case, 
however, we would not expect a relation between action prediction and reproduction 
specifically for the Agent condition. 
Learning in infancy: structure-detecting skills
Several learning mechanisms have been identified that may contribute to cognitive de-
velopment in complementary ways. Researchers have, for instance, provided empirical 
and conceptual evidence for accounts of causal (e.g., Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 
2001), associative (e.g., Ray & Heyes, 2011), and statistical learning (e.g., Kirkham et al., 
2002). In our experiment, we referred to the learning mechanism taking place as statis-
tical learning, mainly because the information that we manipulated in our experiment 
was statistical in nature. We consider these learning mechanisms to be components 
of the same set of general structure-detecting skills. Our focus here was to provide 
evidence for how prediction can arise from the statistics contained in action sequences, 
and in particular, how action processing may differ from general visual processing. 
Despite providing evidence for learning, we found that toddlers’ proportion scores were 
generally low and did not exceed 30% except in the Agent condition on later trials. One 
reason for this is likely due to the fact that, unlike previous studies, we only examined 
toddlers’ anticipatory (rather than reactive) looks to upcoming targets. In a recent 
experiment investigating spatiotemporal learning in 8-month-olds, approximately 35% 
of infants’ gaze fixations were anticipatory, whereas the remaining 65% were reactive 
(Tummeltshammer & Kirkham, 2013). For more complex stimuli (i.e., multiple objects 
presented simultaneously to which infants must distribute their visual attention), up 
to 95% of infants’ fixations were reactive rather than predictive (Tummeltshammer, Po-
miechowska, Gliga & Kirkham, 2015). In the current study, we introduced the additional 
demands of tracking statistical relations between actions and events without spatial 
information to help guide predictions. We found that toddlers can make anticipatory 
eye movements for these complex sequences when they observed the Agent condi-
tion, but not the Ghost condition. 
The influence of action-effects on learning
Interestingly, our findings revealed no significant interactions between toddlers’ correct 
anticipations and the presence of the action-effect (i.e., Effect vs. No-effect pairs), and 
the pattern of results were similar when the action-effect was removed from analyses. 
This suggests that the evidence for learning statistical regularities did not depend on 
whether the paired actions caused an effect. Rather, those toddlers who learned the 
associations between observed actions did not need to rely on other supportive cues 
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(consistent with Waismeyer et al., 2015). The light effect’s distal relation to its associated 
action may have even hindered learning the action-effect association, although the 
finding that more toddlers selectively reproduced the Effect pair speaks against this 
possibility. 
A separate question raised by this research is whether the transitions between the 
actions and their effects are encoded qualitatively differently from the transitions 
between actions. The most immediate sensory consequence of an action or an event is 
the change in the environment directly caused by the action itself, such as the opening 
of the door in our experiment. These could be considered proximal action-effects, and 
the light effect a more distal effect or a separate goal-related outcome altogether. 
We did not specifically address these questions in our analyses, but they represent an 
interesting direction to pursue in follow-up studies. 
Action performance
The relationship between how toddlers perceive actions and their own emerging 
action capabilities is an important developmental phenomenon. Our findings indicate 
a relation between uninstructed learning from observation and spontaneous action 
performance that was not due to a priori differences in toddlers’ motor behavior. For the 
toddlers who observed a human actor, those who were better at predicting the second 
action of the action-effect pair were also more likely to integrate what they learned 
into their own behavior by performing this pair more frequently themselves. Given the 
intentional lack of any instructional or pedagogical cue in the current research, it is re-
markable that there was an immediate transfer between observation and reproduction 
on such a brief timescale. Some insight into the underlying mechanism comes from 
the reinforcement learning literature, which has shown that transitional probabilities 
can be learned in the absence of any outcomes, but only manifests in behavior when 
action choices lead to a reward (Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, & O ’doherty, 2010). Possibly, the 
action-effect was interpreted as a rewarding outcome that enabled or motivated some 
toddlers to reproduce it. There was no correlation between predictions and action per-
formance for the pair that did not cause an effect, nor when toddlers did not observe 
a human actor. 
For the toddlers who did not reproduce any action pairs, exploration may have simply 
been more interesting than activating the light or imitating the observed sequence. 
Exploration is a critical developmental behavior that allows discovery of new environ-
mental features (Hopper et al., 2010). Though important in certain contexts, adult in-
struction causes children to limit their exploratory play in order to focus on performing 
target actions (Bonawitz et al., 2011). The toddlers who did reproduce effect pairs may 
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have interpreted the agent’s demonstration as an instructional cue, and constrained 
their behavior to those actions more likely to cause a salient outcome (e.g., Bushnell & 
Boudreau, 1998). 
Conclusion
Our findings provide evidence that toddlers use their statistical learning skills to learn 
the structure in observed action sequences and make predictions about upcoming 
actions. Making accurate predictions depended on whether they observed an agent or 
a ghost sequence, providing further support for the unique role of observing human 
agents on toddlers’ action processing. Further, we found evidence for a correlation 
between observational learning and action production, which was constrained by both 
action cues and action effects. In sum, our study shows that statistical regularities in ob-
served action sequences are a powerful learning opportunity for toddlers and support 
the developing ability to generate predictions about future actions. From observing 
their parents preparing a meal and knowing what the outcome will be, to acquiring the 
ability to perform increasingly complex action sequences themselves, young children 
make use of diverse statistical and social information in order to understand and predict 
the structure underlying human actions.
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Abstract
Humans are sensitive to the statistical regularities in action sequences carried out by 
others. In the current eye-tracking study, we investigated whether this sensitivity can 
support prediction of upcoming actions when observing unfamiliar action sequences. 
In two between-subjects conditions, we examined whether observers would be more 
sensitive to statistical regularities in sequences performed by a human agent vs. self-
propelled ‘ghost’ events. Secondly, we investigated whether regularities are better 
learned when associated with contingent effects. Both implicit and explicit measures 
of learning were compared between agent and ghost conditions. Implicit learning was 
measured via predictive eye movements to upcoming actions or events, and explicit 
learning was measured via uninstructed reproduction of action sequences and verbal 
reports of the regularities. Findings revealed that participants, regardless of condition, 
readily learned the regularities and made correct predictive eye movements to upco-
ming events during online observation.  However, different patterns in explicit learning 
outcomes emerged following observation: participants were most likely to recreate the 
sequence regularities and to verbally report them when they observed an actor create 
a contingent effect. These results suggest that the shift from implicit predictions to 
explicit knowledge of what has been learned is facilitated when observers perceive 
another agent’s actions and when these actions cause effects. Findings are discussed 
with respect to the potential role of the motor system in modulating how statistical 
regularities are learned and used to modify behavior.
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Introduction
Predicting the behavior of other people is central to social cognition and interaction. 
As we observe others, we automatically predict the unfolding movements and future 
course of their actions (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). In everyday life, many of the 
actions we observe are embedded within continuous, temporal sequences. Imagine 
the act of baking a cake: this action is comprised of a continuous stream of individual 
action steps such as gathering ingredients, measuring them into bowls, mixing things 
together, pouring batter into a tin, and so forth. The ability to anticipate the upcoming 
events in a sequence is an indicator that the observer possesses some knowledge of 
the overarching structure of the global action and the relations between the individual 
steps. Perceiving the boundaries of the distinct elements in a sequence and anticipating 
what follows is crucial for our cognitive system to perceive the overarching activity as 
coherent and meaningful (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). In the current study, we investigated 
whether statistical regularities in novel, unfamiliar sequences support the ability to 
generate predictions of future events during observation. Specifically, we investigated 
whether observers make anticipatory gaze fixations to upcoming action events based 
on their transitional probabilities alone, and whether they recreate learned regularities 
in their own action performance following observation. 
Statistical learning in the domain of action
Statistical learning (SL) refers to the ability to detect regularities from structured input 
and operates across sensory domains (Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Krogh et al., 2013). 
From early in life, humans are sensitive to multiple sources of statistical information 
in visual and auditory stimuli (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport, 1999). Converging 
evidence indicates that SL skills are rapid and automatic, often occurring without 
the learner being consciously aware that he or she has learned anything at all (Turk-
Browne, Scholl, Chun, & Johnson, 2008). This has led to the assumption that SL is a 
domain-general mechanism, with similar underlying computations and outcomes 
across sensory modalities. However, there is also evidence that the outcomes of SL 
are specific to the modality in which the stimuli are learned. For instance, one study 
(Conway & Christiansen, 2006) presented participants with auditory, tactile, and visual 
sequences defined by respective artificial grammars. Findings showed that sensitivity 
to statistical features was specific to each sensory modality, suggesting that SL involves 
“distributed, modality-constrained subsystems” (Conway & Christiansen, 2006; p.911). 
Does sensitivity to statistical regularities extend to the domain of action? If so, does SL 
operate in a domain-general manner across all forms of perceptual events, or are there 
specialized subsystems that might facilitate SL particularly for observed actions? An 
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initial study on action sequence processing by Baldwin and colleagues (2008) demon-
strated that observers can rely on statistical regularities to segment action streams into 
discrete steps, even when transitional probabilities are the only information available 
for identifying action segments. At a group level, participants’ performance on this 
action segmentation task was comparable with performance on similar tasks in the 
language domain. Developmental research has demonstrated similar findings with 
preverbal infants (Roseberry et al., 2011; Saylor et al., 2007; Stahl et al., 2014), showing 
that these segmentation skills emerge early in development. Similarity in performance 
across studies has led researchers to speculate that a common “statistical tracking 
mechanism” (Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008, p. 1404) is shared between 
processing of action and processing of other forms of perceptual stimuli. 
Segmentation reveals whether observers demonstrate sensitivity to the sequence 
structure after learning has occurred. Typical paradigms measure segmentation by the 
ability to remember the items they had observed during a previous learning phase (e.g., 
Baldwin et al., 2008; Saffran et al., 1997). However, current theories of action perception 
claim that continual, automatic prediction of upcoming actions is a central feature of 
action processing (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007a, 2007b). Importantly, predicting the 
outcomes of ongoing actions requires integrating prior knowledge about the most 
likely outcomes of the action with incoming perceptual input. Though active motor 
experiences are one important source of action knowledge (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; 
Libertus & Needham, 2010; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005), motor expe-
rience alone is insufficient to explain the full range of infant and adults’ capabilities for 
learning about actions (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). Statistical learning skills are there-
fore a candidate mechanism for how humans learn and generate predictions about 
upcoming action steps when observing novel, unfamiliar sequences (Ahlheim, Stadler, 
& Schubotz, 2014), though direct evidence for this does not yet exist. As we discuss 
below, we hypothesized that observing human action engages specialized cognitive 
processes that particularly facilitate learning of observed action sequences, relative to 
visual event sequences.
Outcomes of learning: implicit and explicit measures
The outcomes of SL have long been a topic of debate; in particular, discussions focus on 
whether and under what conditions SL results in explicit or implicit learning outcomes 
(Perruchet & Pacton, 2006). Typical findings have shown that SL usually occurs automa-
tically and without conscious intent; people are often unaware of the regularities they 
have learned (e.g., Haider et al., 2014; Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005; Turk-Browne 
et al., 2008). Behavioral indicators of implicit learning are typically revealed in faster 
reaction times (Fiser & Aslin, 2002) or anticipatory eye movements (Marcus, Karatekin, 
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& Markiewicz, 2006) and participants are usually unaware of the subtle changes in their 
own behavior as a result of learning. On the other hand, SL can also result in explicit 
knowledge about what was learned (Bertels, Franco, & Destrebecqz, 2012; Esser & 
Haider, 2017b). Explicit learning is typically measured by recognition or recall which 
requires “conscious, or deliberate, access to memory for previous experiences” (Gomez, 
1997, p. 166). In the current study, we assessed multiple measures of learning to explore 
how the learned information is transferred into behavior. If participants learned the 
statistical regularities, they could in principle predict what would occur next and shift 
their gaze to the next event in the sequence. If implicit knowledge from observation 
can be accessed and used to modify behavior, participants could also reproduce the 
observed regularities and report knowledge about the sequence structure. 
The role of the motor system during action observation
Observing actions engages neural networks that differ from those involved in general 
visual and attention processes (Adams et al., 2013; Ahlheim et al., 2014; Schubotz & von 
Cramon, 2009). For instance, neuroimaging research has revealed the existence of a 
network of sensorimotor brain regions, collectively termed ‘action-observation network’ 
(AON), which are specifically engaged when observing another person’s actions (Gal-
lese & Goldman, 1998; Kilner, 2011). Activity in the AON, also sometimes termed ‘motor 
resonance’ (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) or ‘simulation’ (Blakemore & Decety, 2001), is 
thought to facilitate prediction of observed actions by simulating how one would 
perform the action oneself. Predictive accounts of the motor system propose that we 
employ our own motor system using an internal, feed-forward model to predict the 
behavior of other people we observe (e.g., Kilner et al., 2007b). 
In the context of embodied accounts of action observation, the motor system facilitates 
efficient transformation of visual information into action knowledge in the observer’s 
motor system. Supporting evidence from a separate line of research on observational 
learning shows that observers are consistently better at imitating and learning novel 
tool functions when observing a human actor relative to any other form of visual 
observation (for a review, see Hopper, 2010). These behavioral studies employed the 
use of a so-called ‘ghost display’, a method in which objects appear to move on their 
own with no agent intervention. In the current study, we adopted the ghost-display 
method to test the hypothesis that the learning advantage when observing another 
human, relative to a non-agent ghost display, extends to action predictions based on 
statistical learning. 
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The role of effects in continuous action sequences
Goal-directed actions typically result in perceivable effects, such as the sound of a 
whistle as it is blown. Through repeated observation, these effects become linked 
to the actions that consistently precede them and create ‘bidirectional action-effect 
associations’ (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Prior research suggests that it is the effects of 
actions themselves that people anticipate when planning their own movements (Hom-
mel, 1996). In the field of implicit learning research, action-effects have been shown 
to enhance implicit sequence learning when participants own motor responses result 
in predictable action-effects (e.g., Haider, Eberhardt, Esser, & Rose, 2014). Recent work 
suggests that they may also be particularly important for transferring learning from im-
plicit into explicit awareness (Esser & Haider, 2017a, 2017b). These findings demonstrate 
that action-effect associations likely play a central role in establishing the contextual 
knowledge needed for making action predictions. Though much of this work has inves-
tigated action-effects in sequence learning of motor responses (e.g., using the standard 
serial reaction time task), there is also evidence to suggest that action-effects also guide 
our predictions during observation alone (Paulus, van Dam, Hunnius, Lindemann, & 
Bekkering, 2011).
How do sensory effects influence observers’ sensitivity to statistical regularities when 
they are embedded within continuous sequences, as is the case during daily real-life 
perception? Based on ideomotor theory (James, 1890) and the related action-effect 
principle (Hommel, 1996), observers should be better at learning action contingencies 
when they are paired with an effect even when they do produce the effects themsel-
ves. A matter that has not received much attention, however, is the fact that non-action 
visual events also result in sensory effects, such as a crashing wave. So far, we have 
defined effects as action-effects to be consistent with prior research, but it is possible 
that sensory effects lead to similar bidirectional associations in any form of perceptual 
sequence. In fact, another recent theory (Schubotz, 2007) suggests that prediction of 
sensory effects occurs within our sensorimotor system and can be generalized to any 
form of perceptual event, whether action or not. On the other hand, as we described 
above, evidence for enhanced learning from observing action suggests action-effects 
should be perceived and learned qualitatively differently than the effects of non-action 
perceptual events. In the current study, we manipulated whether statistical regularities 
were paired with an action-effect to investigate the importance of observed effects for 
action predictions. 
The current experiment
The central aim of this study was to investigate whether observers could learn statistical 
regularities within continuous sequences. We compared learning between conditions 
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in which participants observed either an actor or a ghost display (Agent and Ghost 
conditions), and between paired events that did or did not cause an effect (Effect and 
No-effect pairs). Unlike the cake example above, the sequences used in the current 
study were abstract in the sense that they did not lead to a global action goal. This 
was to ensure that predictions could only be based on acquiring knowledge of the se-
quence regularities rather than prior knowledge about the overarching event structure. 
Predictive gaze fixations during observation, post-observation action performance 
and verbal reports were analyzed as complementary measures of implicit and explicit 
learning.
Method
Participants
Fifty university students participated in this study (25 in each condition [Agent and 
Ghost]; 43 females; M = 20.07 years, range = 18-25 years, SD = 2.29). Participants were 
recruited via an online system for students at the university and were awarded course 
credit for participation. Seven participants were excluded from analyses for not mee-
ting the inclusion requirements for total looking time (see Analysis section), resulting 
in 43 participants in the final sample (23 in the Agent condition and 20 in the Ghost 
condition). 
Stimuli 
Participants’ eye movements were recorded with a Tobii T60 eye-tracker (Tobii, Stock-
holm, Sweden) with a 17” monitor. Participants sat approximately 60cm away from the 
screen. Stimuli were presented with Tobii ClearView AVI presentation software and 
sounds were played through external speakers. 
Participants observed a full-screen (1280x1024 pixels) film of a sequence involving a 
multi-object device that afforded six unique manipulations and a central, star-shaped 
light (see Figure 2-1, p. 26). To avoid confusion, we will subsequently refer to the 
individual object manipulations in the sequence as ‘events’, as in one condition they 
were human actions and in the other they were object movements. The movies were 
filmed with a Sony HandyCam video camera and edited using Adobe Premiere Pro Cs5 
software. The same device used during filming was presented to participants before 
and after the observation phase. 
Sequence  
We constructed four pseudo-randomized sequences, using the program Mix (van 
Casteren & Davis, 2006). All sequences contained two deterministic pairs (transitional 
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probability between events = 1.0), labelled ‘Effect’ and ‘No-effect’ pairs (described in 
more detail in the following paragraph). The second event of each deterministic pair 
was labelled a target, as these were the events that became predictable as the sequence 
unfolded. All other possible random pairs occurred with equal frequency (transitional 
probabilities between events = 0.167; Figure 2-1b). No event or pair could occur more 
than three times consecutively. All pairs and random events occurred 12 times (targets 
thus occurred 12 times within pairs and 12 times outside of pairs). In total, participants 
viewed 24 deterministic pairs (12 Effect and 12 No-effect pairs) and 48 random unpaired 
events, for sequences of 96 total actions or events. Effect and No-effect pairs were 
composed of two actions that were randomly selected from the 6 possible actions. 
Two sets of the four sequences were created: the two actions comprising the Effect pair 
in one set became the No-effect pair in the second set, and vice-versa. Thus, there were 
eight possible sequences within each condition and 16 videos in total; participants 
were randomly assigned to view one of these videos. 
The ‘Effect pair’ caused a central star to light up, whereas the ‘No-effect pair’ caused 
no additional effect. We will subsequently refer to the second events of both pairs as 
targets, as these were the events that became predictable as the sequence unfolded. 
The effect onset occurred at a natural mid-point of the target event during the Effect 
pair: for example, during the target open, the light turned on the moment the yellow 
door was fully open and turned off again after it closed (see Figure 2-1a). 
Targets could also occur elsewhere in the sequence outside of the deterministic pair 
(see Figure 2-1b). In these instances, the effect never occurred. This ensured that the 
second event did not independently predict the effect, and observers were required to 
learn the two-step pair structure to accurately predict the effect. 
Each video sequence was divided into four blocks, with the viewing angle oriented from 
a different side of the box for each block. This was to dissociate the events (and their 
corresponding objects) with their spatial location, and thus ensure that the observer 
could not predict the next event based on its location on the screen. Each block lasted 
approximately 90s and consisted of 24 events. Brief cartoon animations were presented 
between blocks in order to reengage the participant’s attention. At the beginning of 
a block, one 4s still frame of the stimulus was presented to allow observers to reorient 
to the new perspective. Movies were approximately seven minutes long. Engaging, up-
beat music was played throughout the entire demonstration that did not correspond 
in any way to the unfolding sequence.
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Agent condition
In the Agent condition movies, a hand manipulated the stimulus objects in a conti-
nuous sequence. For each action, the hand entered the screen closest to the object on 
which it acted (Figure 2-2 top). Each action was exactly three seconds in duration with 
a one-second pause between actions during which the hand was off-screen and only 
the stimulus was visible.
Ghost condition
In the Ghost condition, the objects appeared to move on their own with a spotlight 
focused on the current event (Figure 2-2 bottom). The spotlight gradually illuminated 
each object just prior to its movement onset and faded again after the object ceased 
moving. Between ghost events, there was a 1s pause during which it was ambiguous 
where the spotlight would next begin to appear, which matched the period of time the 
actor’s hand was off-screen in the Agent condition. Like the actor’s hand, the spotlight 
cued which object would subsequently move. The intensity and focus of the spotlight 
was equal for all objects. The sequence order and timing of events were otherwise 
identical to the videos in the Agent condition.
Procedure 
Participants were first seated at a table upon which the stimulus device was placed. The 
side facing each participant was counterbalanced. Participants were told they would 
watch a video of a person interacting with the device, and were allowed to first fami-
liarize themselves with the objects before beginning the experiment. The side of the 
object facing the participant during the action execution phase was kept the same as 
during the initial familiarization. A 9-point calibration sequence was repeated until valid 
calibration data was acquired for at least eight calibration points. Following calibration, 
participants were shown one of the eight stimulus sequences. They were told that they 
would be shown a video but were not given specific viewing instructions. 
Immediately after the observation phase, participants returned to the table and were 
told that they could freely interact with the stimulus for one minute (this duration 
was based on pilot testing). Participants were given no instruction, as our aim was to 
investigate whether they would spontaneously integrate observed regularities into 
their own actions in the absence of any task demand. The experimenter sat opposite 
the participant and monitored their behavior, pressing a hidden button that activated 
the effect (i.e., central star light) whenever he or she performed the Effect pair. After 
one minute, the experimenter ended the action execution phase and then asked each 
participant the following questions: “Do you know how to make the light turn on?” and 
“Did you notice any other pattern in the movies?” If participants responded “yes” they 
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were then asked to demonstrate the correct sequence on the device. A camera facing 
the participant recorded this session and behavior was later coded offline to assess 
action performance. 
Data Analysis
Eye-tracking data 
Participants with total fixation time more than one standard deviation below the mean 
were excluded due to relative inattention to the movies. These participants yielded 
gaze data for less than 25% of the demonstration, which corresponded to only 3 ob-
servations of each pair and was insufficient to assess learning over the course of the 
experiment. This resulted in the exclusion of two participants in the Agent condition 
and five participants in the Ghost condition (see Participants section above). 
Eye movement data was exported from Tobii ClearView analysis software and separated 
into discrete fixations using a customized software program with a spatial filter of 30 
pixels and a temporal filter of 100ms. Fixation data was imported into Matlab for further 
analysis. Regions of interest (ROI) of identical size were defined around each object 
(250x250 square pixels), and a smaller ROI (130x130 square pixels) was defined around 
the light (due to its smaller size relative to the objects). 
For the Agent condition, fixations were considered predictive if they occurred in the 
time window from when the actor’s hand entered the screen to perform the first action 
of a pair until the frame before it reappeared for the target action (Figure 2-2). This 
corresponds to the time in which the participant had enough information to predict 
the next action before its onset. For the Ghost condition, this time window was defined 
from the moment the spotlight highlighted the first object until the frame before 
the light shifted towards the second object of a pair. Time windows were identical in 
length in both conditions. As the main aim of this study was to examine prediction, 
only predictive gaze fixations were included in our analyses (i.e., we did not examine 
reactive fixations).
To assess predictive gaze during observation, we compared proportions of fixations to 
correct vs. incorrect objects (Implicit learning measure I). Second, we analyzed propor-
tions of correct predictive fixations over the course of the experiment to examine how 
learning unfolded over time. Third, proportions of predictive fixations to target objects 
were compared between deterministic and random transitions (Implicit learning mea-
sure II). The first reflects the extent to which observers predict the correct location of 
an upcoming event, relative to other locations, and the second reflects the frequency 
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of predictive looks to the target actions during predictable relative to non-predictable 
trials. We describe both measures in more detail below.
Implicit learning measure I: Correct vs. incorrect locations
Target regions were defined around the location of the second events of each pair. Fixa-
tions to targets during predictive time windows were counted as Correct and fixations 
to the four remaining objects as Incorrect. Objects currently being manipulated (i.e., the 
first action of the pair) were excluded from analyses. The first trial of each pair was not 
analyzed, because participants were not expected to correctly predict the first observa-
tion of a pair. If participants learned the pair structure, we expected them to make more 
fixations to the locations of target objects relative to any other object during predictive 
time windows. For both Effect and No-effect pairs, we calculated the proportion of 
correct and incorrect fixations out of the total fixations to all objects (Equations 1 and 
2). Because there were uneven numbers of correct and incorrect locations, the incor-
rect proportion was defined as the average number of fixations to the four remaining 
objects out of the total number of fixations. This location measure represents observers’ 
bias for looking toward the correct target, relative to other objects, before it was acted 
upon. For additional analyses in which we included fixations to the action-effect, see 
Supplementary Materials.  
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during predictable relative to non-predictable trials. We describe both measures in more 
detail below. 
Implicit learning measure I: Correct vs. incorrect locations 
Target regions were defined around the location of the second events of each pair. 
Fixations to targets during predictive time windows were counted as Correct and fixations to 
the four remaining objects as Incorrect. Objects currently being manipulated (i.e., the first 
action of the pair) were excluded from analyses. The first trial of each pair was not analyzed, 
because participants were not expected to correctly predict the first observation of a pair. If 
participants learned the pair structure, we expected them to make more fixations to the 
locations of target objects relative to any other object during predictive time windows. For 
both Effect and No-effect pairs, we calculated the proportion of correct and incorrect 
fixations out of the total fix tions to all objects (Equations 1 and 2). Because there were 
uneven numbers of correct and incorrect locations, the incorrect proportion was defined as 
the average number of fixations to the four remaining objects out of the total number of 
fixations. This location measure represents observers’ bias for looking toward the correct 
target, relative to other objects, before it was acted upon. For additional analyses in which we 
included fixations to the action-effect, see Supplementary Materials.   
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓      ( 1 ) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 4 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓/4𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓     ( 2 ) 
Implicit learning measure II: Deterministic vs. random transitions 
Our second learning measure compared fixations to targets during deterministic vs. 
random trials (Equations 3 and 4). Random trials were defined as transitions between any 
possible event and the subsequent occurrence of a target event outside of a deterministic pair. 
We discarded all repetition trials (for example, push followed by push) because it was 
impossible to determine whether fixations during these trials were predictive or reactive (i.e., 
 ( 1 )
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during predictable relative to non-predictable trials. We describe both measures in more 
detail be ow. 
Implicit learning measure I: Correct vs. incorrect locations 
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Fixat ons to targets during predictive time windows ere counted as Correct and fixat ons to 
the four remaining objects as Incorrect. Objects urrently being manipulated (i.e., the first 
action of the pair) were xcluded from analyses. The first t ial of each pair was not analyzed, 
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Implicit learning measure II: Deterministic vs. random transitions 
Our second learning measure compared fixat ons to targets during deterministic vs.
random trials (Equations 3 and 4). Random trials were defin d as transitions betw en any 
possible event a d the sub equ nt occurrenc  of a target event outside of a deterministic pair. 
We discarded all repetition trials (for example, push followed by push) because it was 
impossible to determine whether fixat ons during these trials were p dictive or reactive (i. ., 
 ( 2 )
Implicit learning measure II: Deterministic vs. random transitions
Our second learning measure compared fixations to targets during deterministic vs. 
random trials (Equations 3 and 4). Random trials were defined as transitions between 
any possible event and the subseq ent occurrenc  of a target vent outside of a de-
terministic pair. We discarded all repetition trials (for example, push followed by push) 
because it was impossible to determine whether fixations during these trials were 
predictive or reactive (i.e., simply not moving the eyes). This analysis thus enabled us to 
compare fixations to the same location (target objects) in different statistical contexts.
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simply not moving the eyes). This analysis thus enabled us to compare fixations to the same 
location (target objects) in different statistical contexts. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓 (𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓)
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   ( 3 ) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓 (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 − 𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓)
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓    ( 4 ) 
Behavioral data 
Explicit learning measure I: Action performance  
Participants’ self-produced action sequences were coded from the videotape 
recordings. Each object manipulation was counted as a single action. To account for variation 
in the overall length of participants’ sequences, we calculated the conditional probability, 
defined as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴)= 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) 
of performing the second action of a pair (B) given performance of the first action (A).  
Explicit learning measure II: Verbal responses 
Responses to the experimenters’ explicit questions—“Do you know how to make the 
light turn on?” and “Did you notice any other pattern in the movies?”—were coded as yes or 
no; if their response was yes, it was further coded as ‘yes’-correct or ‘yes’-incorrect 
depending on whether or not they demonstrated the correct sequence on the first attempt. 
Proportions of participants who indicated each response type were calculated for each pair, 
per condition.  
Results 
Eye movement data 
To examine whether the Agent and Ghost displays elicited similar rates of overall 
visual attention to the objects of interest, we compared the number of predictive fixations 
between the two conditions. There were no differences in the number of anticipatory fixations 
 ( 3 )
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simply not moving th  eyes). This analy is thus enabled us to compare fixations to the same 
location (target objects) in different statistical contexts. 
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Behavioral data 
Explicit learning measure I: Action performance  
Participants’ self-produced action sequences were coded from the videotape 
recordings. Each object manipulation was counted as a single action. To a count for variation 
in the overall length of participants’ sequences, we calculated the conditional probability, 
defined as: 
𝑃𝑃 𝐵𝐵 𝐴𝐴
𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴 𝐵𝐵
𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴
 
of performing the second action of a pair (B) given performance of the first action (A).  
Explicit learning measure II: Verbal responses 
Responses to th  experimenters’ explicit questions—“Do you know how to make the 
light turn on?” and “Did you notice any other pattern in the movies?”—were coded as yes or 
no; if their response was yes, it was further coded as ‘yes’-correct or ‘yes’-incorrect 
depending on whether or not they demonstrated the correct sequence on the first attempt. 
Proportions of participants who indicated each response type were calculated for each pair, 
per condition.  
Results 
Eye movement data 
To examine whether the Agent and Ghost displays elicited similar rates of overall 
visual attention to the objects of interest, we compared the number of predictive fixations 
betw en the two conditions. There were no differences in the number of anticipatory fixations 
 ( 4 )
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Behavioral data
Explicit learning measure I: Action performance 
Participants’ self-produced action sequences were coded from the videotape re-
cordings. Each object manipulation was counted as a single action. To account for 
variation in the overall length of participants’ sequences, we calculated the conditional 
probability, defined as:
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simply not moving the eyes). This analysis thus enabled us to compare fixations to the same 
location (target objects) in different statistical contexts. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓 (𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓)
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   ( 3 ) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓 (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 − 𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓)
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓    ( 4 ) 
Behavioral data 
Explicit learning measure I: Action performance  
Participants’ self-produced action sequences were coded from the videotape 
recordings. Each object manipulation was counted as a single action. To account for variation 
in the overall length of participants’ sequences, we calculated the conditional probability, 
defined as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴)= 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) 
of performing the second action of a pair (B) given performance of the first action (A).  
Explicit learning measure II: Verbal responses 
Responses to the experimenters’ explicit questions—“Do you know how to make the 
light turn on?” and “Did you notice any other pattern in the movies?”—were coded as yes or 
no; if their response was yes, it was further coded as ‘yes’-correct or ‘yes’-incorrect 
depending on whether or not they demonstrated the correct sequence on the first attempt. 
Proportions of participants who indicated each response type were calculated for each pair, 
per condition.  
Results 
Eye movement data 
To examine whether the Agent and Ghost displays elicited similar rates of overall 
visual attention to the objects of interest, we compared the number of predictive fixations 
between the two conditions. There were no differences in the number of anticipatory fixations 
of performing the second action of a pair (B) given performance of the first action (A). 
Explicit learning measure II: Verbal responses
Responses to the experimenters’ explicit questions—“Do you know how to make the 
ligh  turn on?” and “Did you notice any other pattern in the movies?”—wer  coded as
yes or no; if their response was yes, it was further coded as ‘yes’-correct or ‘yes’-incorrect 
depending on whether or not they demonstrated the correct sequence on the first 
attempt. Proportions of participants who in icated each response type were calculated 
for each pair, per condition. 
Results
Eye movement data
To examine whether the Agent and Ghost displays elicited similar rates of overall visual 
attention to the objects of interest, we compared the number of predictive fixations 
between the two conditions. There were no differences in the number of anticipatory 
fixations made during target trials (Ghost = 41.55, SEM = 4.80; Agent: M = 44.61, SEM = 
3.41; p = .60) or in the total number of fixations made across the entire demonstration (p 
= .21) suggesting that differences in the visual stimuli in the Agent and Ghost conditi-
ons did not underlie any potential differences in anticipatory fixations. Analyses of total 
looking times in seconds are reported in the Supplementary materials.
Implicit learning measure I: Correct vs. incorrect locations
Our primary learning measures in each condition are presented in Table 1. Proportions 
of gaze fixations were analyzed via a repeated-measure ANOVA with Prediction (Cor-
rect vs. Incorrect) and Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) as within-subject factors and Condition 
(Agent vs. Ghost) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a main effect of 
Prediction, indicating that participants made a higher proportion of correct relative to 
incorrect predictive fixations across pairs (mean difference = .14 [SEM = .04], F(1,40) = 
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16.27, p < .001, hp2 = .29). There were no other significant main effects or interactions 
(ps > .13). The results of additional analyses including the location of the action-effect 
as a correct location are available in the Supplemental Information. 
Table 3-1. Main implicit and explicit dependent measures, separated by condition.  
      Agent (N = 23) Ghost (N = 20)
 DV Pair  Factor Mean SD Mean SD
Correct vs. Incorrect Effect Correct 0.39 0.26 0.34 0.33
Incorrect 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.07
No-effect Correct 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.22
  Incorrect 0.19 0.07 0.19 0.06
Deterministic vs. 
Random
Effect Deterministic trials 0.39 0.26 0.34 0.33
Random trials 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.16
No-effect Deterministic trials 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.22
  Random trials 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12
Behavior Effect Conditional probability 0.54 0.36 0.30 0.30
  No-effect Conditional probability 0.29 0.36 0.09 0.16
Verbal Responses (“yes” 
– correct) 
Effect % participants 68.4% 15.4%
No-effect % participants 5.9% 7.7%
Learning over trials
To examine changes in predictions across trials, we performed a general estimating 
equations (GEE) analysis. GEE analyses are a preferred method for analyzing data with 
repeated measures that contain missing points, such as trials in which no anticipatory 
fixations were recorded, because they do not apply list-wise exclusion of cases (Zeger, 
Liang, & Albert, 1988). Proportions of correct fixations to the targets were entered as 
the dependent variable in a linear, model-based GEE with an unstructured Working 
Correlation Matrix. Condition (between-subjects), Trial (within-subjects), and Pair 
(within-subjects) were entered as predictors in a factorial model. In this analysis, the 
first trial was included (in contrast to Learning measures I and II).
The GEE analysis yielded significant main effects of Trial (χ2(11) = 47.19, p < .001) and 
Pair (χ2(2) = 26.89, p < .001) a significant interaction between Condition and Trial (χ2(11) 
= 21.52, p = .028) a significant interaction between Condition and Pair (χ2(2) = 8.70, p = 
.003) and a three-way Condition by Trial by Pair interaction (χ2(11) = 22.96, p = .02). The 
Condition by Pair interaction revealed that proportions of correct fixations were signi-
ficantly greater in the Agent relative to the Ghost condition for the Effect pair (mean 
difference = .18 [SEM = .05], p < .001) but not for the No-effect pair (mean difference = 
-.09 [SEM = .06], p = .11)2. As illustrated in Figure 3-1, the Condition by Trial interaction 
revealed that the Agent and Ghost conditions did not differ from one another on the 
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very first (p = .45) or second trial (p = .15). By the third trial, participants in the Agent 
condition made more correct fixations than in the Ghost condition (mean difference = 
.28 [SEM = .12], p = .015) and this pattern continued for several trials. The two conditions 
converged again by the 6th trial (p = .53) for the remainder of the experiment.  Together, 
these findings suggest that participants showed a selective learning benefit for making 
correct anticipations when viewing an agent producing action-effects, relative to the 
other observation contexts.
Figure 3-1. Learning over time. Estimated marginal means of correct predictive fixations across 
pairs as a function of trial, (left) collapsed across pairs and (right) separated by Effect and No-effect 
pairs. Bars represent standard errors.
Implicit learning measure II: Deterministic vs. random transitions
The proportion of gaze fixations to target objects (Equations 3 and 4) were entered 
as the dependent variables into an ANOVA with Transition (Deterministic vs. Random) 
and Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) as within-subjects factors and Condition (Agent vs. Ghost) 
as a between-subjects factor. This revealed a main effect of Transition, showing that 
participants made more target fixations during deterministic than during random 
transitions across conditions and pairs, F(1, 42) = 42.9, p < .001, hp2 = .51. There were no 
other effects or interactions (ps > .11).
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Explicit measures of learning
Explicit learning measure I: Action performance
Across conditions, participants performed sequences with an average length of 26.22 
actions (SD = 7.1), and performed a mean of 2.12 Eff ect pairs and 0.64 No-eff ect pairs 
(see Table 3-1 for additional descriptive measures). There were no diff erences in the 
total length of action sequences performed between conditions (p = .19). 
Conditional probabilities for performing the target action given the performance of 
the fi rst action of the pair were entered in an ANOVA with Pair (Eff ect vs. No-eff ect) as 
a within-subjects factor and Condition (Agent vs. Ghost) as a between-subjects factor. 
This revealed main eff ects of Condition and Pair: participants in the Agent condition 
were more likely to perform an action pair than those in the Ghost condition, F(1, 34) 
= 11.57, p = .002, ηp2 = .25 (see Figure 3-2a). Across conditions, participants were more 
likely to perform the Eff ect pair than the No-eff ect pair, F(1, 34) = 8.25, p = .007, ηp2 = .20. 
There was no interaction between Pair and Condition (p = .78). 
Figure 3-2. Action performance and verbal awareness.
A: The mean probability of performing Eff ect and No-eff ect pairs (P(B|A)). Bars represent standard errors. 
B: Scatterplot illustrating the relation between predictive fi xations (Equation 5) and action performance (P(B|A)) 
for the Eff ect pair, across conditions. 
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C: Pie graphs showing the percentage of participants who gave each response type to the experimenter’s ques-
tion. For the Effect pair, this was “Do you know how the light turns on?” and for the No-effect pair this was “Did 
you see any other pattern in the movies?”
To assess whether participants in each group performed more pairs than would be 
expected by chance, we conducted a one-sample t-test to compare the mean condi-
tional probability of performing each pair against a chance level of 0.167 (one out of 
six possible actions, given any previous action). This revealed that the participants in 
the Agent condition performed Effect pairs significantly more than chance (p < .001), 
while participants in the Ghost condition did not (p = .13). In neither condition were the 
No-effect pairs performed at an above-chance level (ps > .05). 
To investigate whether action execution was related to anticipatory looking behavior, 
we correlated the proportion of correct target fixations (Equation 1) and the conditi-
onal probability of producing action pairs for each pair type. Across conditions, there 
was a significant positive correlation between target fixations during Effect pairs and 
the conditional probability of producing Effect pairs, r(35) = .41, p = .02, indicating that 
participants who demonstrated higher rates of learning during the observation phase 
were more likely to reenact the action-effect during the subsequent behavioral session 
(Figure 3-2b). There was no correlation for the No-effect pair, r(36) = .01, p = .97. These 
correlation coefficients differed significantly from one another, Z = 1.75, p = .043.
Explicit learning measure II: Verbal responses
Figure 3-2c illustrates the distributions of participants per each explicit response type to 
the experimenter’s questions following the action execution phase, separated by pair 
and condition. The pie charts reflect the following pattern: 94.7% of participants in the 
Agent condition reported explicit knowledge of the Effect pair; of these, 72.2% were 
correct and 27.8% were incorrect. Only 53.8% reported explicit knowledge of the pair 
in the Ghost condition; 28.6% of these were correct and 71.4% were incorrect. Further, 
only 40% reported knowledge of the No-effect pair across conditions, and those who 
did were usually incorrect (93.3% of these 40%).    
To compare these proportions of participants (Agent vs. Ghost) to one another, we 
calculated the confidence intervals of the difference between them (the difference 
between proportions is statistically significant wherever the confidence interval exclu-
des zero; Newcombe, 1998). Table 3-2 reports the confidence intervals for the differences 
3 For thoroughness, we also averaged across pairs and correlated the fixation proportions with condi-
tional probability for Agent and Ghost conditions separately. Across pairs, there were no significant 
correlations for either group, ps > .42. These correlation coefficients did not differ significantly from 
one another (Z = .41, p = .34).
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in proportions for each response type. For the Effect pair, the proportion of participants 
who responded ‘yes’ and were correct was significantly greater in the Agent than the 
Ghost condition. A higher proportion of participants in the Agent condition reported 
knowledge of the Effect pair—and could demonstrate the correct sequence—than in 
the Ghost condition. Likewise, significantly more participants in the Ghost condition 
reported no knowledge of the Effect pair than in the Agent condition. For the No-effect 
pair, the pattern of responses was similar across conditions. Thus, participants obser-
ving an actor were more likely to retain precise knowledge they could verbalize about 
the pair structure, but only when the actor’s actions led to a causal effect. Participants 
observing ghost events were less likely to report verbal knowledge, and when they did, 
their representations of the pair structure were more likely to be inaccurate.
Table 3-2. Mean differences (and confidence intervals) between conditions (Agent – Ghost) in the pro-
portions of participants reporting each response type for Effect and No-effect pairs.
Effect Pair No effect Pair
Response Diff(Pa-Pb) 95% CI Diff(Pa-Pb) 95% CI
“No” -.41 [.11, .66]* .11 [-.22, .41]
“Yes”-correct .53 [.18, .73]* -.02 [-.20, .28]
“Yes”-incorrect -.12 [-.18, .42] -.09 [-.22, .40]
Note. Diff(Pa-Pb) indicates the difference between the proportions of participants in the Agent and Ghost condi-
tions. *denotes statistically significant difference between the two sample proportions (p < .05).
Discussion
The current study investigated whether observers can learn statistical regularities 
during observation of continuous action or event sequences. Specifically, we measu-
red anticipatory gaze fixations as an implicit measure of whether participants could 
use statistical information to predict upcoming actions or events in the sequence. 
After learning, we measured spontaneous action performance and verbal reports as 
explicit measures of whether observed statistical regularities influence participants’ 
self-produced actions and knowledge of the sequence. 
Implicit learning: Predictive gaze 
Across conditions and pairs, participants demonstrated a robust tendency to predict 
correct relative to incorrect locations. They also predicted the target more frequently 
during deterministic relative to random transitions between events. In other words, 
they learned where to look when a target event was statistically probable, and they 
learned to selectively look at targets more frequently when they were likely to occur 
next than when they were unlikely to occur next. 
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Our main findings revealed that patterns of learning were similar across conditions 
and pairs, suggesting that learning the sequence regularities did not depend on 
either the presence of an actor or on action-effects separately. When examining cor-
rect predictions over time, an interaction effect between these two manipulations 
emerged: participants appeared to learn the regularities best when they observed an 
actor produce an action-effect. In addition, different patterns emerged between the 
Agent and Ghost conditions for implicit and explicit learning outcomes, as measured 
by visual anticipations, action performance, and verbal knowledge of the pair structure. 
Specifically, observing actions in the Agent condition did not seem to uniquely benefit 
predictive gaze performance relative to observing visual events in the Ghost condition; 
however, it did increase reproduction of the action pair and verbal knowledge about 
the pair structure. Importantly, these differences were apparent only for the sequence 
pair which resulted in an action-effect. One explanation for these patterns is that 
action-specific processing in the Agent condition facilitated transfer from implicit (i.e., 
eye movements) to explicit (i.e., self-produced actions, verbal awareness) knowledge, 
as we discuss in the following sections. 
Actions versus perceptual sequences 
Participants demonstrated learning both when observing an actor and ghost events, 
as indicated by their correct predictive looks while observing the sequences in both 
conditions. This finding suggests that statistical learning operates consistently across 
the different types of perceptual events, both action and non-action. Interestingly, the 
rates of learning during the observation phase differed between the two conditions. 
Participants in the Agent condition showed an increase in correct predictions earlier 
in the sequence, whereas those in the Ghost condition did not ‘catch up’ until they 
received more exposure to the deterministic pairs. Consistent with prior research, this 
finding reveals a subtle learning benefit when observing an agent relative to other 
forms of visual displays (Hopper et al., 2010, 2015). According to motor-based accounts 
of action observation, this benefit originates from internal predictive models based in 
the motor system (Kilner et al., 2007; Stapel, Hunnius, Meyer, & Bekkering, 2016). Here 
we show that observers demonstrate faster learning in the Agent condition relative 
to the Event condition. Specifically, participants’ rates of correct fixations to target 
actions increased more quickly in the Agent condition, revealing that they more easily 
detected the statistical relations between the actions and could modify their looking 
behavior accordingly. Interpreted within these motor-based accounts, this may reflect 
a more efficient ability to transfer knowledge acquired from visual statistical learning 
into action predictions that are generated in the motor system (Kilner, 2009). 
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As discussed in the introduction, developmental studies have shown that children 
learn significantly better from observing an agent performing actions relative to other 
forms of observational learning (Hopper, 2010). One recent study, in fact, showed 
that toddlers were able to learn action sequences when observing an actor, but not 
ghost events (Monroy, Gerson, & Hunnius, 2017). This finding may reflect an interesting 
developmental shift, in which actions provide a unique context that helps infants and 
children use acquired knowledge from statistical learning to make predictions, above 
and beyond other stimuli. Adults, on the other hand, are able to employ their statistical 
learning abilities across action and non-actions contexts. Nevertheless, observing acti-
ons seems to elicit a learning benefit that is consistent across development. 
The role of effects
Observing an agent produce causal effects led to higher rates of verbal knowledge and 
reproduction of the action pair, relative to observing the ghost events or the pairs with 
no effect (both action and ghost). This pattern supports the interpretation that observing 
actions primarily influences the way in which learned knowledge is subsequently used 
to modify behavior. Even though participants were uninstructed, observing an actor 
produce an effect in the world may have automatically induced participants to perceive 
these events as goal-directed, and to attempt to re-create them in the test setting. An al-
ternative explanation, suggestive of lower-level accounts, is that the action-effect simply 
provides additional information and is therefore easier to learn. The action-effect relation 
contains more information (i.e., A predicts both B and C) than the action-only pair (A 
predicts B). In addition, the action-effect contingency contains an additional dimension 
(i.e., actions and effects versus only actions). According to the model of sequence learning 
given by Keele and colleagues (2003), multidimensional learning requires additional 
attention components that are not required during unidimensional learning. These at-
tentional requirements enhance sequence learning by making the learned information 
accessible to explicit awareness (Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003). 
When only analyzing correct predictions over time, an interaction effect emerged which 
revealed that participants in the Agent condition demonstrated more correct predictive 
fixations for the Effect relative to the No-effect pair, whereas this pattern did not hold for 
the participants in the Ghost condition. However, this interaction effect did not appear 
when comparing fixations to both correct and incorrect locations. One possible explana-
tion for this inconsistency is that, in the absence of a visual effect, participants were free 
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to engage in more visual exploratory behaviors to the other objects, resulting in higher 
proportions of incorrect fixations for the No-effect pair relative to the Effect pair. 
Action performance and its relation to prediction
Across conditions, participants were more likely to reproduce the pair associated with 
an effect than the pair without an effect. In addition, rates of performing the effect pair 
were correlated with participants’ predictive looking for this pair. Specifically, the more 
accurately observers predicted the Effect pair, the more likely they were to reproduce 
the effect following observation. Adults and children easily recreate effects that they 
see in the world when explicitly asked to do so; this has been empirically demonstrated 
in both forced-choice and free-choice designs for simple action-effect contingencies 
(Elsner, 2007; Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Here, our results provide new evidence that ob-
servers could recreate action-effects based only on learning transitional probabilities, 
and they did so in the absence of instruction or any explicit task. These findings suggest 
that new action knowledge—acquired via observational statistical learning—can be 
accessed and used for action control when the learned actions are used for produced 
a desired effect or outcome. 
In addition, participants in the Agent condition were more likely to reproduce action 
pairs than participants in the Ghost condition. This was not due to a general difference 
in activity between the two conditions, as they did not simply perform more actions 
overall. Based on the idea that we naturally tend to perceive human behavior as goal-
directed, observers in the Agent condition may have automatically attributed meaning 
to the actor’s actions and were more motivated to imitate what they observed, espe-
cially when they resulted in an effect (Hopper, 2010; Hopper et al., 2014). Alternatively, 
consistent with the faster emergence of correct anticipations in the Agent condition, 
these participants may have also been better able to retain the new knowledge gained 
from the observed sequence and apply it when performing their own action sequences 
than those in the Ghost condition. 
Relations between predictive gaze, action performance, and verbal 
knowledge
Whether statistical learning engages implicit or explicit processes—and whether the 
resulting knowledge is also implicit or explicit—is an ongoing debate (see Daltrozzo & 
Conway, 2014 for a review). In the current study, we measured predictive gaze, action 
performance, and verbal responses as reflecting different learning outcomes. These 
behaviors may also relate to varying levels of implicit and explicit knowledge of the 
learned structure. Studies on SL typically demonstrate that the outcomes of learning, 
and thus the learning processes, are manifested in implicit behaviors such as anticipa-
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tory gaze, if at all (Fiser & Aslin, 2001; Perruchet & Pacton, 2006; Turk-Browne et al., 2008). 
Currently, there is a divide between those who argue that SL is an implicit mechanism 
(e.g., Clegg, DiGirolamo, & Keele, 1998) and those who suggest that the process may 
be implicit but the knowledge obtained via SL can become explicit when, for instance, 
learning reaches a certain threshold (Cleeremans, 2006). In the former case, it is argued 
that knowledge can only become explicit when other cognitive systems come into play. 
Recent findings have shown that sequence learning also results in explicit knowledge 
depending on the ‘task set’; that is, the relation between the stimulus characteristics 
and the required response of the learner (Esser & Haider, 2017a, 2017b).
Consistent with these recent findings, our data suggest that observing action sequen-
ces results in both implicit and explicit learning outcomes4. One possibility, grounded 
in predictive accounts of the motor system, is that the knowledge gained via statistical 
learning can be accessed by the motor system and used to update internal action 
models. These models serve to generate predictions about the most likely upcoming 
action and to prepare appropriate motor responses. Our findings differ from prior 
research in that, in the current experiment, no response was required from participants 
during observation. Thus, the resulting explicit knowledge did not arise from learned 
stimulus-response associations (as in Haider et al., 2014). Rather, observation alone was 
sufficient to elicit both implicit and explicit knowledge. Further, our findings suggest 
that observing human actions facilitates both implicit sequence learning (indicated 
by faster learning rates in the Agent condition) and transferring learned knowledge 
into explicit responses. However, as suggested by Schubotz (2007), motor-based lear-
ning and prediction can still occur for external events (i.e., non-actions). A fascinating 
question for further research is whether observing action sequences engages entirely 
distinct learning processes from other forms of observational learning, or whether the 
difference mainly lies in how the knowledge is accessed and used. Another possibility 
to be considered is that acting immediately prior to being questioned by the expe-
rimenter may have influenced some participants’ verbal knowledge. That is, action 
performance may have helped them to verbalize knowledge that otherwise would 
have remained implicit. However, if there was an effect of acting on participants’ ex-
plicit knowledge of the sequence, this should have been consistent across conditions. 
Instead, the dramatic group differences in verbal knowledge that we observed suggest 
that responses were primarily influenced by the action observation condition, rather 
than their own action production. 
4 As we did not directly measure the learning processes, but rather the learning outcomes, we cannot 
speak to whether or not the learning processes themselves were implicit or explicit and focus our 
discussion on the outcomes of learning.
Conclusion
The current study investigated whether SL abilities can support online prediction 
during action observation. In particular, we compared observers’ sensitivity to statis-
tical regularities in action sequences when observing a human actor relative to visual 
events. Our main finding revealed that implicit learning occurred in both observation 
conditions and was not dependent on action-effects; however, explicit knowledge was 
only consistently extracted when observers viewed a human actor perform action se-
quences with causal effects. These findings shed light on the potential role of the motor 
system in enhancing how information learned solely via observation can be accessed 
and used to modify behavior.
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Abstract
Prior research has shown that infants learn statistical regularities in action sequences 
better than they learn non-action event sequences. This is consistent with current 
theories claiming that the same mechanism guides action observation and action exe-
cution. The current eye-tracking study tested the prediction, based on these theories, 
that infants’ ability to learn statistical regularities in action sequences is modulated by 
their own motor abilities. Eight- to 11-month-old infants observed an action sequence 
containing two deterministic action pairs (i.e., action A always followed by action B) em-
bedded within an otherwise random sequence. One pair was performed with a whole-
hand grasp. The second pair was performed with a pincer grasp, a fine motor skill that 
emerges around 9 months of age. Infants were then categorized into groups according 
to which grasp was dominant in their motor repertoire. Predictive looks to correct 
upcoming actions during the deterministic pairs were analyzed to measure whether 
infants learned and anticipated the sequence regularities.  Findings revealed that, as 
a group, infants made more correct than incorrect predictive fixations to upcoming 
actions regardless of grasp type, evidence for learning the statistical regularities. The 
infants with a dominant pincer grasp showed an earlier (i.e., faster) increase in correct 
predictions for the pair performed with a pincer grasp, and not the whole-hand grasp. 
Conversely, infants with a dominant whole-hand grasp showed an early increase in 
correct predictions for the pair performed with a whole-hand grasp, and not the pincer 
grasp. Together, these findings suggest that infants’ ability to learn action sequences is 
facilitated when the observed action matches their own action repertoire. However, 
findings cannot be explained entirely by motor accounts, as infants also learned the 
actions less congruent with their own abilities. Findings are discussed in terms of the 
interplay between the motor system and additional non-motor resources during the 
acquisition of new motor skills in infancy.
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Introduction
Within the first months of life, infants begin to demonstrate remarkable abilities to form 
expectations about the actions they observe others perform. Infants readily anticipate 
the outcomes of observed actions and the trajectories of an actor’s movements as they 
unfold (Ambrosini et al., 2013; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006). For instance, they can predict that 
an adult will bring a cup to her mouth upon grasping it, long before they themselves 
can grasp mugs and drink from them (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). The mechanisms 
that support this ability have recently been a focus of intense study (for a review, see 
Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). This body of work has centered around understanding 
how infants learn to anticipate observed actions based on observational experiences 
and their own developing action experiences. 
Observational experiences create opportunities for infants to learn the statistical regu-
larities in their environment. A recent surge of empirical work has provided convincing 
evidence that infants can detect multiple types of statistical regularities in different 
sensory domains from early in life (Aslin, Saffran, & Newport, 1998; Fiser & Aslin, 2001; 
Kirkham et al., 2002; Slone & Johnson, 2015; Teinonen, Fellman, Näätänen, & Alku, 2009). 
For instance, at 8 months of age, infants can segment novel auditory sequences into 
word-like units based on the transitional probabilities between syllables (Saffran et al., 
1996).  They can also form visual associations between objects and spatial locations 
based on their recurring co-occurrence (Kirkham et al., 2002) and can anticipate where 
an object will appear next based on those learned associations (Marcus et al., 1999). 
Recent evidence has shown that statistical learning abilities extend to the action do-
main as well. Human action contains inherent sequential structure within a seemingly 
complex stream of motion (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Zacks, 2004). From early in life, infants 
are sensitive to regularities in the actions they observe. For instance, 8-month-old infants 
segment observed action streams into separate units similarly to how they segment 
auditory sequences into words (Stahl et al., 2014). Within the first year of life, infants 
can learn to associate actions and the effects they produce, both for actions that they 
observe (Paulus et al., 2012) and those that perform themselves (Verschoor, Spapé, Biro, 
& Hommel, 2013). These findings add to a growing body of work which demonstrates 
that both observational and motor experiences contribute to infants’ emerging skills for 
processing and performing goal-directed actions.
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate whether, beyond segmentation, infants 
can also predict upcoming actions based on statistical learning. In a recent experiment, 
18-month-old toddlers observed continuous action sequences with either determinis-
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tic or random transitional probabilities between actions. In a control condition, another 
group of toddlers observed the same sequence that featured self-propelled events 
rather than a human actor (Monroy, Gerson, & Hunnius, 2017). Proportions of correct 
predictive looks preceding the deterministic actions increased over trials for the tod-
dlers who observed the human actor, but not for those who observed the non-action 
visual events. These findings provided evidence that observing actions benefits action 
prediction, above and beyond observing non-action perceptual sequences. One pos-
sible explanation is that prior motor experiences with the observed actions contributed 
to the enhanced learning, as these actions were all within the motor capabilities of 
toddlers. 
Support for this hypothesis comes from a growing body of evidence illustrating 
that action prediction is tightly coupled to infants’ motor proficiency (Cannon et al., 
2012; Gerson, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2015; Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Kanakogi 
& Itakura, 2011). For instance, in one recent experiment, infant and adult participants 
watched videos of other infants either crawling or walking across a room while their 
eye movements were recorded. Infants for whom crawling was their dominant form 
of locomotion predicted crawling more accurately than walking. In contrast, infants for 
whom walking was the dominant form of locomotion and adults were equally accurate 
at predicting both actions (Stapel et al., 2016).  Training studies—in which infants are 
given novel experience with actions they have never yet performed—immediately al-
ter how infants subsequently perceive those actions (Gerson & Woodward, 2014; Som-
merville et al., 2005). Together, these findings suggest that infants process actions more 
efficiently once the actions are more strongly established in their own motor repertoire.
Current theories propose that activation of the motor system during action observation 
is the most likely mechanism underlying efficient action prediction (Falck-Ytter et al., 
2006; Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). In line with this claim, findings from neuroimaging 
studies reveal that motor regions in the brain are activated when infants observe 
others’ actions. Activity in these regions is greater in response to actions with which 
infants have more motor experience, and are therefore more dominant in their motor 
repertoire, relative to actions with which they have less or no experience (Gerson et al., 
2015; Southgate, Johnson, Karoui, & Csibra, 2010). In adults, motor activation is causally 
linked to predictive eye movements: introducing a competing motor task inhibits the 
ability to. Likewise, disrupting activity in the motor cortex via transcranial magnetic sti-
mulation (TMS) impairs predictive eye movements, further suggesting that the motor 
system may even be necessary to successfully predict ongoing actions (Elsner et al., 
2013).
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Together, the current research shows that both observational statistical learning and 
action experience are central to infants’ action understanding (Hunnius & Bekkering, 
2014). To date, a few studies have attempted to compare the relative contributions 
of self-produced and observed actions on infants’ action understanding (Gerson & 
Woodward, 2014) but none have examined how these two forms of experience might 
interact. We aimed to address this gap by asking whether newly acquired motor expe-
rience with grasping actions modulated infants’ abilities to learn statistical regularities 
between those same actions when they were viewed in continuous sequences. In 
other words, if infants recruit motor representations when they observe actions they 
can perform, does this help them to more easily detect the sequential regularities 
between those actions during observation? 
To tackle this question, we exploited infants’ natural acquisition of a pincer grasp, a 
fine motor skill that emerges in the second half of the first year of life. Results from a 
prior study in our own lab indicated that the pincer grasp emerges between 8 and 
11 months of age (Meyer et al., 2016). We thus expected 8- to 11-month-old infants 
to vary in the degree to which a whole hand (i.e., palmar) grasp and a pincer grasp 
were more dominant in their motor repertoire. In an eye-tracking experiment, infants 
were shown a video of an action sequence comprised of six possible object-directed 
actions. Within this sequence, there were two deterministic pairs in which one action 
always followed a second action with 100% probability and was followed by an effect. 
All other actions occurred in a random order. If infants learned the statistical structure of 
the action pairs, they should, in principle, make visual anticipations to the locations of 
the second action upon observing the first action (cf. Monroy et al., 2017). Both actions 
of one pair were performed with a pincer grasp, whereas both actions of the second 
pair were performed with a whole-hand grasp. Following the video, a grasp test was 
conducted to assess each infant’s grasping proficiency. 
We expected that, if infants learned the action pairs, they would make more visual an-
ticipations towards the second action and/or its effect than to any other object during 
the first action of an action pair (i.e., a predictive time window).  We also expected they 
would demonstrate an increase in correct visual anticipations to the second actions 
as the sequence progressed (Monroy et al., 2017; Shafto, Conway, Field, & Houston, 
2012). Finally, we hypothesized that infants would be better at learning the statistical 
regularities for the action pairs more dominant in their current motor repertoire. For 
example, we expected that those infants performing more whole-hand grasps, but not 
yet performing pincer grasp actions, would anticipate the second action of the whole 
hand pair more reliably than the pincer grasp pair. Infants for whom both actions are 
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equally dominant in their motor repertoire should not show preferential learning for 
one pair over the other.
Material and Methods
Participants
Forty-eight infants from 8 to 11 months of age were included in the final sample (Table 
1). Infants were recruited from a database of interested families from the surrounding 
region who volunteered to participate. Seven additional infants were tested but exclu-
ded from the final sample due to calibration errors (n = 1) or failure to complete the 
observation phase due to excessive fussiness (n = 5). One infant made zero fixations on 
any of the trials of interest (i.e., the action pairs) and was also excluded from analyses. 
The study was approved by the ethical committee of behavioral science at the Faculty 
of Social Sciences in Nijmegen (Ethische Commissie Gedragswetenschappelijk Onder-
zoek; ECG2012-1301-006). All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki.  
Stimuli 
Video stimuli were created featuring a toy with multiple objects that could be mani-
pulated in distinct ways (Figure 4-1a). An adult actor performed a continuous action 
sequence with the various objects on the toy. For each action, the actor’s hand entered 
the screen nearest to the object upon which she would act, performed one action with 
that object (3s), and then left the screen. This was followed by a brief pause (1s) before 
the next action began. Only the actor’s hand was visible during each action. 
Videos were divided into four blocks, with the viewing angle of the toy stimulus alter-
nating between blocks to ensure that spatial location did not become a predictable 
cue. Attention-getter clips (4s) were played between blocks followed by a still frame 
(1s) of the toy (with no hand visible) to help the infant reorient to the new perspective. 
The entire sequence lasted approximately seven minutes. Engaging background music 
accompanied the video stimuli and was unrelated to the stimulus presentation.
Action sequence
The action sequence was structured as follows: two deterministic pairs were embed-
ded within an otherwise pseudorandomized order of six object-directed actions. One 
pair was performed with a pincer grasp (Pincer pair) and consisted of the actions ‘slide’ 
followed by ‘open’; the second pair was performed with a whole-hand grasp (Hand 
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pair) and consisted of ‘bend’ followed by ‘push’ (Figure 4-1c). The second actions of 
the pairs were labeled the target actions, as these were the actions that infants could 
learn to predict as they observed the unfolding sequence. Both pairs caused an action-
effect, which was a green or a pink colored light in the center of the toy that turned 
on at the midpoint of the target actions. The light’s two colors (green and pink) always 
corresponded to the same pairs within one sequence. This matching was randomly 
counterbalanced across infants: one group always saw the Pincer pair activate a green 
light and the Hand pair activate a pink light, and the second group saw the reverse.
Figure 4-1. A. Example frame from the video stimuli, in which an adult performed a continuous se-
quence of actions with the six possible objects on the toy. B. Following observation, infants’ grasp-
ing abilities were assessed using the pictured apparatus, which required them to extract the bead 
from the wooden board. C. Schematic illustrating the statistical structure of the action sequence 
containing two deterministic pairs that caused a light effect: one pair was performed with a pincer 
grasp and the second with a whole-hand grasp. Numbers represent transitional probabilities be-
tween paired and random actions. Dotted lines underneath the first action of a pair depict the 4s 
period preceding the target actions in which predictive gaze fixations were analyzed.
No action or pair occurred more than three times consecutively, and all elements (pairs 
and random actions) occurred with equal frequency. Target actions also occurred 
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elsewhere in the sequence as random actions, to ensure that the effect only occurred 
after the two-step action pair and could not be independently associated with the 
target actions. Action sequences consisted of 96 total actions with 12 trials of each pair 
(Pincer and Hand). 
Grasp test device
Infants’ grasping proficiency was assessed using a wooden apparatus (Figure 4-1b). 
A small and a large bead (3 and 5mm diameter) were attached to strings that were 
threaded through removable wooden panels which fit into the apparatus frame. 
Procedure
The testing procedure consisted of an action observation phase followed by the grasp 
test. Infants were seated on a caretaker’s lap throughout both phases. During the action 
observation phase, eye movements were recorded continuously with a Tobii T120 eye-
tracker (Tobii Technologies, Inc.) at 60Hz. Gaze was calibrated using a standard 9-point 
calibration procedure until at least 8 points were acquired or a maximum of three 
attempts. Immediately following calibration, infants were shown the video stimuli. 
Caretakers were requested to avert their gaze during calibration and to refrain from 
influencing their child during the observation phase.
After the sequence was completed (or until infants became too fussy to continue the 
observation task), caretakers and infants moved to a nearby table for the grasp test 
(adapted from the procedure of Meyer et al., 2016). The experimenter placed the test 
apparatus in front of the infant and performed a single demonstration of how to grasp 
the bead and pull it out. After returning the bead to its original position (Figure 4-1b), 
infants were given one minute to pull out each bead. Each time they removed the 
bead, the experimenter replaced it and the infant could try again. This phase was video-
taped from a camera placed with full view of the infant for offline behavioral analysis. 
In addition, a parental questionnaire was administered prior to the testing session with 
questions about infants’ grasping history5. 
Data Analysis
Eye-tracking data
Raw eye-tracking data was separated into discrete fixations using a custom software 
program (GSA; Philip van den Broek, Donders Institute) with a spatial filter of 30 pixels 
and a temporal filter of 100ms. Regions of interest (ROIs) of equal size were defined 
5 This was collected as a secondary measure to support the data from the grasp test and was not used 
in the current analyses.
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around each object (i.e., action location) and around the action-effect (250 and 130 
square pixels, respectively). Predictive time windows were defined as the four seconds 
from the first frame in which the hand appeared to perform the first action of a pair 
until the final frame just before the hand reappeared to perform the target (second) 
action (dashed bars; Figure 4-1c). 
Calculation of proportions of predictive fixations
Fixations to the target object and to the action-effect locations during predictive time 
windows were considered correct, whereas fixations to any other object were conside-
red incorrect. Fixations to the location of ongoing actions were always excluded. We 
first calculated the proportions of correct (Equation 1) and incorrect predictive fixations 
(Equation 2) across all trials for each pair, divided the sum by the total fixations made 
to all ROIs. Total incorrect fixations were divided by four to yield the average number 
of fixations to an incorrect region; this measure has also been described elsewhere as 
an estimate of chance (Tummeltshammer & Kirkham, 2013). Proportions of correct and 
incorrect fixations were compared for each action pair, representing infants’ preference 
for anticipating a correct upcoming action and/or its effect relative to the other object 
locations. Proportions of correct fixations (Equation 1) were also calculated per trial 
and analyzed using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) to examine the emergence 
of predictive gaze over the course of the experiment. GEE analyses do not apply list-
wise exclusion of cases and are thus advantageous for analyzing data with repeated 
measures that contain missing points, such as trials in which no anticipatory fixations 
occur (Zeger et al., 1988).
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Equations 1-2: Calculations of the proportion measures. ‘All ROIs’ refers to the six objects and 
the action-effect. 
Grasp test
Infants’ ability to pull the beads out of the panels served as our measure of grasp pro-
ficiency (Figure 4-2). Video recordings of the grasp test phase were coded offline by a 
coder who was blind to th  aims of the study. Each attempt to extra t the bead from 
the device was coded as hand grasp, a transitional (i.e., inferior pincer) grasp, or a pincer 
grasp. Next, we calculated the proportion of times infants used each grasp type out of 
the total number of times he or she successfully extracted the beads, collapsed across 
small and large beads. Unsuccessful attempts were not coded. 
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Figure 4-2. Illustrations depicting classifi cation of grasping actions into whole hand (A), transi-
tional (B), or pincer (C) grasps during the grasp test. Only (C) was considered a true pincer grasp as 
this action requires opposition of the thumb and forefi nger. Image modifi ed with permission from 
(Erhardt, 1994). 
Almost all infants could extract the bead from the device, while demonstrating dif-
ferent levels of grasping competence to do so. We thus classifi ed infants according to 
the type of grasp they used most frequently to extract the bead, reasoning that this 
would refl ect the motor ability most dominant in their current repertoire. Rather than 
acquiring new motor skills in sudden steps, infants’ motor skills emerge in a gradual, 
graded way (see Ambrosini et al., 2013 for another non-binary scoring method). Each 
infant was classifi ed as Pincer-dominant, Hand-dominant, or Transitional depending 
on which grasp they used most (Table 4-1). For instance, if the relative proportions of 
an infant’s grasping actions were 0.58, 0.25, and 0.17 (pincer, transitional, and hand, 
respectively) this infant would be classifi ed as a Pincer-dominant infant. Infants whose 
relative proportions were evenly distributed across grasp types—such as 0.33, 0.33 
and 0.34—were also classifi ed as Transitional infants. To avoid confusion, infant groups 
(Pincer-dominant, Hand-dominant, and Transitional) are presented in italics and action 
pairs (Pincer, Hand) in non-italics.
Table 4-1. Characteristics of the fi nal sample.
Sample characteristics Grasp test measures
Motor group n Mean age in 
months (sd)
Gender
(f:m)
Mean prop. 
pincer grasps 
(sd)
Mean prop. 
hand grasps 
(sd)
Mean span in 
months* (sd)
Pincer-dominant 11 10.86 (0.63) 6:5 0.65 (0.17) 0.18 (0.13) 2.65 (1.58)
Transitional 22 10.07 (0.94) 6:16 0.21 (0.16) 0.35 (0.25) 1.93 (1.10)
Hand-dominant 15 9.94 (0.97) 7:8 0.06 (0.08) 0.80 (0.10) 1.65 (0.90)
*number of months since infant fi rst used a pincer grasp, per parent report (for descriptive purposes only; not 
used in analyses.
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Results
Age effects 
A one-way ANOVA with age as dependent variable and Motor Group as a factor indica-
ted that mean age differed significantly among the three motor groups, F(2,47) = 3.89, 
p = .03 (see Table 4-1). Pairwise comparisons revealed that the Pincer-dominant infants 
were significantly older than the Hand-dominant groups (mean difference [MD] = 27.96 
days, p = .01) and the Transitional group (MD = 24.00 days; p = .02). There were no dif-
ferences between the Hand-dominant and the Transitional infants (MD = 3.96, p = .66).
Visual Attention
There were no differences between infant groups in overall looking time to all regions 
of interest throughout the entire video, or in the total number of fixations during pre-
dictive time windows (ps > .25). Thus, infants with different levels of motor experiences 
did not demonstrate different visual attention to the action sequence. Across groups, 
infants made anticipatory fixations to the target actions on 28.3% of the experimental 
trials for which gaze data was obtained across both pairs. This rate of anticipatory looks 
is typical for infants in this age range (Tummeltshammer & Kirkham, 2013). 
To assess rates of anticipations over the course of the experiment, we conducted a 
linear, model-based GEE with an unstructured working correlation matrix. Each of 
the 12 trials from each pair (Pincer, Hand) was assigned a 1 if it included anticipation 
and a 0 if not. Trials were then collapsed into four time bins with three trials in each 
bin. Pair (Pincer, Hand) and Time Bin (T1, T2, T3, T4) were entered as within-subjects 
repeated measures and Motor Group (Pincer-dominant, Transitional, Hand-dominant) 
was entered as a between-subjects factor. Across all infants, rates of anticipation de-
creased significantly over the course of the experiment, χ2(3) = 51.14, p < .001. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed a consistent statistically significant decrease in the proportion of 
trials containing predictive fixations from each Time Bin to the next (e.g., from T1 to T2, 
from T2 to T3 and from T3 to T4). There were no other main effects or interactions (ps > 
.17), indicating that rates of visual attention did not differ across infants based on age 
or motor abilities.
Correct vs. Incorrect
To assess whether infants anticipated the next events in the sequence, we first compa-
red proportions of correct fixations (Equation 1) relative to incorrect fixations (Equation 
2) across the duration of the experiment. If infants learned the action pairs, proportions 
of fixations to correct locations should be higher than proportions to incorrect loca-
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tions. In this analysis, the first trial was always excluded from calculations, as infants 
should not be able to correctly predict on the very first observation of each pair.
We first compared correct and incorrect fixations across all infants to assess whether 
learning occurred at all. An ANOVA with Prediction (Correct vs. Incorrect) and Pair 
(Pincer, Hand) as within-subject factors revealed a statistically significant main effect of 
Prediction, F(1,46) = 22.08, ηp2 = .32, p < 001 (Figure 4-3). Across pairs, correct proporti-
ons were higher than incorrect proportions (MD = .14, SEM = .03, p < .001). There was no 
main effect of pair (p = .64) nor was there an interaction between Pair and Prediction (p 
= .64). With age included as a covariate, the effect of Prediction was marginally signifi-
cant, F(1,43) = 3.04, ηp2 = .07, p = .09. Age was a significant factor, p = .04.
Figure 4-3. The mean proportion of correct gaze fixations collapsed across motor groups. Bars 
represent standard errors of the mean.
We next added Motor Group (Pincer-dominant, Transitional, Hand-dominant) as a 
between-subjects factor to assess whether correct and incorrect fixations varied among 
motor groups with age as a covariate. This yielded no main effects or interactions with 
Motor Group (ps > .60). Thus, as a group, infants selectively anticipated the correct 
action and its effects more frequently than they incorrectly anticipated other objects 
on the screen across all trials, and this did not significantly differ between pairs or motor 
groups. 
A one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that proportion scores did not dif-
fer from a normal distribution for all dependent variables (ps > .05). A Levene’s test 
confirmed that the variances between the motor groups did not significantly differ 
from one another, p > .05.
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Learning over time
To further probe infants’ predictive gaze behaviors, we examined correct gaze propor-
tions over time. We expected proportions of correct fixations (Equation 1) to increase 
over trials, as infants learned the sequence regularities. Correct fixations were entered 
into a linear, model-based GEE with an unstructured Working Correlation Matrix. Pair 
(Pincer, Hand) and Time Bin (T1, T2, T3, T4) were entered as within-subjects repeated 
measures and Motor Group (Pincer-dominant, Transitional, Hand-dominant) was ente-
red as a between-subjects factor. Age was included as a covariate. The GEE revealed 
a significant main effect of Time Bin, χ2(3) = 31.00, p < .001, a significant interaction 
between Pair and Time Bin, χ2(3) = 15.047, p = .002, a significant interaction between 
Motor Group and Time Bin, χ2(6) = 23.33. p = .001, and a significant 3-way interaction 
between Pair, Motor Group and Time Bin, χ2(6) = 22.98, p = .001. There was no main 
effect of age, p = .16.
To assess whether the time-course of learning differed among motor groups, pair-
wise comparisons were conducted to follow up on the significant 3-way interaction 
between Pair, Motor Group, and Time Bin. This interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 
4-4. Based on our a priori hypotheses, we expected the largest differences in predictive 
gaze between Pincer-dominant and Hand-dominant infants. Therefore, we first focus on 
the results from follow-up comparisons between these two groups, before turning to 
the results from the Transitional group. 
For the Pincer-dominant motor group, correct predictions to the Pincer pair sharply 
increased from T1 to T2 (MD =.34, SEM = .12, p = .003) and then subsequently decreased 
from T2 to T4 (MD = .32, SEM = .10, p = .002). In contrast, the Hand-dominant group 
demonstrated no such increase in correct proportions from T1 to T2 (MD = .12, SEM = 
.10, p = .23). However, there were no differences between Pincer- and Hand-dominant 
groups for the Pincer pair at either T1 or T2 (ps > .14). It was not the case that the 
Hand-dominant infants showed no evidence for learning of the Pincer pair, as they did 
improve from T1 to T4 (MD = .33, SEM = .10, p = .001), but this increase was slower than 
that of the Pincer-dominant infants and did not emerge until the final quarter of the 
trials.  
For the Hand pair, the pattern was reversed: the Pincer-dominant infants showed no 
difference in correct predictions from T1 to T2 (MD = .08, SEM = .12, p = .53) whereas 
correct predictions increased marginally for the Hand-dominant infants (MD = .19, SEM 
= .10, p = .07). There was no difference between Pincer-dominant and Hand-dominant 
groups for the Hand pair at T1 (MD = .03, SEM = .10, p = .78); however, they did differ sig-
nificantly at T2 (MD = .29, SEM = .12, p = .017). The Hand-dominant infants subsequently 
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showed a decrease in correct predictions from T2 to T3 (MD = .24, SEM = .10, p = .016) 
and no significant gain across the experiment (T1 to T4; (MD = .02, SEM = .09, p = .80). 
The Pincer-dominant infants also showed no significant gain across the experiment for 
the Hand pair (MD = .02, SEM = .12, p = .85). 
Figure 4-4. The mean proportion of correct gaze fixations over the four time bins of the experi-
ment plotted separately for the Pincer pair (above) and the Hand pair (below). Lines represent the 
three infant motor groups. Bars represent standard errors.
The Transitional group demonstrated a pattern in between that of the Pincer-dominant 
and the Hand-dominant group. For the Pincer pair, the transitional group also increased 
their correct fixations from T1 to T2 like the Pincer-dominant group (MD = .27, SEM = .08, 
p = .001), followed by a decrease from T2 to T3 (MD = -.41, SEM = .08, p < .001). However, 
they again showed a second rise in correct predictions from T3 to T4 (MD = .51, SEM 
= .06, p < .001), like the Hand-dominant group, and overall their correct predictions 
increased from T1 to T4 (MD = .37, SEM = .08, p < .001). For the Hand pair, the transitional 
group closely followed the pattern of the Hand-dominant infants, with an initial gain in 
correct anticipations from T1 to T2 (MD = .24, SEM = .08, p = .003) followed by a decrease 
from T2 to T3 (MD = -.22, SEM = .07, p = .002), and no significant change across the entire 
experiment (T1 to T4; MD = .03, SEM = .08, p = .70).
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To sum up, the infants with more dominant pincer grasp abilities quickly detected the 
pair structure for actions performed with a pincer grasp and correctly anticipated the 
upcoming action or its effect within the first few observations. This was then followed 
by a decrease in correct predictions in later trials. Similarly, the infants with a dominant 
hand grasp showed a faster improvement in predictions for the actions performed with 
a hand grasp, followed by a decline in performance. The Transitional infants, whose 
motor experience fell between Hand-dominant and Pincer-dominant infants, showed 
fixation patterns which shared characteristics with both groups.
Discussion
Observational statistical learning and motor experiences are both key pathways to 
infants’ developing action understanding and social-cognitive abilities (Hunnius & Bek-
kering 2014). In the current eye-tracking experiment, we aimed to shed light on how 
these processes interact with one another during action observation. Infants observed 
an action sequence containing two deterministic pairs, one performed with a pincer 
grasp and the other with a whole-hand grasp. Predictive gaze to the second actions of 
each pair and their associated effects were measured as an indicator of statistical lear-
ning. Following observation, infants’ motor performance on a grasp test was used to 
determine their dominant grasp type. Our central hypothesis was that learning would 
be modulated by infants’ level of motor proficiency with the observed grasp type. 
Findings revealed that infants, as a group, learned the transitional probabilities within 
the observed action sequences. Across pairs and motor groups, infants made more 
fixations to the correct upcoming actions and/or their effects than to other action loca-
tions on the screen. Consistent with prior findings with older infants (Monroy, Gerson & 
Hunnius, 2017), these results show that 8- to 11-month-olds can predict upcoming ac-
tions and their effects by learning transitional probabilities within an action sequence. 
Further, the general ability to predict upcoming actions was not driven by the specific 
motor action observed or by infants’ levels of motor proficiency.  
A direct link between infants’ action perception and action production has previously 
been demonstrated for simple, isolated actions such as reaching and grasping (e.g., 
Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). In the current experiment, 
we examined whether this link extends to situations in which infants need to use their 
statistical learning skills to predict upcoming sequential actions. This would be consis-
tent with motor-based accounts of action understanding, which hypothesize that the 
motor system guides the generation of action predictions (Kilner et al., 2007a). 
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Our data provide partial support for the notion that recent motor experiences influence 
infants’ statistical learning for action sequences. However, they do not provide conclu-
sive support for the hypothesis that motor-based learning is essential for action predic-
tions. Results showed that infants with a dominant pincer-hand grasp demonstrated 
an early increase in correct anticipations for the pincer grasp but not the hand grasp, 
indicating faster learning for the action dominant in their current motor repertoire. 
Likewise, infants with a dominant whole-hand grasp similarly demonstrated an early 
increase in correct anticipations for the hand grasp, but not the pincer grasp. The tran-
sitional infants—who likely had similar levels of proficiency with both actions—shared 
similar patterns with both groups. In sum, infants’ ability to learn action pairs based on 
statistical regularities was faster for the actions that are dominant in their current motor 
repertoire. 
Faster learning for the action pair matching infants’ own motor abilities may reflect the 
influence of motor experiences on the ability to predict upcoming sequential actions, 
as we had hypothesized. According to motor-based accounts, the motor system com-
bines prior knowledge with incoming sensory input to generate a prediction (Kilner et 
al., 2007a). Motor experiences with the observed act are one important source of prior 
knowledge and allow the motor system to generate more precise predictions (Stapel 
et al., 2016). According to these views, the current data show that infants more readily 
predicted the actions for which they could recruit an established motor representation. 
Unexpectedly, infants with a dominant whole-hand grasp, who had little experience 
performing a pincer grasp, still demonstrated learning for the pincer grasp pair. These 
findings suggest that the motor system was not the critical driving factor in infants’ 
action processing. However, there were three principal differences between the current 
experiment and the previous evidence for a closer link between motor skills and action 
prediction skills (e.g., Ambrosini et al., 2013; Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Kanakogi 
& Itakura, 2011). First, our paradigm featured sequential actions that differed in both 
statistical likelihood and type of grasp, whereas previous studies featured isolated 
reaching actions that differed only in the observed grasp. A recent study with adults re-
vealed that, when action sequences contain varying degrees of predictability between 
actions, non-motor neural networks are activated that are traditionally involved in 
processing uncertainty within probabilistic perceptual input (Ahlheim et al., 2014). In a 
similar vein, perceptually difficult conditions engage additional brain regions beyond 
those typically activated during action observation (Lingnau & Petris, 2013). Thus, under 
uncertainty, domain-general regions outside the action-observation network become 
involved. One possibility is that additional non-motor processes became involved when 
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infants’ own motor system does not have enough knowledge or sensory information to 
generate a precise prediction.
Secondly, prior research investigating anticipatory gaze and motor abilities have mea-
sured anticipations to the target, or end-point, of the actor’s reach-to-grasp actions. 
For instance, in Ambrosini et al., 2013, fixations during an actor’s reaching movement 
were recorded and anticipations were defined as any fixation to the object before the 
hand made contact. In this study, infants with faster anticipations to the object were 
considered more predictive than infants who anticipated later (see also Falck-Ytter et 
al., 2006; Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Rosander & von 
Hofsten, 2011). Some have interpreted such findings as evidence for the influence of an 
internal motor program, indicated by faster visual anticipations during the movement 
trajectory of observed action (i.e., a ‘gaze advantage’, Rosander & von Hofsten, 2011). 
In the current experiment, we assessed anticipations to a future action step, rather 
than speed of gaze latencies during a reaching phase in which multiple motor cues 
are immediately available—such as movement velocity, hand shape and trajectory. 
Possibly, the difference between our findings and those of the aforementioned studies 
could indicate that motor experiences have a lesser impact on predicting the identity 
of an upcoming action step that cannot be predicted solely based on incoming motor 
information. 
A third important difference between the current study and most prior research is our 
method of classifying motor ability. Here, we classified infants based on the relative 
dominance of each grasp type, rather than a binary classification of whether infants 
could in general perform the action or not (e.g., van Elk et al., 2008). This method more 
closely mirrors how infants’ motor development naturally unfolds (Ambrosini et al., 
2013). Infants accumulate both visual and motor experiences with the fine-grained ki-
nematics of an action—such as a certain muscle movement—before piecing together 
the entire action skill (Senna et al., 2016). Thus, although the whole-hand infants do not 
yet readily or voluntarily perform a pincer grasp, they may be able to take advantage 
of finer-grained motor cues for movements that they can do, such as the actor’s hand 
shape (Ambrosini et al., 2013). Indeed, some motor-based accounts claim that the mo-
tor system can predict even those actions well outside our own physical abilities—such 
as a bird’s flight—by approximating the link between the observed act and the motor 
system’s internal model (Schubotz, 2007). 
Recent studies have further probed the influence of developing motor abilities on 
infants’ visual attention to actions and the objects and effects related to them. Impor-
tantly, shifts in visual attention may relate to the nature of what is attended to, rather 
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than simply the overall amount. Though we observed no differences in global attention 
to objects between motor groups, there may have been differences in the microstruc-
ture of infants’ gaze shifts which could have led them to receive altered visual inputs 
according to the congruency between the observed action pair and their own motor 
expertise. For instance, Smith and colleagues (Smith & Yu, 2008; Yu & Smith, 2011) 
used microanalytic techniques to show that infants’ learning outcomes related to fine-
grained patterns of gaze shifts between objects, and could be modelled by a simple 
associative learning model. Although in the current study we restricted our analyses to 
only predictive gaze, further analysis of the relations between fine-grained measures of 
visual attention and motor abilities would be an interesting avenue for future research 
and may shed additional light on the observed patterns.
Along these same lines, in the current study we considered predictions to upcoming 
actions and their effects as correct. We did not investigate whether infants only pre-
dicted the effect instead of the next upcoming action. Prior research has shown that 
infants of a similar age range rely on cues from action-effects to learn about sequential 
outcomes (Monroy et al., 2017; Verschoor, Weidema, Biro, & Hommel, 2010). It has also 
been suggested that the motor system predicts the effects of our own actions and 
those that we observe (Elsner et al., 2002). Thus, though it was not the focus of the 
current study, it would be interesting to further investigate whether the presence of 
action-effects might be an important aspect of the relation between motor experien-
ces and statistical learning.
Surprisingly, following the initial rise in correct predictions for actions matching their 
own motor abilities, correct predictions subsequently declined. This decline was consis-
tent across all infants and across action pairs, and showed that predictions did not follow 
a stable pattern over time. One simple explanation is a loss of attention to the stimuli. 
The proportions of trials containing predictive gaze fixations steadily decreased over 
the course of the experiment, indicating that infants made fewer predictions during 
later trials. Infants may have simply stopped anticipating after successfully making a 
few correct predictions, given that no new information was offered by subsequent 
repetitions of the action pairs. They may instead have begun to engage in other visual 
behaviors such as tracking the actor’s hands or exploring the visual scene in search of 
novel information. Some paradigms use so-called ‘occluders’ to encourage participants 
to make visual anticipations (e.g., Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Hunt & Aslin, 2001; Johnson 
et al., 2003; Paulus et al., 2011). In contrast, in our study, all objects were freely visible 
throughout the entire demonstration which, though more ecologically valid, may also 
have ‘discouraged’ anticipatory gaze. The conditions under which infants reliably and 
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consistently anticipate actions, particularly in naturalistic, live contexts, are an impor-
tant avenue for future research which we are currently pursuing.
Conclusion
Given the accumulating evidence for the role of the motor system in facilitating action 
processing, can motor accounts explain the current findings? We propose that infants 
were engaging their motor systems as they processed the action sequence: when 
the observed action pairs were congruent with the grasping action most dominant 
in their motor repertoire, infants demonstrated a rapid increase in correct predictions. 
However, differences between motor groups were subtle. Learning was not tightly 
constrained by infants’ level of motor expertise, suggesting that additional cognitive 
processes come into play when infants need to use their statistical learning skills to 
generate action predictions. These findings further demonstrate that infants’ action 
prediction abilities cannot solely be explained by motor accounts, but likely reflect the 
recruitment of both motor and non-motor strategies when prediction requires learning 
statistical regularities in action sequences.
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Abstract
Infants are sensitive to structure and patterns within continuous streams of sensory 
input. This sensitivity relies on statistical learning, the ability to detect predictable re-
gularities in spatial and temporal sequences. Recent evidence has shown that infants 
can detect statistical regularities in action sequences they observe, but little is known 
about the neural process that give rise to this ability. In the current experiment, we 
combined electroencephalography (EEG) with eye-tracking to identify electrophysiolo-
gical markers that indicate whether 8-11-month-old infants detect violations to learned 
regularities in action sequences, and to relate these markers to behavioral measures of 
anticipation during learning. In a learning phase, infants observed an actor performing 
a sequence featuring two deterministic pairs embedded within an otherwise random 
sequence. Thus, the first action of each pair was predictive of what would occur next. 
One of the pairs caused an action-effect, whereas the second did not. In a subsequent 
test phase, infants observed another sequence that included deviant pairs, violating 
the previously observed action pairs. Event-related potential (ERP) responses were 
analyzed and compared between the deviant and the original action pairs. Findings 
reveal that infants demonstrated a greater Negative central (Nc) ERP response to the 
deviant actions for the pair that caused the action-effect, which was consistent with 
their visual anticipations during the learning phase.  Findings are discussed in terms of 
the neural and behavioral processes underlying perception and learning of structured 
action sequences.
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Introduction
Infants face the constant challenge of perceiving meaningful events within the complex 
action sequences they observe. Human actions contain inherent statistical regularities, 
characterized by predictable patterns that result in specific goals or outcomes. For 
instance, the everyday action of ‘drinking tea’ always consists of the same sequence: 
grasping a kettle, heating water, adding milk (if you are British), and so forth. Sensitivity 
to sequential regularities forms the basis for the ability to predict action goals, their 
outcomes, and to adaptively respond during social interactions. In fact, infant’s growing 
abilities to understand the social world may arise initially from their statistical learning 
skills (Ruffman et al., 2012).  
Recent studies have investigated infants’ sensitivity to different kinds of statistical infor-
mation in actions they observe. Paulus and colleagues (2011) showed that 9-month-olds 
used frequency information from prior observations to predict where an agent would 
reappear along a path after disappearing (Paulus et al., 2011). In another experiment 
(Stahl et al., 2014), 18-month-olds viewed action sequences comprised of three-step 
deterministic action ‘units’ (example: A-B-C and D-E-F). Afterwards, they were tested on 
their ability to discriminate intact units (A-B-C) and ‘part-units’, which featured lower 
transitional probabilities (example: C-D-E). Their results showed that 18-month-olds 
successfully discriminated between units and part-units, indicating that they succes-
sfully segmented the action sequence according to its transitional probabilities. 
Further behavioral studies show that infants can detect regularities in visual events 
and actions from the statistical information alone, independently from physical or 
movement cues (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Hespos, Saylor, & Grossman, 2009; Kirkham et 
al., 2002; Saylor et al., 2007). One hypothesis arising from this evidence is that infants 
initially rely on statistical learning skills to predict upcoming events based on sequential 
regularities, and that these skills precede the ability to form conceptual expectations 
about goal-directed actions (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). In other words, infants first 
learn that someone grasping a mug typically pours tea before drinking, which in turn 
enables them to predict that the mug will be brought to the mouth, and ultimately 
leads to a meaningful concept of the act of ‘drinking tea’. 
The sensory consequences of an action—action-effects—are a central feature of 
goal-directed action. As in the tea example, each step is associated with a change 
in the sensory environment such as the sound of the pouring tea. The development 
of infants’ understanding of goal-directed actions may primarily emerge through 
repeated observation of actions and their perceptual effects (Hunnius & Bekkering, 
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2014). Prior behavioral studies illustrate that action-effects are critical in guiding how 
infants perceive and learn about action events (Jovanovic et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2006; 
Verschoor et al., 2010). However, though they may enhance learning or induce chan-
ges in behavior, action-effects may not be necessary for infants to initially learn the 
regularities in observed action sequences. Some research has shown that infants and 
adults demonstrate neural responses to sequential events based only on their statistical 
likelihood (Abla & Okanoya, 2009; Teinonen et al., 2009). Given these findings there is 
no reason to expect infants could not do so for action sequences as well, though they 
might acquire a stronger association between sequential actions that cause action-
effects for several reasons. First, infants are drawn to contingency, and action-effects are 
salient sensory events that are also contingent upon the action causing them (Gergely 
& Watson, 1996, 1999). Second, action-effects may be perceived as goals and draw at-
tention to the actions that precede them, as action goals have a powerful influence on 
how infants subsequently process observed actions (Henderson & Woodward, 2011). In 
the current study, we compared event-related potential (ERP) responses, as described 
below, to sequential actions that either did or did not cause a salient visual effect. 
The ERP technique has made it possible to explore the neural mechanisms that sup-
port action processing in infants. ERPs are voltage oscillations in the electroencep-
halography (EEG) signal that are time-locked to the onset of perceived events (Luck, 
2014). Components can be identified in the ERP waveforms that mark specific stages 
of perceptual and cognitive processes in infants (for a review, see de Haan, 2007). Two 
ERP components are particularly relevant for research on infant action processing: the 
Negative central (Nc) and the N400, which reflect visual attention and semantic proces-
sing, respectively (Kaduk et al., 2016; Pace, Carver, & Friend, 2013; Reid et al., 2009). 
The Nc component has been interpreted as a marker of attention orientation towards 
salient stimuli and is often larger in response to novel or unexpected stimuli (e.g., Cour-
chesne, 1977; Karrer & Monti, 1995; for a review, see Reynolds, 2015). The Nc emerges 
shortly after birth (Karrer & Monti, 1995), and between 3 to 6 months infants begin to 
show a stable Nc response that is larger for novel compared to familiar stimuli (except 
in certain cases, such as a mother’s face or emotionally salient stimuli; de Haan & Nel-
son, 1997). Increased negative amplitude is thought to reflect increased allocation of 
attention towards the stimulus (Courchesne, Ganz, & Norcia, 1981; Richards, 2003). The 
Nc manifests as a negative deflection in the ERP waveform at central and midline elec-
trodes, peaking between 250 and 750ms following stimulus onset (de Haan, 2007). The 
neural generators of the Nc are presumed to be prefrontal and frontal regions related 
to attention and memory systems, reflecting cortical allocation of attention resources 
(Reynolds, Courage, & Richards, 2010).
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The N400 component is observed in both adults and infants during processing of 
‘meaningful’ stimuli; that is, stimuli that grant access to semantic, or conceptual, know-
ledge (e.g., Reid & Striano, 2008; van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2014, 2009). The N400 is 
characterized by a negative peak that is largest over a central-parietal scalp distribution 
and is sensitive to semantic incongruence (for a review, see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
N400 effects have been reported in infants as young as 9 months of age, with a peak 
latency that is delayed relative to the adult component (Kaduk et al., 2016; Parise & 
Csibra, 2012; Reid et al., 2009). By 14 months of age, N400 effects become more robust 
and are elicited in a broader range of modalities and conventional paradigms (Friedrich 
& Friederici, 2004; 2005). Infants display an N400 response following an action outcome 
that is strange within the semantic context, such as bringing a spoonful of food to one’s 
forehead and is thus thought to be functionally similar to the adult N400. N400 effects 
during action observation indicate a violation of an expected action outcome (Kaduk 
et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009). 
The current experiment used ERPs to investigate learning during observation of action 
sequences containing statistical regularities. Infants of 8-11 months of age experienced 
a learning and test phase. The learning phase consisted of a continuous video of an 
action sequence, featuring two deterministic pairs embedded within an otherwise 
random sequence. At test, infants observed another sequence that included two novel 
‘deviant’ pairs, which should violate their predictions if they had successfully learned 
the pairs. If infants perceive these deviants as violations of the expected sequential 
order, this should result in an enhanced Nc response to the deviant, relative to the ori-
ginal pairs, due to increased attention following the violation. We further hypothesized 
that these responses would be stronger for the pair associated with the action-effect. 
Finally, sequence violations might also elicit an N400 response, which would indicate 
that statistical regularities could provide the contextual information needed for storing 
semantic knowledge about the expected action sequence. 
The current study implemented eye-tracking in addition to EEG measurements to as-
sess whether infants also made predictive eye movements towards upcoming actions 
prior to their onset as the action sequence unfolded. Specifically, we examined whether 
infants looked toward the second action of a pair—or the action effect, for the Effect 
pair—during the first action of the pair. This measure provided a behavioral indicator of 
learning and extended results from prior research with 18-month-old infants (Monroy 
et al., 2017). As an exploratory measure, we related the eye-tracking to the EEG measu-
res to further clarify the neural correlates of learning.
Chapter 594
In sum, our primary aim in the current study was to identify novel electrophysiological 
evidence for statistical learning during observation of action sequences and identify 
whether they relate to behavioral indicators of learning. Our second goal was to identify 
the presence of ERP components associated with specific attention and/or semantic 
processes during action observation.  
Method
Participants
Fourteen infants were included in the final sample for the ERP analysis (M = 10.9 
months, range: 8.9-11.9 months, 9 males). Of these, seven infants were included in the 
final sample for the eye-tracking analysis (M = 10.4 months, range: 9.1-11.9 months, 3 
males). An additional 8 infants contributed complete datasets from eye-tracking but 
not EEG measurements (N = 15, M = 10.3 months, range: 9.0-11.9 months, 6 males). All 
infants were recruited from a database of families interested in participating in deve-
lopmental research. Although no demographic information was collected, the families 
were representative of the population of the small European city in which the data 
was collected (i.e., largely Caucasian and middle-class). Written informed consent was 
acquired from all parents, and families received a thank-you gift of 10£ for participation. 
Fourteen additional infants were excluded from the ERP analysis due to insufficient 
artifact-free trials (given a minimum criterion of three trials per condition, n = 9) or 
excessive fussiness (n = 5). This attrition rate (50%) is typical for EEG experiments with 
young infants (cf. Hoehl & Wahl, 2012; Meyer et al., 2015). An additional eighteen infants 
visited the lab but were unable to participate in the experiment due to equipment 
failure. Our final sample size was therefore smaller than the number we had aimed for a 
priori, though it is nevertheless consistent with prior infant EEG experiments reporting 
an Nc effect (Courchesne et al., 1981; Parise, Handl, Palumbo, & Friederici, 2011; van 
Hoogmoed, van den Brink, & Janzen, 2013).
Stimuli 
Learning Phase
Infants were first shown a video of an adult agent performing an action sequence with 
a novel toy, in which only the actor’s hand was visible on screen (see Figure 2-1, p. 
26). The toy featured six unique objects and a central star-shaped light. An action was 
defined as the manipulation of one object. Stimulus movies were filmed with a Sony 
HandyCam video camera and edited using Adobe Premiere Pro Cs5 software. All stimuli 
were presented on a screen with a resolution of 600 x 800 pixels, and a visual angle of 
35 x 20 degrees.
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The sequence structure was defined according to the transitional probabilities between 
action steps. Two action pairs featured deterministic transitions (i.e., action ‘A’ followed 
action ‘B’ with 100% predictability), whereas transitions between unpaired actions 
had a 0.167 (1/6) probability. One of the deterministic pairs caused a light to turn on 
during the second action; the second pair did not cause any effect. We refer to these, 
respectively, as the ‘Effect’ and ‘No-effect’ pairs. For both pairs, the second actions were 
defined as target actions, as these were the events that became predictable during the 
unfolding of the sequence. We constrained the sequence such that no action or pair 
occurred more than three times consecutively, and such that all events occurred with 
equal frequency for a total of 12 repetitions of every action and pair. Importantly, target 
actions also occurred elsewhere in the sequence outside of their pairs, to ensure that 
infants would need to learn the two-step pair structure rather than only associating 
the effect with the target action. The actions that defined the Effect and No-effect pairs 
were counterbalanced in two sets of videos, and infants were randomly assigned to 
one stimuli set. 
For each action, the actor’s hand entered the screen near the object, performed the 
action, and exited the screen in the same place. A brief pause occurred between acti-
ons, during which the object was viewed with no hand present. The onset of the light 
(effect) occurred at a natural mid-point of the target action during the Effect pair and 
ended when the action was completed. For example, during the target action ‘open’, 
the light went on the moment the small yellow door was fully open, and went off again 
as the hand closed the door. 
Each video was divided into four blocks of 24 actions (with approximately 3 trials of 
each pair in each block) with the viewing angle oriented from a different side of the toy 
box in each block to ensure that the object location on the screen did not become a 
predictable cue. At the beginning of a block, one still frame of the object was presented 
with no hand visible to help the infant reorient to the new perspective. In total, the 
entire learning phase lasted approximately six minutes. Engaging, upbeat music was 
played throughout the entire sequence that did not correspond in any way to the 
unfolding action sequence. 
Test Phase
Still frames were selected from the videos that were representative of the mid-point 
of each action for the test phase. The test phase consisted of one block of 144 images, 
in which the target action of each pair was replaced on half of the trials by a different 
action. For example, if the Effect pair during the learning phase was bend-open, infants 
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saw bend-open and bend-slide, with both target images open and slide featuring the 
effect (Figure 5-1). 
Figure 5-1. Test conditions: examples of the original and deviant action pairs (images enlarged for 
clarity; infants observed the display as they had seen it during the learning phase).
Procedure 
Parents and infants were invited into the lab and first given the opportunity to become 
comfortable with the new surroundings. After the procedure was explained, parents 
provided written informed consent. Infants sat on their parent’s lap throughout all 
phases of the study. After preparing the EEG net, parents were instructed to refrain 
from influencing their child during the experiment. The entire session was videotaped 
with the camera positioned behind and to the right of the presentation screen, with 
full view of the child and parent. Although we only analyzed the eye-tracking data from 
the learning phase, both EEG and eye-tracking data were recorded throughout both 
phases of the experiment. This allowed us to perform calibration and prepare the EEG 
cap at the beginning of data collection and avoid disrupting the flow of the experiment 
and potentially causing infants to become fussy. 
EEG Acquisition and Processing
EEG was recorded continuously with the Electrical Geodesics Incorporated (Eugene, 
Oregon, USA) 128-channel recording system (Net Station 4.1.1). The EEG signal was 
referenced to the vertex and recorded with a 0.1-100 Hz band-pass filter and a sampling 
rate of 500Hz. Data was preprocessed using Net Station 4.3 Waveform Tools. Recordings 
were digitally filtered with a 0.3-Hz high-pass filter and a 30-Hz low-pass filter, and were 
segmented from 200ms before to 1000ms after the stimulus onset (the test image) 
for each trial. Consistent with standard practices in the field, segments were visually 
inspected to exclude EEG artifacts such as noisy channels (e.g., channels with consis-
tent high-frequency noise or a flat line indicating loss of signal) or artifacts caused by 
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eye and body movements (Hoehl & Wahl, 2012). Any segments in which infants were 
not attending to the screen based on video recordings of the session were rejected. 
Participants were required to have at least three artifact-free trials per experimental 
condition (Figure 5-1) to be included in further analyses. This trial inclusion criterion 
was selected based on previous evidence that reliable Nc and N400 effects with infants 
are found with as few as three to seven trials per condition (Kaduk et al., 2016; Kaduk, 
Elsner, & Reid, 2013; Missana, Rajhans, Atkinson, & Grossmann, 2014; Stets & Reid, 2011). 
The mean number of artifact-free EEG trials contributed by infants across conditions 
was 6.27 (range = 3–11). For each condition, the mean number of trials contributed was 
as follows: DeviantEffectpair = 5.57 (SD = 1.55), OriginalEffectpair = 6.07 (SD = 2.53), DeviantNon-
effectpair = 6.43 (SD = 2.1), OriginalNoneffectpair = 7.07 (SD = 2.1). The mean number of trials did 
not differ significantly between the compared conditions.
Eye-Tracking
Eye movements were recorded using a Tobii TX300 eye-tracker (Tobii, Stockholm, 
Sweden) at 120Hz with a spatial filter of 40 pixels and a temporal filter of 100ms. First, 
a 5-point calibration sequence was repeated until valid calibration data was acquired 
for at least four points or a maximum of three attempts. Following calibration, infants 
watched the learning video and then were immediately shown the test phase follo-
wing a brief (<1s) pause during which they observed a blank screen. During the test 
phase, the experimenter could initiate attention-grabbers when the infant looked away 
from the stimuli, or a pause if the infant became distressed. Attention-grabbers were 
only implemented during the test phase—thus, the learning phase was never inter-
rupted by them—and they could only be initiated during a fixation image so as not 
to further disrupt the sequence. Following attention-grabbers, the sequence resumed 
from where it had left off. Video stimuli were presented using Psychtoolbox for Matlab 
and a custom-made application written using Python. Sounds were played through 
external speakers.
During the test trials, infants were assigned to either a gaze-contingent or automatic 
presentation group. This was due to the sample also being used for a separate, unre-
lated methodological study (in the final ERP sample, there were 8 infants in the gaze-
contingent condition and 6 infants in the automatic condition). In both groups, each 
test trial began with a fixation image presented at a size of 3º x 3.7º in the location of 
the upcoming action (Figure 5-2). We chose to present the fixation image in the target 
location in order to avoid eye movements towards the target because eye movements 
could distort the EEG signal and interfere with ERP components (Hoehl and Wahl, 2012). 
In the gaze-contingent condition, the test image was immediately presented only if 
the infant was looking at the fixation image. If the child was looking away, the fixation 
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image would wiggle and play a jingling sound until the infant looked at the target 
location, or for a maximum of 4s. Trial duration thus ranged from 2s to a maximum 
of 6s. In the automatic condition, the fixation image remained for 1s before the next 
image automatically appeared. Each trial thus lasted for a total fixed duration of 2s. In 
both conditions, the test image was presented for an identical duration (1s); only the 
duration of the fixation image varied. 
Figure 5-2. Example trials from the test phase.
Data Analysis
ERP Analysis: Test Phase
To identify the presence of an Nc component during the test trials, mean minimum 
amplitude of the ERP was calculated in selected channel groups (Figure 5-3) from 
250-750ms post-stimulus, consistent with prior work on this component (Reid et al., 
2009; Richards, 2003). There is a lack of consistency among the infant studies that report 
an Nc effect; thus, we attempted to select a time window a priori that was consistent 
with most studies featuring a paradigm closest to our own. As the prefrontal cortex 
and anterior cingulate cortex have been suggested as the cortical source of the Nc, 
we expected to find a widespread frontal and central topography in our participant 
group (Reynolds & Richards, 2005). We confirmed our time window and channel group 
selection by visual inspection of the grand average waveforms. Mean amplitude was 
analyzed via a 2 (Pair: Effect, No-effect) x 2 (Condition: Deviant, Original) x 4 (Channel 
Location: Central, Frontal Midline, Frontal Left, Frontal Right) ANOVA. Interactions were 
followed up with pairwise comparisons of estimated marginal means.
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Figure 5-3. An illustration of the EGI 128-channel groups selected for the ERP analysis. Central and 
frontal channel groups (blue and green) were selected for the Nc analysis; parietal channels (purple) 
were selected for the N400 analysis.
For identification of the N400 component, we selected a priori the procedure outlined by 
Reid and colleagues (2009) that suggests a time-window analysis as a more appropriate 
statistical method when there is a defined peak in one condition but not the other. This 
method analyzes the variation in ERP amplitude across time-window samples between 
conditions and reveals the ERP effect of interest as an interaction between condition 
and time (for full details, see Hoormann, Falkenstein, Schwarzenau, & Hohnsbein, 1998). 
Though the N400 has a broader topography in adults, in infants it has been only ob-
served in parietal regions most likely due to masking by the Nc component (Reid et al., 
2009). For our analysis, we selected a time window from 500-700 after stimulus onset 
in parietal channels, as suggested in Reid et al. (2009). After normalizing the data as 
suggested in Hoorman et al. (1998), variance of the ERP amplitude was analyzed using 
a 2 (Pair: Effect, No-effect) x 2 (Condition: Deviant, Original) x 17 (Time: one sample per 
12ms) ANOVA. 
Eye Tracking Data: Learning Phase
Eye movement data from the learning phase were analyzed to assess anticipatory gaze 
fixations to upcoming target actions during predictive time windows. These were de-
fined as the frame when the agent’s hand appeared in order to perform the first action of 
a deterministic pair until immediately before it reappeared for the target action (Figure 
5-4). This corresponds to the time in which the observer has enough information about 
what the next action will be to make a prediction about the upcoming location before 
the subsequent action occurs (Monroy et al., 2017). For both action pairs, we excluded 
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the first trial for each pair, as infants should not be able to make a prediction based on 
prior information during the first trial. Thus, 11 trials were included in the final analysis 
for each deterministic pair. Infants observed an average of 6.5 (SEM = 0.63) repetitions 
of the Effect pair and 6.08 (SEM = 0.64) repetitions of the No-effect pair during the 
learning phase. Thus, we did not apply an inclusion criterion based on looking time 
from the learning phase, given that previous research has shown that infants can learn 
these types of regularities within very few trials (Monroy et al., 2017).
Figure 5-4. Example frames illustrating the predictive time window during the learning videos. Red 
arrows indicate the first frame in which the agent’s hand appears.
Regions of interest (ROI) of equal size were defined around each stimulus object. Fixati-
ons to the ROI of the target action during the predictive time window were counted as 
correct, and fixations to any other ROI were incorrect. Fixations to the object currently 
being manipulated were excluded from calculations. For the Effect pair, fixations to the 
star were counted as correct; for the No-effect pair, they were excluded (Equations 1-4). 
If infants learned the pair associations, they should look more to the target object of 
each pair than to all other objects during the first action. For each pair, we calculated 
the proportion of correct or incorrect fixations, out of the sum of all fixations within 
predictive time windows. For incorrect fixations, we summed the total fixations to the 
four alternative locations and divided by four to yield the average number of fixations 
to an incorrect region. 
Effect Pair:
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proportion of correct or incorrect fixations, out of the sum of all fixations within predictive 
time windows. For incorrect fixations, we summed the total fixations to the four alternative 
locations and divided by four to yield the average number of fixations to an incorrect region.  
Effect Pair: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓 &𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 &𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓     ( 1 ) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 4 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/4
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 &𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓     ( 2 ) 
No-effect Pair: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓      ( 3 ) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶= # 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 4 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/4
𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓      ( 4 ) 
Equations 1-4. Calculations of the proportion measures. For the effect pair, the effect ROI 
was included for the number of correct looks and the total number of looks (‘all ROIs’) while 
for the No-effect pair it was not included in the total number (‘all objects’). 
 
Results 
Event-related potentials 
Negative central 
The Nc component was found as a clear negative peak located in frontal and central 
electrodes, peaking at approximately 400ms following stimulus onset (Figure 5-5). Latency 
and amplitude of the peak were analyzed separately. No significant effects were found for Nc 
latency, indicating that the ERP peak amplitude featured a similar time course across 
conditions and pairs. For peak amplitude, the ANOVA analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between Pair and Condition, F(1, 13) = 7.09, p = .02, p2 = .35. For the Effect 
pair, Nc amplitude was significantly greater following the deviant compared to the original 
targets (mean difference = 4.23μV, SE = 1.26, p = .005). For the No-effect pair, no 
 ( 1 )
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proportion of correct or incorrect fixations, out of the sum of all fixations within predictive 
time windows. For incorrect fixations, we summed th  total fixations to the four alternative 
locations and divided by four to yield the average number of fixations to an incorrect region.  
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No-effect Pair: 
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Equations 1-4. Calculations of the proportion measures. For the effect pair, the effect ROI 
was included for the number of correct looks and the total number of looks (‘all ROIs’) while 
for the No-effect pair it was not included in the total number (‘all objects’). 
 
Results 
Event-related potentials 
Negative central 
The Nc component was found as a clear negative peak located in frontal and central 
electrodes, peaking at approximately 400ms following stimulus onset (Figure 5-5). Latency 
and amplitude of the peak were analyzed separately. No significant effects were found for Nc 
latency, indicating that the ERP peak amplitude featured a similar time course across 
conditions and pairs. For peak amplitude, the ANOVA analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between Pair and Condition, F(1, 13) = 7.09, p = .02, p2 = .35. For the Effect 
pair, Nc amplitude was significantly greater following the deviant compared to the original 
targets (mean difference = 4.23μV, SE = 1.26, p = .005). For the No-effect pair, no 
 ( 2 )
Sensitivity to structure in action sequences: An infant event-related potential study 101
No-effect Pair:
Chapter 5 
118 
 
proportion of correct or incorrect fixations, out of the sum of all fixations within predictive 
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𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 #𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓      ( 4 ) 
Equations 1-4. Calculations of the proportion measures. For the effect pair, the effect ROI 
was included for the number of correct looks and the total number of looks (‘all ROIs’) while 
for the No-effect pair it was not included in the total number (‘all objects’). 
 
Results 
Event-related potentials 
Negative central 
The Nc component was found as a clear negative peak located in frontal and central 
electrodes, peaking at approximately 400ms following stimulus onset (Figure 5-5). Latency 
and amplitude of the peak were analyzed separately. No significant effects were found for Nc 
latency, indicating that the ERP peak amplitude featured a similar time course across 
conditions and pairs. For peak amplitude, the ANOVA analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between Pair and Condition, F(1, 13) = 7.09, p = .02, p2 = .35. For the Effect 
pair, Nc amplitude was significantly greater following the deviant compared to the original 
targets (mean difference = 4.23μV, SE = 1.26, p = .005). For the No-effect pair, no 
 ( 3 )
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proportion of correct or incorrect fixations, out of the sum of all fixations within predictive 
time windows. For incorrect fixations, we summed the total fixations to the four alternative 
locations and divided by four to yield the average number of fixations to an incorrect region.  
Effect Pair: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓
    ( 1 ) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 4 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 4
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓
    ( 2 ) 
No-effect Pair: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
     ( 3 ) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 4 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 4
𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
     ( 4 ) 
Equations 1-4. Calculations of the proportion measures. For the effect pair, the effect ROI 
was included for the number of correct looks and the total number of looks (‘all ROIs’) while 
for the No-effect pair it was not included in the total number (‘all objects’). 
 
Results 
Event-related potentials 
Negative central 
The Nc component was found as a clear negative peak located in frontal and central 
electrodes, peaking at approximately 400ms following stimulus onset (Figure 5-5). Latency 
and amplitude of the peak were analyzed separately. No significant effects were found for Nc 
latency, indicating that the ERP peak amplitude featured a similar time course across 
conditions and pairs. For peak amplitude, the ANOVA analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between Pair and Condition, F(1, 13) = 7.09, p = .02, p2 = .35. For the Effect 
pair, Nc amplitude was significantly greater following the deviant compared to the original 
targets (mean difference = 4.23μV, SE = 1.26, p = .005). For the No-effect pair, no 
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was included for the number of correct looks and the total number f looks (‘all ROIs’) 
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Results
Event-related potentials
N gative c ntral
The Nc component was found as a clear negative peak located in frontal and central 
electrodes, peaking at approximately 400ms following stimulus onset (Figure 5-5). La-
tency and amplitude of the peak were analyzed separately. No significant effects were 
found for Nc latency, indicating that the ERP peak amplitude featured a similar time 
course across condi ions and pairs. For peak amplitude, the ANOVA analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between Pair and Condition, F(1, 13) = 7.09, p = .02, hp2 = .35. For 
the Effect pair, Nc amplitude was significantly greater following the deviant compared 
to the original targets (mean difference = 4.23μV, SE = 1.26, p = .005). For the No-effect 
pair, no differences were found between deviant and original targets (mean difference = 
-0.47μV, SE = 1.57). As can be seen in Figure 5-5 (top), the re ponse elicited by deviants 
of the Effect pair featured a clear peak that was more negative in amplitude relative to 
original actions; this pattern does not vary across frontal and central electrodes.  
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Figure 5-5. The grand average event-related potential (ERP) waveforms over frontal and central 
channels. The larger plots (left) display the average across all channel groups selected for analy-
sis. Gray rectangles indicate the time window of analysis for the Nc component (250-750ms). The 
smaller plots (right) display the waveforms for each of the four channel groups (Figure 5-3). Shaded 
regions indicate standard errors. Negative is plotted up.
Data were collapsed across the automatic and gaze-contingent groups. To verify there 
were no differences in the Nc amplitude because of stimulus presentation during the 
test phase, the ANOVA was repeated with Presentation (Gaze-contingent vs. Automa-
tic) as a between-subjects factor. There were no significant main effects or interactions 
with Presentation (ps > .24) confirming that the Nc amplitude during experimental 
trials of interest were not different between infants who observed gaze-contingent 
and automatic conditions. 
N400
We found no clear evidence for an N400 effect in the grand averaged waveforms based 
on either statistical analyses or visual inspection of the expected channel region (Figure 
5-6). During the time window of interest, there was no interaction effect between Pair, 
Condition, and Time (p = .37), confirming that the variation in ERP amplitude across 
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time window samples did not differ between conditions and this was consistent across 
pairs. There were no other interaction effects with time or condition (ps > 0.27). To 
confirm this null finding, we also repeated this analysis using the standard technique 
commonly reported in the adult literature. We extracted the mean amplitude during 
the time window of interest (500-700ms) over the same channel groups and performed 
a 2 (Condition: Deviant, Original) x 3 (Channel: Pz, P3, P4) ANOVA, that also indicated no 
main effects or interactions with Condition (ps > .25).
Figure 5-6. The grand average event-related potential (ERP) waveforms over parietal channels. The 
larger plots (left) display the average across all electrodes selected for analysis. Gray rectangles in-
dicate the time window of analysis for the N400 component (500-700ms). Shaded regions indicate 
standard errors. Negative is plotted up. 
Eye Tracking Results: Learning Phase
Data were collapsed across the automatic and gaze-contingent groups, as there were 
no differences in the stimulus presentation between these groups during the learning 
phase. Across pairs, predictive fixations accounted for 60.22% of all gaze fixations and 
the remaining 39.78% were fixations to the action currently occurring on screen. There 
were no significant differences between the mean percentage of predictive looks for 
the Effect and No-effect pairs (p = .88). A 2 (Pair: Effect, No-effect) x 2 (Location: Correct, 
Incorrect) ANOVA yielded a marginal interaction effect between Location and Pair, F(1, 
14) = 3.34, p = .09, hp2 = .19. As can be seen in Figure 5-7A, this effect was due to a 
greater proportion of correct relative to incorrect fixations for the Effect pair (mean dif-
ference = .18, SE = .08; p = .05), and no difference for the No-effect pair (mean difference = 
-.02, SE = .03, p = .51). A t-test comparing fixations to the effect alone during Effect and 
No-effect pairs revealed a marginally significant difference between pairs (t(14) = 1.75, p 
= .10), suggesting that gaze fixations to the effect itself were more frequent during the 
first action of the Effect pair compared with the No-effect pair (Figure 5-7b). 
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Figure 5-7. A. Proportions of fixations as a function of ROI and pair. B. Proportion of fixations to the 
action-effect location during the first action of each pair. Bars represent standard errors. †p < .10; * 
p < .05.
Relating Behavioral and Neural measures
In order to test for consistency between behavioral and ERP measures, we explored 
whether infants who demonstrated higher rates of correct predictions during the 
learning phase were also those who demonstrated a robust Nc effect at test. Using 
a method similar to Reynolds et al., 2010), infants who contributed both eye-tracking 
and EEG data measurements (n = 7) were divided into two groups based on the mean 
amplitude difference between conditions across all electrodes. Infants with an Nc dif-
ference greater than the group mean (-4.23mV; n = 5) received a score of 1 and infants 
below the mean (n = 2) were assigned a 0. We then conducted an ANOVA analysis of 
gaze fixations as before, with Nc Difference (above or below mean) as an additional 
between-subjects factor. This revealed a main effect of Nc Difference, F(1, 5) = 9.53, p = 
.03, hp2 = .66. Infants who had a larger Nc effect also made a greater proportion of 
correct relative to incorrect fixations (mean difference = .27, SE = .07, p = .01) than those 
infants with a weaker Nc effect (mean difference = .01, SE = .11, p = .93). 
Discussion
The central aim of this study was to investigate the ERP components associated with 
violations of prediction based on the statistical structure in action sequences. Speci-
fically, we asked whether deviant action events, which violated a previously learned 
association, altered infants’ ERP responses. We tested for the presence of two potential 
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components, the Nc and N400, which are known to index perceptual and semantic 
cognitive responses, respectively. Second, during the learning phase of the experiment, 
we investigated whether infants made predictive eye movements to upcoming actions. 
Nc Findings and Interpretation
To investigate the response to a violation of predictions built up on the basis of sta-
tistical learning, we examined the ERP responses following deviant actions that were 
inconsistent with previously learned sequential regularities. Our results illustrate an 
enhanced Nc component in response to deviant action pairs, relative to original action 
pairs, when they were associated with a salient effect. Prior studies have found an Nc 
effect for repeated observations of single action events, such as bringing a spoon to the 
mouth (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009). Our study extends these prior findings, by 
showing that an Nc effect can occur for individual action steps within longer sequences, 
and is modulated by their congruency within the learned sequential structure. Howe-
ver, the direction of the Nc effect differed between the current study and Reid et al. 
(2009) and Kaduk et al. (2016). Our findings revealed an Nc amplitude that was greater 
in response to the unanticipated action step, whereas in Reid et al. (2009) and Kaduk et 
al. (2016), the Nc amplitude was greater in response to the anticipated action outcome. 
This discrepancy is likely explained by the level of attentional engagement (Reynolds, 
2015) for the current study when contrasted with these earlier studies. Even though the 
Nc is commonly reported to be larger in response to novel, or unfamiliar stimuli (which 
‘grab’ infants’ attention), the Nc has also been found to be larger for stimuli which are 
highly familiar and highly salient such as the maternal face of each infant (de Haan & 
Nelson, 1997) or eating actions (Reid et al., 2009). In addition, in the current study the 
compared actions were both unfamiliar, but one drew more attention due to its relative 
novelty within the experimental setting.
The topographical distribution of the Nc component we observed is consistent with 
previous findings (Reynolds & Richards, 2005, 2009). Reynolds and colleagues (2005) 
showed that the Nc is greater during periods of sustained attention and is likely to 
reflect activity from distinct brain areas involved in information processing that are 
independently influenced by attentional state. Likely cortical sources of the infant Nc 
include the inferior and superior prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex, 
which are neural regions that modulate sustained attention and recognition memory 
(for a review, see Duncan & Owen, 2000). This suggest that the deviant targets in our 
paradigm triggered additional visual processing, indicating that this attention system 
was modulated by changes in the rules governing the sequential structure. There are 
two interpretations for explaining the presence of the Nc component in our study. The 
first interpretation, supported by our eye-tracking results, is that infants encoded the 
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predictive relation between the actions of the effect pair during the learning phase and 
perceived the deviant pair as surprising or unexpected. In other words, the Nc effect 
that we observed may reflect the recognition of a violation of perceptual predictions 
for how the following events should unfold.
A second interpretation of our findings for the Nc component is that infants recognized 
the association between the deviant second action and the effect, rather than surprise 
at observing this event contingent upon the first action of the pair. In our study, devi-
ant items were both statistically unlikely and visual novelties. Future research aimed at 
dissociating the separate contributions of stimulus novelty and probability could clarify 
whether the Nc response reflects the buildup of stored information about stimulus pro-
bability or whether it is limited to the detection of familiar versus novel items. However, 
infants seemed to make correct visual predictions only for the Effect pair, an indication 
that learning may have only occurred when there was an upcoming salient effect. This 
finding, coupled with its relation to the strength of the observed Nc effect, suggests 
that visual novelty alone is not sufficient to explain our pattern of findings. 
Though both deviant Effect and No-effect events violated the action sequence, only 
the deviant event co-occurring with the effect elicited the enhanced Nc peak. Pre-
vious research has shown that action-effects influence infants’ learning and imitation 
as measured in their behavioral responses (Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008; Verschoor et 
al., 2010). One explanation provided in the literature is that bidirectional action-effect 
associations can be established through observation, which results in motor represen-
tations of the effects themselves. From this perspective, the effect may have resulted in 
a corresponding representation of the action ‘unit’ (i.e., the two-step pair) preceding it, 
which infants did not acquire for the No-effect pair. A second explanation is that action-
effects are salient perceptual cues that make the structure easier for infants to attend 
to and maintain in working memory. Accordingly, several prior studies have provided 
evidence that the influence of action-effects on infant behavior is due to a bias towards 
perceiving actions in terms of their goal structure (Buresh & Woodward, 2007; Cannon 
& Woodward, 2012; Klein et al., 2006). In line with this notion, it is possible that the 
effect was perceived as a goal or intentional outcome of the activity stream, and thus 
biased attention toward that particular action pair because of its temporal relation with 
the effect. A third possible explanation, drawn from the literature on reinforcement 
learning, is that the action-effect was perceived as a rewarding sensory change in the 
environment. Evidence from adult studies suggests that external rewards are crucial 
for observers to update their internal representations of the environment (Gläscher et 
al., 2010). Infants might have selectively updated their model of the action sequence 
only when observing a perceptible external reward, provided by the light turning on. 
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Whether observing the light was rewarding to the infants or perceived as a potential 
reward or goal of the actor is a novel question that could be empirically tested in future 
research.
Our findings are consistent with a large body of literature examining the development 
of causal learning, which explains how children achieve increasingly sophisticated the-
ories about the social and physical world from noisy and limited data (see for a review, 
Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). This work has shown that Bayesian concepts of inference can 
also apply to children’s learning of the causal structure of the world. Bayesian inference 
refers to the process of combining prior evidence with current incoming data and for-
ming a prediction about what will occur next, resulting in a probabilistic model of the 
world. Of relevance for the current study, probabilistic models also provide one of the 
most elegant explanations for how the motor system can predict the actions of other 
people (Kilner, 2011). Our data show that, at 10 months of age, infants can use statistical 
information from observation alone to generate expectations about the actions and 
their effects. This step may reflect the initial building of prior knowledge about the most 
likely outcome of an action, a necessary prerequisite for constructing causal models of 
other people’s actions and their social intentions. 
The N400 Component
Prior studies have shown that unexpected final outcomes of familiar action sequences, 
such as bringing a pretzel to one’s ear or a spoon with food to one’s forehead, elicits 
an N400 effect in both infants and adults (Reid et al., 2009, Kaduk et al., 2016). Across 
studies, N400 effects become smaller as stimulus probability increases. The explanation 
proposed in the literature is that processing incoming information is facilitated when 
it ‘fits’ with the current context, if accumulated experience from previous contexts has 
built up meaning (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). From this perspective, an N400 response 
to action stimuli is interpreted as a violation of predictions that are based on current 
semantic information and prior experiences. 
In the current experiment, we found no evidence for an N400 response to deviant 
action steps. Unlike prior studies, which have shown N400 effects for action events 
that occur within a familiar context (‘day-to-day’ actions such as eating), our study 
featured novel action sequences which were also abstract, in the sense that they did 
not reach an overarching goal or take place in a familiar setting. The statistical structure 
was therefore the only information infants could use to build expectations about the 
sequence, requiring them to remember six different objects and the transitional pro-
babilities between them. One simple explanation is that the brief learning phase was 
not sufficient for young infants to generate a semantic context for the observed action 
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events. Perhaps infants need to sample extensive amounts of data to build up a context 
in which to compare new incoming information. Another possibility is that actions and 
their context need to become associated with a goal that the observer has experience 
with, before they engage cognitive systems associated with semantics and conceptual 
knowledge. The factors that cause a shift from perceptual to semantic processing in 
action sequences during development are an intriguing question for further research.
Predictive gaze fixations
Infants made more predictive gaze fixations to the correct upcoming events than 
to other object locations during the learning phase of the experiment. This finding 
provides evidence they detected the pair structure of the unfolding action sequence, 
and used this information to guide their looking behavior. Critically, this behavior 
was modulated by whether or not a predictable action event was associated with a 
salient effect. Correct anticipations were more frequent for the Effect pair than the No-
effect pair, and anticipations to the effect itself during predictive time windows were 
also marginally higher for Effect pairs than the No-effect pair. This finding is partially 
consistent with a prior experiment in which 18-month-old infants only demonstrated 
spontaneous, uninstructed imitation of actions that resulted in action-effects, and not 
of actions without a corresponding effect (Monroy et al., 2017). In that study, the older 
infants also only demonstrated a relation between their visual anticipations during 
observation and their ability to imitate upcoming actions for actions that caused ef-
fects. These findings, taken together with the current study, suggest that action-effects 
provide a learning cue that guides infant behaviors during both action perception and 
action performance. Further, Monroy et al. (2017) also found that the 18-month-olds 
were able learn both pair types, even in the absence of an action-effect, which sug-
gest interesting developmental changes in sensitivity to effect-related cues occurring 
between the first and second year of life. 
The eye-tracking data yielded marginally significant differences between experimental 
conditions, which may have been due to the small number of infants who yielded 
enough data for analysis. Alternatively, the task demands of our experiment were 
relatively high: infants needed to continuously attend to the screen, remember and 
encode the pair structure in the unfolding sequence, and make predictive eye move-
ments towards one of many possible locations on the screen within a brief time period. 
Prior research has shown that under conditions of uncertainty, even adults make fewer 
predictive movements—which require effort and are therefore costly—and prefer 
to assume a neutral position (Dale, Duran, & Morehead, 2012). It is possible that our 
learning effects are small because infants at this age are just beginning to acquire the 
ability to encode the statistical relations in more complex stimuli, or that they do not 
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always make visual predictions during ongoing observation. Future research could aim 
to differentiate these two possibilities. Despite this, the consistency between our eye-
tracking and ERP results provides converging evidence that infants learned to predict 
the outcome of the sequence structure for the Effect pair. 
Relation between behavioral and ERP measures
Our method for assessing the relation between behavioral and neural measures of 
learning was to examine infants’ predictive gaze fixations during the learning phase 
in relation to the magnitude of their Nc response during test trials. In a study aimed at 
identifying the relation between infant visual preferences and ERP responses, Reynolds 
and colleagues (Reynolds & Richards, 2005, 2009) provided evidence that infants aged 
4.5-7.5 months who demonstrated a visual preference for novel events were those that 
showed an Nc effect with greater amplitude. Consistent with these findings, in our 
study, the infants who demonstrated a greater Nc amplitude in response to a deviant 
target action in the action-effect condition also made a greater proportion of correct, 
relative to incorrect, predictive gaze fixations in this condition. This result suggests that 
the Nc response may reflect predictive processes based on the perception statistical 
regularities, which adds to the current understanding of the functional significance of 
the Nc in young infants.
The sample size in the current study was limited due to difficulties in combining EEG 
and eye-tracking data collection methodologies with young infants, which is typical for 
developmental research and is consistent with similar studies (for a meta-analysis see 
Stets, Stahl, & Reid, 2012). Due to the combination of a small sample size and limited 
number of trials in our experimental conditions, findings from the current study should 
be interpreted cautiously and validated in future work. However, we also note that our 
main finding of an Nc effect is consistent with a large body of prior studies (reviewed in 
de Haan, 2007). Specifically, the Nc component in the current study matches previously 
reported findings both in terms of the experimental context in which it was elicited—
that is, a response to a perceptually unexpected event—and its characteristics, such as 
latency and morphology of the waveform. 
Conclusion
Human action naturally contains statistical regularities that define the overall predictabi-
lity of upcoming action events. The ability to recruit perceptual processes for detecting 
these regularities is critical for making accurate predictions during action observation. 
The results of this experiment suggest that, by ten months of age, infants are sensitive 
to the sequential structure between action steps when they result in salient effects. 
Our study further supports a consistency between neural and behavioral measures of 
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statistical learning in infancy. In sum, statistical regularities provide a learning cue that 
guides visual expectations and attention during ongoing processing of novel action 
sequences. The findings reported here have direct implications for our understanding 
of the development of social cognition in infancy. We suggest that infants initially have 
the capacity to rely on their powerful statistical learning skills to detect regularities 
among the actions of other people, enabling them to anticipate upcoming action 
goals and to eventually attain understanding of the mental states of other people. 


 
Chapter 6
The motor system predicts actions 
based on visual statistical learning 
in toddlers
Based on: Monroy, C., Meyer, M., Schröer, L., Gerson, S., & Hunnius, S. 
(under review). The infant motor system predicts actions based on 
visual statistical learning.
Chapter 6114
Abstract
Motor theories of action prediction propose that our motor system combines prior 
knowledge with incoming sensory input to predict other people’s actions. This prior 
knowledge can be acquired through observational experience, with statistical learning 
being one candidate mechanism. But can knowledge learned through observation al-
one transfer into predictions generated in the motor system? To examine this question, 
we first trained infants at home with videos of an unfamiliar action sequence featuring 
statistical regularities. At test, motor activity was measured using EEG and compared 
during perceptually identical time windows within the sequence that preceded actions 
which were either predictable (deterministic) or not predictable (random). Findings 
revealed increased motor activity preceding the deterministic but not the random 
actions, providing the first evidence that the infant motor system can use knowledge 
from statistical learning to predict upcoming actions. As such, these results support 
theories in which the motor system underlies action prediction.
6
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Introduction
According to motor theories of action observation, we predict the actions of other 
people by means of our own motor system (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Kilner, 2011; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). When we perceive someone reach for a coffee mug at 
the breakfast table, we already anticipate they will next bring the mug to their mouth. 
This anticipation takes place in cortical pre-motor regions that are active both when 
performing and observing actions or their effects (Kilner et al., 2004; Paulus, et al., 2013). 
Motor predictions of observed actions are thought to underlie adaptive social inter-
action (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009) and inferring the goals and mental states of others 
(Becchio et al., 2012; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Ondobaka et al., 2015).
However, a challenge for the motor system is that perceptually similar actions can result 
in very different outcomes. As a consequence, predictions cannot always be made 
on the basis of the current ongoing action alone (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). Motor 
accounts of action prediction have been criticized for failing to explain how action 
predictions can be generated for cases in which the observed motor act itself does 
not contain enough information to make an accurate prediction (Kilner et al., 2007). 
To solve this ambiguity problem, recent probabilistic accounts have emerged that are 
largely based on principles of predictive coding (Friston, 2003, 2005). The core idea in 
this approach is that the motor system combines prior knowledge with incoming sen-
sory input to determine the most likely action outcome (Kilner et al., 2007; Ondobaka 
et al., 2015; Wolpert et al., 2003). If the person reaching for her coffee mug is standing 
next to the sink with a sponge in hand, this will elicit a different motor prediction based 
on the observer’s world knowledge that her intention is most likely to wash the mug. 
Crucially, these accounts rest on the assumption that this prior knowledge is ‘fed’ into 
the motor system and allows it to generate an accurate prediction based on the current 
action context. 
Predictive processing accounts provide a solution for the ambiguity problem, yet raise 
a new challenge: how does new action knowledge—acquired from perceptual infor-
mation—become encoded in the motor system? Observational experiences are one 
important route to prior knowledge, particularly during development (Hunnius & Bek-
kering, 2014). An infant may, for instance, observe a parent reach for a peanut butter jar, 
which could be followed by many possible outcomes. However, if the majority of the 
time their parent then removes the lid, scoops peanut butter from the jar and reaches 
for a slice of bread, after multiple observations, the infant can predict what is most 
likely to occur next when their parent first grasps the jar. In this example, the statistical 
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regularities between action steps provide information that the infant can learn through 
observational experiences. 
This ability is referred to as statistical learning (SL), a powerful mechanism that explains 
how humans can acquire knowledge of the environment through observation (Per-
ruchet & Pacton, 2006). SL skills broadly refer to the ability to detect regularities in 
continuous sensory input, and have been demonstrated empirically across sensory 
modalities and across the lifespan (Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Fiser & Aslin, 2005; 
Kirkham et al., 2007; Saffran et al., 1996; Slone & Johnson, 2015). A few recent studies 
have shown that both infants and adults are also sensitive to the statistical regularities in 
continuous human actions (Ahlheim et al., 2014; Baldwin et al., 2008; Monroy et al., 2017; 
Stahl et al., 2014). For instance, Baldwin and colleagues (2008) investigated whether 
observers can parse action streams according to the transitional probabilities between 
action steps. In their experiment, adult participants observed an action stream made of 
3-step action elements presented continuously, such as ‘pour-poke-clink’ or ‘peek-clink-
rattle’. Participants were next shown ‘action’ sequences (the original 3-step sequences, 
such as ‘pour-poke-clink’) and ‘part-action’ sequences (which spanned the boundaries 
of two actions, such as ‘poke-clink-peek’). Adults accurately discriminated action from 
part-action sequences, which could only be based on the transitional probabilities 
within these 3-step sequences (Baldwin et al., 2008). Infants from seven months of age 
demonstrate similar segmentation skills for familiar action sequences such as cleaning 
a kitchen (Baldwin, Baird, & Saylor, 2001), and for novel, abstract movement sequences 
(Stahl et al., 2014). 
Building upon these studies, which measured sensitivity to action structure post-
observation, Ahlheim and colleagues (2014) examined neural responses to statistical 
structure during observation of action sequences. Results showed that increases in 
neural activation corresponded to the probability of the occurrence of the next action 
step in the sequence. These findings confirm that adults can exploit statistical structure 
while processing continuous human action. They also suggest that observers use statis-
tical learning skills to inform their predictions of upcoming action steps.
The current study tested the hypothesis that new action knowledge, acquired via 
observation, can be ‘fed’ into the motor system and result in a motor prediction of 
an observed action based on visual statistical learning. Infants, who have a limited 
knowledge base for many of the actions they observe—in terms of observational and 
motoric experience—present an ideal opportunity for investigating this question. A 
developmental approach allowed us to directly test the effect of introducing naïve 
participants to novel perceptual information about action sequences, and whether this 
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new knowledge is used to generate predictions in their motor system. In a previous 
study, we showed that 18-month-old infants can learn statistical regularities in conti-
nuous action sequences and predict upcoming actions (Monroy et al., 2017). Impor-
tantly, infants correctly anticipated more frequently when they observed sequences 
performed by a human actor, relative to infants who observed a non-action event 
sequence. This finding supports the hypothesis that the motor system is involved in 
the perception and prediction of observed actions. Building upon this prior work, we 
conducted a combined training and EEG study with 18-month-old infants. Infants were 
first trained over three days by observing videos of action sequences in which one 
action pair was deterministic: the second action always followed the first action of this 
pair and was thus 100% predictable. The remaining actions in the sequence were ran-
dom and thus less predictable. Following this training phase, infants participated in an 
EEG test session in which they observed a novel sequence featuring the same statistical 
structure as the training phase.
A decrease in power of the mu rhythm overlaying motor regions is an established index 
of anticipatory activation occurring prior to the onset of an observed action in infants 
and adults (Marshall & Meltzoff, 2011; Southgate et al., 2009). The mu rhythm, also so-
metimes referred to as sensorimotor alpha, features reduced power during both action 
execution and observation (Fox et al., 2016; Vanderwert et al., 2012). In infants, this sup-
pression is also observed prior to the onset of an observed action, suggesting that the 
mu rhythm reflects predictive activity in the human mirror neuron system (Southgate 
et al., 2009). We hypothesized that the mu rhythm would be suppressed over the motor 
cortex, reflecting an increase in motor activity, in anticipation of upcoming actions 
infants could predict based on statistical regularities learned through observation. 
Conversely, we hypothesized that infants would show no such anticipatory activity for 
actions which occurred at random and that they could thus not predict. 
Method
Participants
Twenty-eight infants (mean age = 18.55 months, SD = .41, 17 males) were included in 
the final sample. Our predetermined target sample size of approximately 25 infants was 
based on conventional standards for studies that measure the mu rhythm in infants 
(Gerson et al., 2015; Marshall, et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2009). Sixteen infants were 
tested but excluded from the final analysis due to refusal to wear the EEG cap (n = 4), 
insufficient artifact-free trials given a minimum requirement of 3 trials per condition 
(n = 9), not completing the required 3 days of home training (n = 1), or experimenter 
error (n = 2). This attrition rate is not atypical in infant EEG studies (Stets et al., 2012). 
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All parents gave written consent, and families received a small gift or 20 euros for par-
ticipation. Participants were recruited from a database of interested families from the 
surrounding region of Nijmegen, a middle-sized city in the Netherlands. All procedures 
were approved by the local ethics committee.
Stimuli and Materials
Three training videos and one test video were created, which were identical in length 
(7m) and statistical structure. Videos featured an adult performing an action sequence 
on a box-shaped toy which afforded six unique object-directed actions (Figure 6-1). 
Action sequences consisted of deterministic and random action pairs, which were 
presented with a brief fixation cross between each pair. Deterministic pairs consisted of 
two pre-selected actions occurring in the same order, such as ‘slide’ always followed by 
‘bend’, and repeated 10 times throughout the sequence. Random pairs were comprised 
of any other combination of the six objects on the toy. The order of all pairs was shuffled 
pseudo-randomly in each of the four videos. Thus, infants observed a novel video on 
each training day and during the test phase. Three sets of stimulus videos were created, 
in which the two actions comprising the deterministic pair were uniquely selected 
from the six possible actions. These three video conditions were counterbalanced 
across infants.
Figure 6-1 illustrates the presentation of an action pair. There were 60 total pairs in each 
video featuring 10 deterministic pairs and 50 random pairs for a total of 120 observed 
actions. Thus, during the learning phase, infants were presented with a maximum of 360 
total actions and 30 repetitions of the deterministic pairs over the three days. All actions 
were presented an identical number of times (20) to ensure that infants received equal 
exposure to all six actions.
Videos were divided into four blocks, with the orientation of the toy relative to the ca-
mera rotated in each block. This ensured that infants could not simply learn the physical 
location on the screen where each action occurred, as the objects’ spatial locations 
were dissociated from their temporal position in the action sequence. In addition, we 
imposed the following constraints: all actions occurred with equal frequency (20 times); 
no pair could occur more than two times consecutively, random pairs could not consist 
of the same action twice, and deterministic pairs were evenly distributed among the 
four blocks of the videos. Lastly, no sound was played during any of the videos.
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Figure 6-1. Example frames from video stimuli illustrating two successive trials. Trials began with 
a static fixation cross, followed by four successive clips played continuously (7s total). EEG markers 
were time-locked to the onset of each clip. Yellow boxes indicate the two condition time windows 
used for comparison in the EEG analysis: both conditions are perceptually identical (a 1s still frame 
with no action occurring), but in the Deterministic condition, infants can make a prediction about 
the subsequent action based on statistical likelihood, whereas in the Random condition they can-
not make a prediction better than chance. The fixation cross was used as a baseline condition in 
the analyses.
Procedure
Training phase. 
Parents were asked to show each of the three learning videos to their infants at home 
once per day over the three days immediately prior to their lab appointment. These 
videos were made available to parents via links on YouTube (www.youtube.com) which 
were sent to them by email We instructed parents to play the videos to their infants in 
a quiet setting with minimal distraction and to maintain identical viewing conditions 
each day if possible. They were further instructed to watch the videos with their infant 
seated on their lap approximately one meter from the viewing screen, to mimic the 
conditions in the laboratory they would experience during the EEG session.
Parents were asked to fill out a detailed diary at home containing information about 
each video session, including the number of minutes the child watched the movie and 
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their own rating of their infant’s average attention to the screen on a scale from 1 to 5. 
In addition, they were asked to record the type of device they used to watch the videos 
(e.g., laptop, television screen, or tablet), the time of day, and any additional notes about 
each training day. The aim of the diary was to assess whether parents complied with 
the instructions and to measure potential individual differences in infants’ exposure to 
the training videos. All parents but one brought completed diaries with them to the 
EEG lab session. The mean number of minutes that infants watched the three training 
videos at home was 13.06 minutes (SD = 5.9; range = 1-21), which yielded an average of 
18.44 observations of the Deterministic pair. Mean rating of attention on the five-point 
scale was 3.07 (SD = 1.21, median = 3.33).  
EEG session (test phase). 
Test sessions took place on the day following the final training day and consisted of 
an action observation phase followed by an action execution phase. Infants were first 
familiarized with the environment while the procedure was explained to the parent. 
Experimenters then fitted an infant-sized EEG cap to the infant (ActiCap, Brain Products, 
Munich, Germany) with 32 active electrodes arranged according to the standard 10-20 
configuration. Following capping, EEG was recorded continuously while infants sat on 
a caretaker’s lap in a shielded testing room. The EEG signal was referenced online to FCz 
and re-referenced offline to the average of all electrodes after excluding noisy chan-
nels. The mean number of channels included in the average reference was 22 (SD = 3). 
During measurement, the signal was amplified using a Brain-Amp amplifier, band-pass 
filtered (0.1–125 Hz) and digitized at 500Hz.
Infants were next shown the test video displayed on a monitor at approximately 50cm 
distance from the infant and caretaker. An experimenter monitored a live video feed of 
infants’ behavior from an adjacent room and initiated attention-grabbers (brief, salient 
cartoons) whenever necessary to regain the infant’s attention. Trials containing or 
following attention-grabbers were excluded from further analyses. After all trials were 
completed or when infants lost interest, an action execution phase began. The purpose 
of this phase was to identify the sample-specific mu frequency range, as defined by a 
decrease in power during overt movement relative to baseline (Meyer et al., 2016). The 
experimenter turned off the video monitor and placed the toy stimulus in front of the 
infant. Infants were allowed to play with the toy for several minutes or until they began 
to lose interest. The entire testing session was video-recorded for offline movement 
and behavior analysis.
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Data Analysis.
Coding for movement artifacts and visual attention. 
Video recordings of the action observation phase were coded offline frame-by-frame 
for infant movement. Trials that contained any whole body (e.g., kicking) or single-limb 
(e.g., moving one arm) movement were marked as invalid and removed from analyses 
to eliminate motor activity related to overt motor movements during action observa-
tion. Trials in which the infant was not looking at the screen were marked as invalid 
and removed from analyses as well. Across infants, 32.41% of all trials were removed 
from analyses based on these criteria. These coding procedures are commonly used for 
infant EEG studies (Hoehl & Wahl, 2012).
Identification of the mu rhythm.
 To investigate differences in motor activity during anticipation of deterministic and 
random actions, we first identified the mu rhythm in the current sample of 18-month-
old infants. Video recordings from the action execution phase were coded offline and 
epochs were selected in which the infant reached for or manipulated one of the objects 
on the toy. These epochs were segmented into 1s trials for data processing (see EEG 
processing). To verify that the frequency range in our sample was within the expected 
range for this age (Marshall et al., 2002), the mean power spectrum was inspected in the 
2–50Hz range during baseline and action execution conditions across central channels 
(C3, Cz and C4; Figure 6-2). Consistent with the literature (e.g., Marshall et al., 2011; 
Nyström et al., 2011), data inspection indicated a clear alpha peak around 8 Hz (+/-
1Hz) in which power during action execution was lower compared to baseline, despite 
broadband differences. Consequently, a sample-specific frequency range of 7-9Hz was 
used to compare our conditions of interest in the action observation phase.
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Figure 6-2. Power values as a function of frequency (Hz) for the action execution and baseline tri-
als. The mu rhythm is clearly visible as a sharp peak between 7 and 9Hz. Electrode layout depicted 
on the right; selected channels corresponding to motor regions are outlined in red. Shaded areas 
represent the standard error of the mean.
EEG processing. 
Data were analyzed using Fieldtrip, an open source toolbox for Matlab (Oostenveld 
et al., 2011). Each action pair was divided into two trials: the 1-second fixation cross 
(Baseline condition) and the 1-second time window of still-frame preceding the second 
action, which became the Deterministic and Random conditions depending on the 
pair (Figure 6-1). Trials were de-trended, corrected by the mean of the entire segment, 
and a DFT filter was applied to remove line noise. They were then visually inspected 
for artifacts such as noisy channels or muscle artifacts (Marshall et al., 2011; Meyer et 
al., 2016). Segments in which infants were not attending to the screen based on video 
recordings of the session were rejected. Based on prior work, participants were required 
to have at least three artifact-free trials per experimental condition to be included in 
further analyses (Kaduk et al., 2016; Monroy et al., 2017). Table 6-1 contains the mean 
number of trials included in the analysis for each condition after artifact rejection. 
The motor system predicts actions based on visual statistical learning in toddlers 123
Table 6-1. Mean number of artifact-free trials during the test phase (SD).
Baseline Condition
(max = 60)
Deterministic Condition
(max = 10)
Random Condition
(max = 50) Action Execution phase
17.64 (11.08)
Range: 3-52
4.54 (1.75)
Range: 3-8
16.39 (10.25)
Range: 4-41
12.93 (11.39)
Range: 3-45
Following artifact rejection, we performed a fast Fourier transform using a multitaper 
method (Hanning taper) to estimate power values between 7-9Hz (see Identification of 
the Mu Rhythm). 
Results
We first conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with mean normalized power of the 
mu rhythm over central sites (C3, Cz, and C4) as the dependent variable and Condition 
(Deterministic, Random, Baseline) as a within-subjects factor. This revealed a main effect 
of Condition, F(2.54) = 5.22, p < .01, hp2 = .16 (Figure 6-3). A one-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test revealed the Random condition in the occipital region, p = .03, differed 
significantly from a normal distribution. No other dependent measures differed from 
a normal distribution, ps > .20. There was one outlier (+/- 3SD from the mean) in the 
Baseline condition over central channels; however, as results did not change when this 
participant was excluded, we included all participants in our analyses. 
Pairwise comparisons confirmed that power in the mu rhythm over central channels 
was lower in the Deterministic condition relative to both the Random and Baseline 
conditions (ps < .02; see Table 6-2). There was no significant difference between the 
Random and Baseline conditions (p = .56). These findings show that motor activity se-
lectively increased in anticipation of the deterministic actions and not prior to random 
actions. 
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Figure 6-3. A. Mean log-transformed power depicted for the two experimental conditions (De-
terministic, Random) and the baseline condition (a fixation cross) over central channels overlaying 
motor regions (electrode layout depicted on the right; selected channels are outlined in red). Er-
ror bars represent the standard error of the mean. B. Power values as a function of frequency (Hz). 
Shaded areas represent the standard error of the mean. Gray dotted lines indicate the selected mu 
frequency range (7–9 Hz). 
Table 6-2. Paired t-test comparisons of mean normalized power for the mu rhythm (7-9Hz) over central 
channels (N = 28).
Paired sample t-tests Mean Difference (SD) t(27) p-value 95% CI
Random - Deterministic .22 (.44) 2.64 0.01 [0.05, 0.39]
Baseline - Random -.04 (.32) -0.59 0.56 [-0.16, 0.09]
Baseline - Deterministic .18 (.39) 2.51 0.02 [0.03, 0.34]
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Based on previous literature (Vanderwert et al., 2012), we expected mu suppression 
to reflect activation of the motor cortex and thus be specific to channels over motor 
regions. To investigate the topographical specificity of the observed mu suppression, 
we also examined activity in the 7-9Hz range over occipital channels (O1, Oz, and 
O2) located over the visual cortex. We did not expect visual activity to differ between 
Deterministic and Random conditions because the input was perceptually identical. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA with mean normalized power as the dependent variable 
and Condition (Deterministic, Random, Baseline) as a within-subjects factor yielded a 
main effect of Condition, F(1,43) = 6.34, p < .01, hp2 = .19 (Figure 6-4).
Pairwise comparisons revealed that normalized power during Deterministic and 
Random conditions was lower than during the Baseline condition (mean difference-
Deterministic-Baseline = -.30, t(27) = 4.34, p < .001, mean differenceRandom-Baseline = -.20, t(27) = 
2.62, p = .01, respectively). There was no significant difference in normalized power 
between Deterministic and Random conditions (mean differenceDeterministic-Random = -.11, 
t(27) = 1.78, p = .09). Thus, power reduction reflecting visual processing was greater 
during predictive time windows (displaying the toy stimulus) than during the baseline 
(displaying the fixation cross), regardless of the upcoming action’s probability. These 
results confirm that the differential mu suppression during anticipation of deterministic 
relative to random actions was specifically observed over motor, and not visual, regions. 
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Figure 6-4. A. Mean log-transformed power depicted for the two experimental conditions (Deter-
ministic, Random) and the baseline condition (fixation cross) over occipital channels corresponding 
to visual regions (electrode layout depicted on the right; selected channels outlined in red). Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean. B. Power values as a function of frequency (Hz). 
Shaded areas represent the standard error of the mean. Gray dotted lines indicate the selected mu 
frequency range (7–9 Hz).
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Discussion
The current study is the first to examine whether new knowledge learned through 
observation in infancy can be ‘fed’ into the motor system and thereby used for pre-
dicting upcoming actions. Until now, research on action perception has focused on 
the role of statistical learning in action segmentation and prediction, or on the role of 
the motor system in generating action predictions. Using a developmental approach, 
we investigated how these two systems interact by examining whether infants make 
motor predictions about upcoming actions based solely on visual statistical learning. 
In line with our hypothesis, findings revealed suppression of the infant mu rhythm, an 
index of motor activity, during anticipation of upcoming actions that were statistically 
deterministic, and not for random actions. Infants were not simply anticipating that 
any action would occur; rather, the observed motor activated reflected anticipation of 
specific actions based on their statistical likelihood. Moreover, as the videos used in the 
EEG session had never been seen before, infants could only base their predictions on 
previously learned transitional probabilities within action pairs. These findings provide 
the first evidence for motor-based predictions based on information acquired through 
visual statistical learning.
Our findings are in line with recent frameworks which propose that prior action know-
ledge is fed into generative models in the motor system  (Kilner, 2011; Schubotz, 2007). 
In the current study, infants learned the transitional probabilities between sequential 
actions from observation alone. The motor system was then able to access this new 
knowledge and infer the most likely upcoming action. In addition, the current study 
extends this framework from predicting single action events (e.g., Kilner et al., 2004) to 
predicting sequential action steps. 
These results are also consistent with prior evidence for statistical learning as a foun-
dational mechanism underlying infants’ developing understanding of their sensory 
environment (for a review, see Krogh et al., 2013). Statistical learning is likely a core 
mechanism that accounts for the human ability to build expectations about upcoming 
sensory events. Statistical learning abilities may thus also be an important pathway 
through which infants develop conceptual knowledge about observed actions (Ruff-
man et al., 2012). In the current study, infants were not simply learning raw frequencies 
of occurrences, as each action was presented an equal number of times. Rather, infants 
could only rely on the transitional probabilities between action events to form predic-
tions, which is consistent with prior research on infant SL abilities (Stahl et al., 2014). 
Future research could target the specific aspects of the structure that infants were able 
to encode, such as joint or conditional probabilities. 
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A separate line of evidence has shown that infants’ own actions are another impor-
tant source of information linked to action processing (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). 
Infants can acquire new sensorimotor associations between self-produced actions and 
the same actions when they observe them performed by others (Gerson et al., 2015; 
Paulus et al., 2012). However, until now these two sources of information—active and 
observational experiences—have been considered complementary but separate from 
one another (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). The current findings challenge this notion 
by providing evidence that the motor system can predict actions from observational 
experiences alone, suggesting that these two pathways are rather part of one integra-
ted mechanism. 
In line with this notion, neuroimaging research in adults reveals that brain regions 
relevant for statistical learning also overlap with regions of the action-observation 
network (Ahlheim et al., 2014; Turk-Browne et al., 2008). According to Kilner (2009) the 
action-observation network relies on reciprocal connections with domain-general 
regions to generate predictions. These regions are likely to include those involved in 
visual statistical learning, such as the medial temporal lobe and the hippocampus, 
which are activated when statistical regularities provide predictive cues of upcoming 
stimuli (Turk-Browne et al., 2008, 2010).
An alternative interpretation of our data could be that the observed power reduction 
in the 7-9Hz range reflects a more general suppression of the alpha rhythm, rather than 
the sensorimotor mu rhythm. As the two rhythms share an overlapping frequency band, 
it is possible that our findings reflect modulation of the ‘classical’ alpha rhythm which is 
thought to reflect general processing of visual stimuli (Bazanova & Vernon, 2014). The 
observed reduction in alpha power prior to the predictable action might then reflect 
enhanced visual attention in anticipation of a stimulus that is expected relative to one 
that is unknown, although if so this should have been observed primarily in the oc-
cipital channels. However, our methodology was designed to reliably separate the mu 
rhythm from the alpha rhythm as suggested in the literature (Bowman et al., n.d.; Fox 
et al., 2016). First, we included both action execution and observation phases, which is 
crucial to identify the mu rhythm as it is characterized by a suppression over motor re-
gions during movement relevant to non-movement (Cuevas, Cannon, Yoo, & Fox, 2014). 
Second, we report findings from multiple electrode sites, including visual areas, which 
did not show the same pattern of results. Third, we controlled for visual confounds by 
analyzing the predictive time window prior to the actions themselves during which the 
stimuli were visually identical. Thus, the observed activity was most likely related to the 
infants’ anticipation of the forthcoming stimulus rather than ongoing visual processing 
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Due to the limited number of trials included in our experimental conditions, findings 
from the current study should be interpreted with caution and replicated in future work. 
Still, our main findings regarding the mu rhythm are consistent with prior research in 
terms of both its functional significance during action anticipation (e.g., Southgate & 
Csibra, 2009) as well as the location and frequency range in infants (Marshall et al., 2002; 
Marshall & Meltzoff, 2011; Nyström, Ljunghammar, Rosander, & Von Hofsten, 2011). In 
addition, the current study is limited to the interpretation of neural data. Given the 
challenges of simultaneous EEG and eye-tracking recordings in infants, we did not 
collect eye-tracking data, which would have allowed us to examine anticipatory eye 
movements as an additional measure of learning and prediction. Directly relating the 
current findings with behavioral findings from prior research (e.g., Monroy et al., 2017) 
using simultaneous recordings—for instance, with adults—would be an interesting 
avenue for future research.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we show that prediction of an upcoming action based on its statisti-
cal likelihood elicits activation of the infant motor system. These results extend the 
functional role of infants’ statistical learning to the development of the human action-
observation network. Infants can acquire new knowledge of an upcoming action by 
using their powerful statistical learning abilities, and subsequently use this knowledge 
to generate action predictions in their motor system.

 
Chapter 7
Statistical learning in social action 
contexts
Based on: Monroy, C., Meyer, M., Gerson, S., & Hunnius, S. (2017). 
Statistical learning in social action contexts. PLoS ONE 12(5): e0177261. 
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0177261
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Abstract
Sensitivity to the regularities and structure contained within sequential, goal-directed 
actions is an important building block for generating expectations about the actions 
we observe. Until now, research on statistical learning for actions has solely focused 
on individual action sequences, but many actions in daily life involve multiple actors 
in various interaction contexts. The current study is the first to investigate the role of 
statistical learning in tracking regularities between actions performed by different ac-
tors, and whether the social context characterizing their interaction influences learning. 
That is, are observers more likely to track regularities across actors if they are perceived 
as acting jointly as opposed to in parallel? We tested adults and toddlers to explore 
whether social context guides statistical learning and—if so—whether it does so from 
early in development. In a between-subjects eye-tracking experiment, participants 
were primed with a social context cue between two actors who either shared a goal 
of playing together (‘Joint’ condition) or stated the intention to act alone (‘Parallel’ 
condition). In subsequent videos, the actors performed sequential actions in which, for 
certain action pairs, the first actor’s action reliably predicted the second actor’s action. 
We analyzed predictive eye movements to upcoming actions as a measure of learning, 
and found that both adults and toddlers learned the statistical regularities across ac-
tors when their actions caused an effect. Further, adults with high statistical learning 
performance were sensitive to social context: those who observed actors with a shared 
goal were more likely to correctly predict upcoming actions. In contrast, there was no 
effect of social context in the toddler group, regardless of learning performance. These 
findings shed light on how adults and toddlers perceive statistical regularities across 
actors depending on the nature of the observed social situation and the resulting ef-
fects.
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Introduction
Statistical learning of action sequences
Statistical learning refers to the fundamental ability to extract regularities from con-
tinuous sensory input. These skills support learning in multiple domains and across 
development from early in infancy throughout adulthood (Kirkham et al., 2002; Krogh 
et al., 2013; Saffran et al., 1999). Observers and listeners can, for instance, readily extract 
regularities from sequences of visual shapes (Fiser & Aslin, 2001), auditory tones (Saffran 
et al., 1996), linguistic items, and grammatical structures (for an in-depth discussion, see 
Romberg & Saffran, 2010)). The range and scope of this mechanism has led to the view 
that statistical learning forms part of the basic cognitive skill set necessary for language 
acquisition (Romberg & Saffran, 2010) and understanding of mental states (Ruffman et 
al., 2012). Recently, researchers have demonstrated that statistical learning also extends 
to the action domain. Across development, humans are sensitive to the regularities 
and structure contained within sequential, goal-directed actions they observe others 
perform (Ahlheim et al., 2014; Monroy et al., 2017). For instance, even 10- to 11-month-
old infants notice when familiar action streams, such as someone cleaning a kitchen, 
are interrupted with pauses that disrupt the known structure of the sequence (Baldwin 
et al., 2001).
Evidence for statistical learning in the action domain largely comes from studies of 
individual action sequences performed by a single actor. Observers are sensitive to 
multiple sources of statistical information within structured action sequences, such as 
the transitional probabilities and co-occurrence frequencies between action steps (Ahl-
heim et al., 2014; Baldwin et al., 2001; Monroy et al., 2017; Stahl et al., 2014). Adults and 
infants make use of this structure to segment continuous action streams into discrete 
events (Stahl et al., 2014) and to make predictions about the goal-directed behavior of 
solo actors (Monroy et al., 2017). 
Yet, many everyday action sequences occur in a social context and are performed by 
multiple, rather than individual, actors. For instance, two people wash dishes together 
by coordinating their movements as one person soaps, scrubs, and rinses the dishes 
and the second person dries and puts them away. Predicting and understanding the 
overall joint goal of such actions entails tracking the regularities, not only within one 
person’s actions, but across both actors. In the given example, to anticipate what will 
happen next, one needs to know the likelihood of what the second actor (the dish 
dryer) will do given what the first actor is currently doing (rinsing a dish). Experienced 
observers automatically and implicitly make anticipatory eye movements that reflect 
their predictions of how familiar individual actions will unfold (Flanagan & Johansson, 
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2003); for instance, when watching an actor place a ball into a bucket, observers will 
look at the bucket predictively before the actor’s hand arrives there. For a naïve obser-
ver, such as a young infant, learning to predict the upcoming events in the sequence 
indicates recognition of the actors’ overarching collaborative goal and each of their 
individual aims. However, it is unknown whether and how we predict the interleaved 
actions of multiple people.
Social context: Joint versus parallel action
Joint actions have been broadly defined as “any form of social interaction whereby 
two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a 
change in the environment” (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009, p.70). Two people’s actions can 
be coordinated in time and space with or without a common goal that characterizes 
their respective actions. For instance, two runners on the same path in Central Park 
might be coordinated in space and time, but their actions have independent, or ‘paral-
lel’, goals. In contrast, two people who wash dishes together share the joint goal to 
clean. Researchers have classified collaborative actions on the basis of the underlying 
goals of the two actors (Bratman, 1992; Searle, 1990). In the current study, we adopt the 
distinction between ‘joint’ and ‘parallel’ actions based on whether or not they share a 
common goal (for a detailed discussion of this topic, see Bratman, 1992).
An observer’s perception of goal-directed interactions between two people varies 
depending on whether he or she thinks that the actors are pursuing joint or parallel 
goals. In a recent study, Eskenazi and colleagues (Eskenazi, Rueschemeyer, de Lange, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2015) compared neural responses during observation of two per-
ceptually identical scenes in which two actors engaged together in a task. The scenes 
were preceded by a social cue that established whether the actors in the video had 
joint or parallel goals. Findings revealed that the observation of these actions activated 
different neural regions depending on the goal of the actors, even though the actions 
were perceptually identical. Converging evidence from a separate line of research 
shows that communicative social interactions between two people helps observers 
anticipate visual elements of the unfolding activity and ascribe particular goals to the 
individual actors (Manera, Becchio, Schouten, Bara, & Verfaillie, 2011).
The importance of social context for learning early in development is well-established 
(Beier & Spelke, 2012; Hoehl, Michel, Reid, Parise, & Striano, 2014; Striano, Chen, 
Cleveland, & Bradshaw, 2006). In a recent study, Fawcett and Gredebäck (Fawcett & 
Gredebäck, 2013) showed toddlers movies in which an actor moved a block to an inter-
mediary location and a second actor then moved the block to a final location. When the 
first actor subsequently appeared alone, toddlers spontaneously anticipated that she 
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would move the block to the final goal location, thus assuming that she shared the goal 
of moving the block to this location with the second actor. Crucially, they did so only if 
the actors had previously engaged in a social interaction, indicating that social context 
guided the toddlers’ predictions about the action outcome. This sensitivity appears to 
emerge after 18 months of age (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013) as younger infants could 
not do so in a follow-up study (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2015). Other research has shown 
that 9-month-olds infants can, however, use simple social cues such as eye gaze to help 
them extract regularities amidst distracting patterns (Wu et al., 2011). Learning statis-
tical regularities is considered a fundamental building block for social understanding 
(Ruffman et al., 2012), yet there is limited evidence for a direct role of statistical learning 
in a social action context during development or in adulthood. One possibility, based 
on these previous studies, is that the social goals underlying interactions between 
people shape the statistical information that observers extract and retain during action 
observation.
The effects of goal-directed actions
The sensory consequences of actions, typically called action-effects, co-occur with 
goal-directed actions and are another important feature of the action context. Actions 
naturally cause effects that are associated with an action goal or outcome, such as the 
appearance of a light when switching on a lamp. Adults and infants readily acquire bi-
directional associations between these effects and the motor plans that produce them 
(Hommel, 1996; Klein et al., 2006). Action-effect associations support learning about 
action goals for both observed and self-produced actions, making them particularly 
important as young children learn novel goal-directed actions and the functions of 
corresponding objects (Hauf & Aschersleben, 2008; Paulus et al., 2012; Verschoor et al., 
2010). 
However, research on acquisition of action-effect couplings within continuous action 
sequences is limited. A recent study showed that action-effects were necessary for 
toddlers to transfer learned actions (of a single actor) into their own action choices, 
possibly because the effects were perceived as a desirable outcome or a goal (Monroy 
et al., 2017). Action-effects could also guide attention to the regularities in sequential 
actions across multiple actors, although to our knowledge the current study is the first 
to test this empirically. The ability to learn action-effect couplings, when caused by two 
co-actors, may be easier when those actors are observed to share a joint goal.  
The current experiment
We conducted an eye-tracking experiment with adults and 18-month-old toddlers 
to assess whether social context moderates statistical learning during observation of 
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action sequences.  Our primary aim was to establish whether observers can track statis-
tical regularities that occur across actions of multiple actors. That is, can they predict the 
actions of one actor based on the previous action of another actor? Secondly, we asked 
whether statistical regularities distributed across actors are more readily learned when 
these actors share a joint goal. We hypothesized that observers would be better at 
learning—as measured by anticipatory gaze fixations and action performance—when 
actions between two individuals are perceived as a joint sequence with a shared goal 
between the actors. Further, we expected that action-effects would generally facilitate 
learning but that observers would benefit most from this cue in a joint action con-
text. Based on prior evidence from Eskenazi et al. (Eskenazi et al., 2015) and Fawcett 
and Gredebäck (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013), we hypothesized that both adults and 
18-month-old toddlers would demonstrate a similar pattern. We measured predictive 
gaze fixations during an action observation phase, followed by an action performance 
phase in which participants performed their own action sequences both alone and 
together with an experimenter.
Method
Participants
Sixty adults and 58 toddlers took part in this study. Toddlers were recruited from a 
database of interested families in the surrounding region. Ten of the adults and 14 of 
the toddlers were excluded from final analyses for failing to meet a minimum looking 
time requirement (see Analysis section) resulting in 50 adults and 44 toddlers in the 
final sample (see Table 7-1 for mean ages and condition assignments). Written informed 
consent was obtained from all adult participants and parents of the toddlers. Adults 
received course credit for their participation, and families received a baby book or 10€ 
as a gift. This study was approved by the local ethics committee (Ethische Commissie 
Gedragswetenschappelijk Onderzoek; ECG2012-1301-006).
Table 7-1. Characteristics of the final sample.
Age group n Mean age (sd)
Adults 50 22.59 (3.82) years
Joint 23 22.18 (3.11)
Parallel 27 22.94 (4.36)
Toddlers 44 17.00 (.26) months
Joint 24 17.94 (.26)
Parallel 20 18.04 (.24)
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Stimuli
We created two complementary rectangular toys that were arranged approxima-
tely 3cm apart from one another. Each rectangle contained three unique objects with 
distinct manual affordances, and a star-shaped light as the effect (Figure 7-1). Lights 
were controlled by two external buttons and could be activated at any time by the 
experimenter. Video stimuli of actions performed with the toys were filmed with a Sony 
HandyCam video camera and edited using Adobe Premiere Pro Cs5 software.
Figure 7-1. Schematic illustrating the experimental design. A. Participants first observed either 
a Joint or a Parallel social cue film. B. Both conditions subsequently observed an identical action 
sequence featuring deterministic action pairs embedded within a random sequence. Targets (out-
lined in yellow) are the second actions of deterministic pairs which occurred within pairs (Deter-
ministic trials) or randomly (Random trials). C. Still frame from an action sequence video depicting 
the toybox stimulus. The location of the light effects is outlined in red.
Social Context Cue
Participants were randomly assigned to either a Joint or a Parallel condition which 
determined the social context of the observed actions. They first observed a brief 
social cue film depicting two actors seated at a table with the toy placed on the table 
between them. In both conditions, the actors first faced each other and engaged in a 
brief conversation about interacting with the toy (Figure 7-1a). Similar to the social cues 
used in previous research (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013), the conditions differed in the 
orientation and eye-contact between the actors and the statements they made. In the 
Joint condition, the actors first made direct eye contact with each other before saying 
“Shall we play together?” (Actor 1) and “Yes, let’s play together!” (Actor 2). In the Parallel 
condition, they instead faced slightly away from each other and each stated “I am going 
to play alone” (Actor 1, then Actor 2). At the end of each film, the camera zoomed 
into the toy as though the social clip and the action sequence were one continuous 
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demonstration. The social cue movie clips were 10s long and repeated before each 
experimental block throughout the action sequence (described below). 
Action sequence
After the social cue, participants watched videos of the actors performing action 
sequences with the toy stimuli, in which only their hands were visible (Figure 7-1c). 
Individual actions were defined as the manipulation of one object by an actor, who 
always acted upon the rectangular half of the toy closest to her.
Two pseudo-randomized action sequences were generated using the program Mix 
(van Casteren & Davis, 2006). Sequences were defined according to the transitional 
probabilities between individual actions directed at the objects on the toy (e.g., ‘push’, 
‘pull’, etc.). Two action pairs featured deterministic transitions: action ‘A’ followed ac-
tion ‘B’ with 100% probability (e.g., ‘push’ always followed ‘pull’). Transitions between 
all other unpaired actions featured a 0.167 (1/6) transitional probability (Figure 7-1b). 
Crucially, the two actions that formed an action pair were each performed on opposite 
rectangular parts of the toy. For instance, if the first action was performed by Actor 1 
on the toy closest to her, the second action would always be performed by Actor 2 on 
the opposite toy. Thus, the statistical regularities that could be learned always occurred 
across the two actors. 
One of the deterministic action pairs (Effect pair) caused a light to turn on during the 
second action; the second pair (No-effect pair) did not cause any effect. The activated 
light was always on the same half of the toy as its corresponding action and thus op-
posite to the first action of the Effect pair (Figure 7-1c). For both the Effect and No-effect 
pair, we defined the second actions as target actions, as these were the actions that be-
came predictable as the sequence unfolded. All actions occurred with equal frequency 
with the exception of target actions: targets occurred within pairs (12 times) and also 
at random (12 times) following any other possible action (random trials). During ran-
dom trials, target actions associated with the Effect pair never activated the light. This 
ensured that participants needed to learn the two-step action pair in order to predict 
the effect, as it did not consistently follow the target action. The actions that defined 
the Effect and No-effect pairs were randomly selected and counterbalanced across 
participants. Lastly, no action or pair could occur more than three times consecutively.
Video sequences were divided into four blocks. The orientation of the toys (Figure 7-1c) 
rotated 180° between blocks to ensure that individuals had to base their predictive 
looks on an action rather than a location. Action sequences were interleaved with social 
cue clips which were repeated at the beginning of each block. In total, the entire action 
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observation phase lasted approximately eight minutes. Engaging, upbeat music was 
played to help sustain toddlers’ attention throughout the sequences and was played 
for the adults to maintain consistency. The music did not correspond in any way to the 
unfolding actions.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of an action observation phase using an eye-tracker, followed 
by an action performance phase in which participants’ own actions were videotaped 
and coded offline (using the same toys from the video stimuli). After obtaining written 
informed consent, participants were seated on a chair approximately 60cm from the 
eye-tracker screen. Toddlers were seated on their parent’s lap during all phases of the 
experiment. 
A 9-point calibration sequence was repeated until valid data was acquired for all 
nine calibration points or for a maximum of three attempts. Following calibration, 
participants were shown the video demonstration as described above. Parents were 
instructed to look away during calibration and to refrain from influencing their child 
during the experiment. Participants’ eye movements were recorded with a Tobii T120 
eye-tracker (Tobii, Stockholm, Sweden) with a 17” monitor (1280x1024 pixels) and 
sampling frequency of 60Hz. Stimuli were presented with Tobii Studio 2.0 presentation 
software and sounds were played through external speakers.
After the videos were completed, participants moved to a nearby table for the action 
performance phase and were presented with the two rectangular toys. The action 
performance phase consisted of two parts: an Individual and a Joint phase. In the In-
dividual phase, participants were told that they could now play with the toys however 
they liked and were given 90 seconds to perform their own action sequences. 
In the Joint phase, the experimenter and participant took turns acting with the toys for 
a total of 12 turns each: the experimenter would perform an action and then the par-
ticipant was encouraged to perform one action. The experimenter performed actions 
on the toy piece closest to her in a pseudorandom but pre-selected order, in which she 
always performed the first action of the Effect and No-effect pairs three times each (i.e., 
a 25% probability for each pair). She never performed the target actions. After the first 
six trials, the toy pieces were rotated and the final six trials were repeated in the same 
way. 
The order of action performance phases (Individual and Joint) was counterbalanced 
across participants. A camera recorded this session and behavior was later coded offline. 
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Throughout both phases, the experimenter sat opposite the participant and pressed a 
hidden button to activate the light if the participant performed the Effect pair.
Data Analysis
Eye-tracking data
Adult and toddler eye-tracking data were processed in identical ways and were ana-
lyzed separately. To ensure sufficient looking time to learn the statistical structure, we 
did not include those individuals with total fixation time of more than one standard 
deviation below the mean within each age group. Toddlers below this criterion wat-
ched the videos for a mean of 34.52 seconds, which corresponds to less than 10% of the 
demonstration and less than one observation of each pair. For consistency, we applied 
the same criterion to the adult group as well; this excluded adults who contributed 
gaze data for less than 15% of the demonstration. This resulted in the exclusion of 10 
adults and 12 toddlers, as noted above in the Participants section.
Gaze fixations were extracted from the raw eye-tracking data using a custom-made 
program with a temporal filter of 100ms and a spatial filter of 30 pixels. Fixation data 
were imported into Matlab for further analysis. Fixations were considered anticipatory 
if they occurred during predictive time windows, which began the moment a hand 
appeared to perform the first action of a deterministic pair until just before it reap-
peared to perform the target action. This represents the time window during which the 
observer could predict the next action before it actually occurred. The first action pair 
was excluded from analyses, as participants could not make a prediction based on prior 
information during the first observation. 
Equally-sized regions of interest (ROIs) were defined around each object (250 square 
pixels). If participants learned the sequential pair structure, they should look more to 
the target object of each pair during predictive time windows than to any other object. 
Fixations in the ROI of the target action were considered correct. Fixations in the ROI 
of the ongoing action (the first action of each pair) were excluded. Fixations to the star 
were counted as correct during the Effect pair and were excluded entirely for the No-
effect pair. For incorrect fixations, we summed the total fixations to the four alternative 
locations and divided by four to yield the average number of fixations to an incorrect 
region. Our dependent measures were the proportions of correct and incorrect fixati-
ons, out of the total predictive fixations, averaged across the predictive windows for all 
target trials (Equations 1-4). 
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Learning performance 
In the statistical learning literature, not all individuals demonstrate learning—across 
various performance measures—and there is typically variability in the degree to which 
regularities are learned (e.g., Abla, Katahira, & Okanoya, 2008; Abla & Okanoya, 2009; 
Emberson, Liu, & Zevin, 2013; Krogh et al., 2013). A primary aim of the current study was 
to investigate whether social information directly guides statistical learning in a top-down 
manner (Manera et al., 2011; Neri, Luu, & Levi, 2006). However, participants must 
demonstrate the ability to learn the regularities in the action sequences at all, before social 
cues can be expected to exert any influence on how well they are able to encode them. To 
investigate relations between the degree of learning and social contexts, we categorized 
adults and toddlers into two sub-groups based on their learning performance. Learning 
performance was assessed by computing a difference score for each participant of Correct – 
Incorrect gaze proportions for each pair. We hypothesized that learning performance would 
be related to the social context that they observed. Specifically, we expected that among the 
participants with higher difference scores, those who observed the Joint condition should 
demonstrate higher performance than those who observed the Parallel condition.  
Action performance data 
For the Individual and Joint phases, video recordings were coded offline to assess the 
sequence of actions that each participant performed after initiating contact with the toy. If 
participants performed two actions simultaneously (i.e., using both hands), both actions were 
 ( 2 )
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Learning performance 
In the statistical learning literature, not all individuals demonstrate learning—across 
various performance measures—and there is typically variability in the degree to which 
regularities are learned (e.g., Abla, Katahira, & Okanoya, 2008; Abla & Okanoya, 2009; 
Emberson, Liu, & Zevin, 2013; Krogh et al., 2013). A primary aim of the current study was 
to investigate whether social information directly guides statistical learning in a top-down 
manner (Manera et al., 2011; Neri, Luu, & Levi, 2006). However, participants must 
demonstrate the ability to learn the regularities in the action sequences at all, before social 
cues can be expected to exert any influence on ho  well they are able to encode them. To 
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performance was assessed by computing a difference score for each participant of Correct – 
Incorrect gaze proportions for each pair. We hypothesized that learning performance would 
be related to the social context that they observed. Specifically, we expected that among the 
participants with higher difference scores, those who observed the Joint condition should 
demonstrate higher performance than those who observed the Parallel condition.  
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For the Individual and Joint phases, video recordings were coded offline to assess the 
sequence of actions that each participant performed after initiating contact with the toy. If 
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 ( 3 )
Chapter 7 
164 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒 4 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 4
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡
    ( 2 ) 
No-effect Pair: 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
      ( 3 ) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒 4 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 4
𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
     ( 4 ) 
Learning performance 
In the statistical learning literature, not all individuals demonstrate learning—across 
various performance measures—and there is typically variability in the degr e to which 
regularities are learned (e.g., Abla, Katahira, & Okanoya, 2 08; Abla & Okanoya, 2 09; 
Emberson, Liu, & Zevin, 2013; Krogh et al., 2013). A primary aim of the current study was 
to investigate whether social information directly guide  statistical learning in a top-down 
ma ner (Manera et al., 20 1; Neri, L u, & Levi, 2 06). However, participants must 
demonstrate the ability to learn the regularities in the action sequences at all, before social 
cues can b  expected to exert any influence on how well they are able to encode them. To 
investigate relations betw en the degr e of learning and social contexts, we categorized 
adults and to dlers into two sub-groups based on their learning performance. Learning 
performance was assessed by computing a difference score for each participant of Correct – 
Incorrect gaze proportions for each pair. We hypothesized that learning performance would 
be related to the social context that they observed. Specifically, w  expected that among the 
participants with higher difference scores, those who observed the Joint condition should 
demonstrate higher performance than those who observed the Parallel condition.  
Action performance data 
For the Individual and Joint phases, video recordings were coded offline to assess the 
sequence of actions that each participant performed after initiating contact with the toy. If 
participants performed two action  simultaneously (i.e., using both hands), both actions were 
 ( 4 )
Learning performance
In the statistical learning literatur , not all individuals emonstrate learning—across 
various performance measures—and there is typically variability in the degree to which 
regularities are lear ed (e.g., Abla, Katahira, & Okanoya, 2008; Abla & Okanoya, 2009; 
Emberson, Liu, & Zevin, 2013; Krogh et al., 2013). A primary aim of the current study 
was to investigate whether social information directly guides statistical learning in a 
top-down manner (Ma era et al., 2011; Neri, Luu, & Levi, 2006). However, participants 
must demonstrate the ability to learn the regularities in the action sequences at all, 
bef re social cues can be expected to exert any influence on how well they are able to 
encode them. To investigate relations between the degree of learning and social con-
texts, we categorized adults and toddlers into two sub-groups based on their learning 
perf rmanc . Le rning performance was ss s ed by computing a difference sc for 
each participant of Correct – Incorrect gaze proportions for each pair. We hypothesized 
that learning performance would be related to the social context that they observed. 
Specifically, we expected that among the participants with higher difference scores, 
those who observed the Joint condition should demonstrate higher performance than 
those who bserved he Parallel condition. 
Action perform nce data
For the Individual and Joint phases, video recordings were coded offline to assess 
the sequence of actions that each participant performed after initiating contact with 
the toy. If participants performed two acti ns simultaneousl  (i.e., using bot  hands), 
both actions were coded. Any manipulation of an object was considered an action. 
As our hypotheses were not related to the kinematics of the actions, but rather their 
sequential order, we ignored individual differences in kinematics and only assessed 
the order of actions performed with the respective objects. Next, we calculated the 
conditi al pr babilities of performing each action pair for each participant. For clarity, 
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we will refer to the first action of a pair as ‘A’ and the second, target action of a pair as ‘B’. 
The conditional probability of performing B, given the performance of A by either the 
participant (Individual phase) or experimenter (Joint phase), is defined as:
P(B|A) =  
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coded. Any manipulation of an object was considered an action. As our hypotheses were not 
related to the kinematics of the actions, but rather their sequential order, we ignored 
individual differences in kinematics and only assessed the order of actions performed with 
the respective objects. Next, we calculated the conditional probabilities of performing each 
action pair for each participant. For clarity, we will refer to the first action of a pair as ‘A’ and 
the second, target action of a pair as ‘B’. The conditional probability of performing B, given 
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Results 
Adults 
Eye-tracking results 
Correct and Incorrect proportions (Equations 1-2) were entered into a repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) and Location 
(Correct vs. Incorrect) as within-subject factors and Condition (Joint vs. Parallel) as a 
between-subjects factor. This test yielded a significant interaction between Pair and Location, 
F(1,48) = 98.52, p < .001, p2 = .67, and significant main effects of Location, F(1,48) = 
141.19, p < .001, p2 = .75, and Pair, F(1,48) = 98.50, p < .001, p2 = .67 (Figure 7-2). 
Pairwise comparisons confirmed that adults made a higher proportion of correct than 
incorrect fixations for the Effect pair (mean difference = .46 [SEM = .03]; p < .001) but not 
for the No-effect pair (mean difference = .01 [SEM = .03]; p = .72). In addition, there was a 
marginal interaction between Location and Condition, F(1,48) = 3.01, p = .09, p2 = .06. 
Based on our a priori hypotheses, planned comparisons were conducted to follow up on the 
interaction effect despite its marginal significance. These revealed marginally significant 
differences between conditions: descriptively, across pairs, adults in the Joint condition made 
Results
Adults
Eye-tracking results
Correct and Incorrect proportions (Equations 1-2) were entered into a repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) and Location 
(Correct vs. Incorrect) as within-subject factors and Condition (Joint vs. Parallel) as a 
between-subjects factor. This test yielded a significant interaction between Pair and 
Location, F(1,48) = 98.52, p < .001, hp2 = .67, and significant main effects of Location, 
F(1,48) = 141.19, p < .001, hp2 = .75, and P ir, F(1,48) = 98.50, p < .001, hp2 = .67 (Figure 
7-2). Pairwise comparisons confirmed that adults made a higher proportion of correct 
than incorrect fixations for the Effect pair (mean difference = .46 [SEM = .03]; p < .001) 
but not for the No-effect pair (mean difference = .01 [SEM = .03]; p = .72). In addition, 
there was a marginal interaction between Location and Condition, F(1,48) = 3.01, p = 
.09, hp2 = .06. Based on our a priori hypotheses, planned comparisons were conducted 
to follow up on the interaction effect despite its marginal significance. These revealed 
arginally significant differences between conditions: descriptively, across pairs, adults 
in the Joint condition made more correct fixations (mean difference = .05, SEM = .03, p = 
.09) and fewer fixations to Incorrect locations (mean difference = -.01, SEM = .01, p = .09) 
than adults in the Parallel condition.
As fixations to the effect were only considered correct for the Effect pair, we controlled 
for differences in the number of correct regions between pairs by performing secondary 
analyses with looks to the effect excluded from all proportion scores. An ANOVA with 
Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) and Location (Correct vs. Incorrect) as within-subject factors 
and Condition (Joint vs. Parallel) as a between-subjects factor revealed a marginally sig-
nificant effect of Location. Across pairs and conditions, proportions of correct fixations 
were descriptively greater than proportions of incorrect fixations, F(1,48) = 2.98, p = .09, 
hp2 = .06. There were no other main effects or interactions, ps > .16.
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Figure 7-2. Adult eye-tracking results. Mean proportions of correct and incorrect fixations for each 
pair and condition. Error bars represent standard errors. *p < .001.
Learning performance
To investigate sensitivity to social context with respect to learning performance, par-
ticipants were separated into high and low learning groups according to the median 
difference between correct and incorrect fixations, collapsed across pairs (including 
looks to the light for the Effect pair; median = .23, SD = .14). Based on this learning split, 
the mean difference score was .34 (SD = .11) for high learners and .12 (SD = .06) for low 
learners (N = 25 in each group). 
Difference scores were entered into an ANOVA with Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) as a 
within-subjects factor, and Learning (High vs. Low) and Condition (Joint vs. Parallel) 
as between-subject factors. This yielded a significant interaction between Learning 
and Condition, F(1,46) = 16.08, p < .001, hp2 = .26 (Figure 7-3). Follow-up comparisons 
revealed that difference scores were significantly greater for the Joint relative to the 
Parallel condition for the high learners (mean difference = .14 [SEM = .03], p < .001), but 
not for low learners (mean difference = - .02 [SEM = .30], p = .42). There were no other 
interaction effects, ps > .27.
Chapter 7144
Figure 7-3. Adult eye-tracking results by learning group. Difference scores (Correct - Incorrect) by 
Learning groups (High vs. Low) and Condition, collapsed across pairs. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
Consistent with the above analyses, there were also main effects of Pair, F(1,46) = 98.08, 
p < .001, hp2 = .68, and a main effect of Condition, F(1,46) = 8.09, p < .01, hp2 = .15. 
Difference scores were significantly higher for the Effect pair, relative to the No-effect 
pair, across groups (mean difference = .45 [SEM = .05], p < .001), indicating that adults 
made a higher proportion of correct relative to incorrect fixations for the Effect than 
the No-effect pair. The main effect of Condition reflected the fact that difference sco-
res were significantly higher for the Joint relative to the Parallel condition when the 
learning groups were merged (mean difference = .06 [SEM = .02], p = .01); however, the 
interaction with Learning reveals that this main effect was driven by the large difference 
between conditions in the high learning group.   
Low learners were not simply less attentive to the screen: an independent-samples 
t-test revealed no differences in overall gaze during the action observation task (p = .17) 
or during the social cue films (p = .96) between high and low learners. There were also 
no differences in visual attention to the action observation task (p = .54) or the social 
cue films (p = .88) between Joint and Parallel conditions. Thus, visual attention to the 
screen did not drive any of the observed patterns in predictive gaze. 
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Action performance
 Individual phase 
The mean conditional probability, P(B|A), across participants during the Individual 
phase was .28 (SD = .33) for the Effect pair and .18 (SD = .21) for the No-effect pair. An 
ANOVA with P(B|A) as the dependent variable, Pair (Effect and No-effect) as a within-
subjects factor, and Condition (Joint vs. Parallel) as a between-subjects factor revealed 
a marginal main effect of Pair, F(1,34) = 3.49, p = .07, hp2 = .09 (Effect > No-effect).  There 
were no other main effects or interactions, ps > .14.  
We additionally tested whether action performance was different between high and 
low learners. P(B|A) was entered into an ANOVA with Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) as a 
within-subjects factor and Learning (High vs. Low) as a between-subjects factor. There 
were no main effects or interactions with Learning, ps > .43: high and low learners did 
not differ in their probability of performing action pairs.
 Joint phase
Mean P(B|A) across participants during the Joint phase was .53 (SD = .42) for the Effect 
pair and .18 (SD = .21) for the No-effect pair. An ANOVA with P(B|A) as the dependent 
variable, Pair (Effect and No-effect) as a within-subjects factor, and Condition (Joint vs. 
parallel) as a between-subjects factor revealed no main effects or interactions, ps > .24. 
Joint action performance also did not differ between high and low learners: an ANOVA 
with P(B|A) (Effect vs. No-effect) as a within-subjects factor and Learning (High vs. Low) 
as a between-subjects factor yielded no significant main effects or interactions with 
Learning, ps > .30.
Relations between anticipatory gaze and action performance
To identify relations between statistical learning during the action observation phase 
and spontaneous action performance, Spearman’s rank-order correlations were perfor-
med between correct anticipations and the probability of performing an action pair 
in the Individual action context. These were conducted separately for each pair, across 
conditions. The correlation was not significant when including looks to the effect (p = 
.13) but there was a positive correlation between correct anticipations to the target 
action of the Effect pair—excluding looks to the effect—and the probability of perfor-
ming an Effect pair, rs(43) = .29, p = .03. Participants who anticipated the target action 
correctly were thus more likely to perform the Effect pair themselves. There were no 
significant correlations for the No-effect pair, ps > .15. We did not assess correlations for 
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the Joint action context because the first action was always performed by the experi-
menter rather than the participant.  
Toddlers
Eye-tracking results
We conducted identical analyses for the toddler age group as for the adult group. 
Figure 7-4 illustrates the mean proportion of gaze fixations toddlers made during 
deterministic action pairs. An ANOVA with Pair (2: Effect vs. No-effect) and Location (2: 
Correct vs. Incorrect) as within-subject factors, and Condition (2: Joint vs. Parallel) as 
a between-subjects factor revealed a Pair by Location interaction, F(1,42) = 14.78, p < 
.001, hp2 = .26. Pairwise comparisons showed that toddlers made a higher proportion of 
correct than incorrect fixations for the Effect pair (mean difference = .08 [SEM = .03]; p = 
.002); in contrast, they made significantly fewer Correct than Incorrect fixations for the 
No-effect pair (mean difference = -.07 [SEM = .03]; p = .01). There were no main effects or 
interactions with Condition, ps > .31.  
Figure 7-4. Toddler eye-tracking results. Mean proportions of correct and incorrect fixations for 
each pair and condition. The asterisk indicates an interaction between Pair and Location (Effect pair: 
C > I; No-effect pair: C < I across conditions). Error bars represent standard errors.
As before, we subsequently excluded looks to the effect as a correct location and 
only considered target object fixations. An ANOVA with Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) and 
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Location (Correct vs. Incorrect) as within-subject factors, and Condition (2: Social vs. 
Non-social) as a between-subjects factor revealed a main effect of Location, F(1,42) = 
19.20, p < .001, hp2 = .31 in the opposite direction: toddlers made fewer fixations to 
Correct relative to Incorrect locations across pairs (mean difference = -.06 [SEM = .02]; p 
< .001).   
To assess the possibility that toddlers were simply looking to the location of the light 
effect throughout the action sequence, we conducted a secondary analysis on fixations 
to the effect only. The proportions of fixations to the light during the Effect pair were 
compared with proportions of fixations to the light during Random pairs (preceding 
the 2nd action of the effect pair when it occurred elsewhere in the sequence). A paired-
sample t-test revealed significant differences between the proportions (mean difference 
= .06, SEM = .03, p = .022) confirming that toddlers were not simply looking at the light 
throughout the action sequence. Rather, they seemed to selectively predict the light 
during the anticipatory time windows of the Effect pairs. 
Learning Performance
Toddlers were also separated into high and low learners based on a median split of the 
mean difference score (correct–incorrect proportions) across pairs. The mean difference 
score was .09 (SD = .07) for high learners and -.08 (SD = .02) for low learners (N = 22 in 
each group). An ANOVA with Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) as a within-subjects factor and 
Learning (High vs. Low) and Condition (Joint vs. Parallel) as between-subjects factors 
showed no significant interaction effects with Learning, ps > .53 (Figure 7-5). Thus, tod-
dlers did not differ in their visual anticipations according to whether they were in the 
Joint or Parallel conditions, regardless of learning performance.
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Figure 7-5. Toddler eye-tracking results by learning group. Difference scores (Correct - Incorrect) 
by Learning groups (High vs. Low) and Condition, across pairs for toddlers. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
Like the adults, toddlers also showed no differences in visual attention to the screen 
during the action observation task or the social cue task depending on whether they 
were high or low learners (ps = .55) There were also no differences in visual attention 
between Joint and Parallel conditions (ps > .47). 
Action performance: Individual and Joint phases
Toddlers performed few actions during either action contexts. Table 7-2 contains the 
mean number of actions performed overall across Individual and Joint phases and 
the number of toddlers who performed an action pair. Across toddlers, there were 
no differences for P(B|A) based on Pair (Effect vs. No-effect) in either the Joint or the 
Individual action context, ps > .11. We conducted identical ANOVA analyses as we did 
for the adult group for consistency, though we did not expect toddlers’ performance 
data to yield meaningful results due to the low frequency of actions performed. There 
were no significant differences in between Joint or Parallel conditions for either pair in 
either the Individual or the Joint phases, ps > .48. There were no also no main effects or 
interactions with Learning, ps > .28, indicating that high and low learners did not differ 
in their probability of performing action pairs for either the Individual or Joint phases.
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Table 7-2. Experimental variables separated by age group, including measures from eye-tracking data 
(visual attention and learning) and post-observation play session (action performance).  
Phase Measure Adults (SD) Toddlers (SD)
Action Observation Visual Attention
Total looking time (s) 203.85 (40.10) 138.36 (38.94)
Total fixations (no.) 70.28 (20.17) 54.61 (19.20)
Learning (across pairs)
DifferenceCorrect- Incorrect 0.23 (0.14) 0.01 (0.10)
Action Performance Individual phase:
Mean # of actions 32.96 (11.18) 13.50 (7.37)
P(B|A) Effect pair .28 (.33) .05 (.14)
P(B|A) No-effect pair .18 (.21) .15 (.27)
Joint phase:
P(B|A) Effect pair 0.53 (.42) .09 (.17)
P(B|A) No-effect pair 0.38 (.37) .07 (.14)
Relations between anticipatory gaze and action performance
Correlations between the proportions of total correct fixations and the conditional 
probability P(B|A) of performing a pair were not significant for either Effect or No-effect 
pairs, ps > .14, whether looks to the light were included or not. Thus, there was no 
indication of any relation between toddlers’ predictive gaze fixations and their repro-
duction of action pairs in the individual action contexts. 
Discussion
Sensitivity to the regularities and structure contained within sequential, goal-directed 
actions is an important building block for generating expectations and understanding 
of the social actions we observe (Ruffman et al., 2012). Until now, however, research 
on statistical learning for actions and research on joint action understanding have pro-
ceeded independently. The current study is the first to investigate the role of statistical 
learning abilities in tracking regularities across people, and whether these abilities are 
moderated by the social context defining the nature of the observed interaction.
We examined statistical learning skills of adults and toddlers during an action observa-
tion task. While keeping the observed sequence regularities identical, we manipulated 
the social context of the observed actions: two actors had either a joint action goal 
or their own individual goals. Consistent with previous research for individual actions, 
adults learned the statistical regularities across the two action partners: they made 
visual anticipations towards upcoming actions and reproduced the observed action 
pairs. However, learning only occurred when the action pair caused an effect; when 
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there was no effect, adults did not anticipate the upcoming action even though it was 
statistically deterministic. Interestingly, we observed a difference in learning perfor-
mance according to which social context the adults observed. That is, for adults with 
higher performance, they correctly anticipated more—i.e., they learned better—if they 
observed actions in a joint rather than a parallel social context. For adults with lower 
performance, action context had no effect on learning. 
Toddlers only learned the action pair with a corresponding action-effect and did not 
anticipate the target action of the pair that did not cause an effect. In addition, there 
was no evidence of any influence of the social manipulation on their visual predictions 
or self-produced actions, even for toddlers with better learning performance. In the 
following, we discuss these findings in more detail with respect to the different roles of 
social context, statistical learning, and action-effects for perception of social interacti-
ons in adults and young toddlers.
Prediction in joint action: The role of action-effects for learning statistical 
regularities across action partners 
Our first aim was to establish whether adults and toddlers could extract statistical re-
gularities of actions across two action partners, given that they can do so for individual 
action sequences (Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008). Our findings provide 
evidence that both age groups were able to correctly anticipate upcoming actions and 
their effects based on sequential regularities across the observed actors. Interestingly, 
both adults and toddlers only predicted the action pair that led to a salient effect. A 
relation between predictive gaze and self-produced actions was also only observed for 
this pair in the adult group. 
These results are consistent with prior research on action-effect binding, which is 
situated within the framework of the ideomotor theory (Hommel, 1996; Prinz, 1997; 
Prinz, 1990). This theory proposes that perceiving an action-effect contingency creates 
bidirectional action-effect associations, and subsequent predictions are based on 
anticipation of the effect itself rather than the actor’s movements. In line with this 
framework, adults and toddlers in our experiment learned the structure of the action-
effect pair (i.e., action A-action B-effect) and predicted the effect during observation of 
the first action in the pair.
 Unexpectedly, adults and toddlers demonstrated essentially no learning for the No-
effect pair. In contrast with evidence highlighting the automaticity and rapidity of 
visual statistical learning (Turk-Browne et al., 2005; Turk-browne et al., 2008), this finding 
suggests that exposure to the transitional probabilities between actions alone did not 
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result in learning, as measured by anticipatory gaze. Traditional accounts of statistical 
learning propose that the underlying computations are based on transitional proba-
bilities between items (Aslin et al., 1998; Saffran et al., 1996). Under this assumption, 
adults should be able to predict actions based on their statistical likelihood and not 
solely based on whether or not they cause an effect. In addition, a prior study showed 
that toddlers can predict upcoming target actions for individual action sequences 
(Monroy et al., 2017). One explanation for the lack of learning of the No-effect pair is 
that the saliency of the action-effect drew attention to the contingencies between the 
paired actions preceding it. Recent findings suggest that statistical learning, though 
robust, is constrained by features of the incoming information such as the surrounding 
perceptual environment and sensory modality (Emberson, Conway, & Christiansen, 
2011; Emberson et al., 2013; Krogh et al., 2013). Our stimuli presented complex visual 
information—i.e., two actors, effects, six different objects, a brief learning period—that 
could compete in terms of working memory or information processing. Adults and tod-
dlers may have recruited a strategy that resulted in learning the more salient regularity 
within the sequence at the cost of not perceiving the second, less salient regularity. 
Toddlers, in fact, demonstrated more incorrect looks than correct looks for this pair, 
indicating that their performance was actually below chance. One explanation for their 
below-chance performance for the No-effect pair is that, in the absence of a visual 
effect, toddlers were free to engage in more visual exploratory behaviors to the other 
objects, potentially resulting in higher proportions of incorrect fixations for the No-
effect pair relative to the Effect pair. 
The effect of social context on statistical learning
The second main aim of the current study was to investigate whether social context 
moderates how observers extract statistical regularities across two actors. Past research 
has demonstrated that subtle social cues, such as whether two actors share a joint 
intention or not, influence how subsequent actions are processed by onlookers (Es-
kenazi et al., 2015; Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013). Eskenazi and colleagues (2015) found 
activation in brain regions associated with organizing sequential movements towards 
a final goal, but only when participants observed two actors with a joint goal and not 
when they observed actors with parallel goals. Interestingly, activation in these regions 
only differed between Joint and Parallel conditions when participants were explicitly 
attending to the intention itself, and not during a working memory task. This finding 
suggests that processing joint goals depends on additional top-down input from brain 
regions involved in theory of mind and mental state reasoning.
In our study, we found that sensitivity to the social context only influenced prediction 
when adults were particularly skilled at picking up the statistical regularities. For those 
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adults with better overall learning, we observed greater performance in the Joint rela-
tive to the Parallel condition; in contrast, there was no difference between conditions 
for adults who learned less well. One explanation for this effect is that statistical learning 
was only moderated by social context when the learning performance reached a cer-
tain threshold; put more simply, learning needed to be robust in the first place for the 
surrounding context to exert any influence. For the adults who were more proficient 
at learning statistical regularities, knowing that two people were acting together with 
a joint goal helped them to learn the regularities across their actions. If observing joint 
goals engages additional top-down neural processes (Canessa et al., 2012; Centelles, 
Assaiante, Nazarian, Anton, & Schmitz, 2011; Eskenazi et al., 2015), this might facilitate 
the detection of lower-level perceptual features of the action sequence such as statis-
tical structure.
In a study on statistical learning of shape sequences, Abla & Okanoya (2009) similarly 
divided participants into learning groups based on performance in a post-test (i.e., 
familiarity judgements of the learned sequences). The better learners also showed 
earlier neural responses to the statistical regularities; less proficient learners only began 
to show neural responses to the regularities at the end of the learning phase. Howe-
ver, the less proficient learners were still above chance performance in the post-test, 
indicating that they still acquired retrospective sensitivity to the learned regularities 
even though they showed no neural markers of anticipation during observation. Thus, 
during learning, the ability to prediction future events may emerge more slowly than 
the ability to make retrospective judgments about what was observed. Our data also 
revealed variability in learning, as measured by online visual predictions, but perhaps 
both high and low learners would demonstrate similar performance in retrospective 
measures of learning which do not require predictions about the future (e.g., Baldwin 
et al., 2001). In a similar vein, sensitivity to social context was revealed in the online 
predictions of only the better learners, yet all observers—independent of learning 
proficiency—may still differentiate between the two social contexts in a retrospective 
measure such as a forced-choice or a familiarity test. This might also explain the lack of 
differences between conditions or learning groups observed in the action performance 
measures: despite varying degrees of success in predicting upcoming actions during 
the learning phase, these differences did not modulate their ability to reproduce the 
action pairs post-learning. The underlying sources of individual learning differences, 
and whether they relate more to general skills in detecting the visual regularities (as 
in Eskenazi et al., 2015) or in perceiving the social aspects of the task (as in Fawcett & 
Gredebäck, 2013) is another question to address in future research. 
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An alternative interpretation that might explain the better performance in the Joint 
relative to the Parallel condition for the higher learners is that observing the parallel so-
cial cue actually hindered learning. Although there are situations in which two people 
who do not have a shared goal might still produce actions with statistical regularities 
(e.g., two people in competition with one another), it is perhaps less important for 
an observer to learn those regularities. Those who observed the two actors declare 
independent goals might have thus been biased away from detecting the regularities 
across their actions. A possible future study that could help answer this question would 
be to include a condition with no social context cue. 
Transferring learned regularities into action performance
The relation between predictive gaze behavior and action performance is an important 
indicator of whether observers are able to access knowledge they have acquired from 
observation and transfer it into their own action choices. This relation may be particularly 
important in a joint action context, as predicting a co-actor’s behavior and responding 
adaptively are necessary for smooth coordination (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). In the 
adult group, predictive gaze was correlated with action performance: adults who made 
more predictive looks to the second actor’s actions also were more likely to reproduce 
the two-step action pair that caused an effect, even though they were acting alone. 
This suggests that observers were able to access knowledge of the sequence structure 
and use it for action control, but only when the actions led to a desired outcome or goal 
(Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, & O ’doherty, 2010; Monroy et al., 2017). For the toddler group, 
there were no correlations between predictive gaze and action performance. However, 
it is difficult to interpret the lack of a significant correlation as there were also far fewer 
data points during the action performance phase for the toddlers than for the adults.
Statistical learning and social context in toddlerhood
Toddlers’ learning performance was not modulated by social context. These findings 
differ from those of Fawcett and Gredebäck (2013), who showed that visual anticipati-
ons of 18-month-olds differ depending on the social relations established between two 
actors. In their study, toddlers were more likely to anticipate the joint goal of two actors 
in a Social condition than in a Non-social condition. However, in their experiment, 
the same action demonstration (moving a block to a final location in three steps) was 
performed in discrete, repetitive trials.  Toddlers in the Social condition, relative to the 
Non-social condition, were more likely to bind the collaborative sequence together 
based on the social cue.
Despite the different outcomes, our results may complement these previous findings. 
In our design, statistically probable actions were embedded within a continuous stream 
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of object-directed actions, with the regularities occurring across actors. Although we 
expected the social context to influence toddlers’ ability to learn the action structure, 
the action-effect instead determined whether or not they could successfully make 
action predictions. Perhaps the action-effect, rather than the social cue, determined 
whether toddlers perceived the interaction as having a shared joint goal. This notion 
is consistent with prior work showing that infants perceive sequences as collaborative 
when they result in an action outcome (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013; Henderson & 
Woodward, 2011). In addition, the effect occurred repeatedly within the sequence itself, 
unlike the social cue, and may have been easier to retain in working memory.
Another point to consider is that, in the current study, we controlled for the spatial 
associations between actions and locations by rotating the stimuli between trial blocks 
so that the physical locations changed throughout the experiment. In the experiment 
by Fawcett and Gredebäck (2013), location and goal were not dissociated; it is thus 
unknown whether infants were predicting an action goal or a spatial location. A recent 
study demonstrated that changing action locations, though more ecologically valid, 
makes action prediction more challenging for infants (Daum, Attig, Gunawan, Prinz, & 
Gredebäck, 2012). Here, given the changing target locations in every block, toddlers 
may have depended on the salient effect to successfully bind the two statistically co-
herent actions together. Faced with this more complex learning situation, toddlers may 
rely on easily identifiable information such as salient effects. Given a more extended 
learning opportunity or additional cues, toddlers might shift their learning strategy and 
use information from subtler cues such as eye gaze and dialogue. A promising avenue 
for future research would be to systematically disentangle the separate contributions of 
social cues and action-effects and identify how and when toddlers and young children 
can flexibly integrate these cues during action observation.
Finally, another possibility is that a greater degree of statistical learning is required for 
individual differences in sensitivity to social context to become apparent. That is, even 
the ‘high learners’ in the toddler group performed poorer in absolute terms than the 
‘low learners’ in the adult group. As discussed above, subtle contextual cues may only 
influence learning above a certain threshold, which toddlers may not reach until later 
in development.
Conclusions
Findings from the current study shed light on the relations between statistical learning, 
social context, and action-effects during observation of two action partners. Just as 
prior research has shown that people can detect regularities in observed actions, we 
present evidence that this ability extends to social situations in which regularities occur 
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across two action partners. For adults who were good at extracting sequence regu-
larities, subtle cues about the underlying intentions of two actors in a social context 
influenced their ability to detect these regularities. That is, when adults watched two 
actors sharing a joint action goal, they were more likely to detect regularities between 
their actions and predict an upcoming action than when they observed two actors 
with independent goals—even though the observed action streams were perceptually 
identical. Toddlers, at 18-months of age, showed similar learning performance regar-
dless of the social context established between the two actors. These findings may 
reflect a developmental process, such that toddlers initially rely upon action-effects to 
define the social context between joint action partners, whereas social cues such as 
dialogue and gaze cues gain relevance later in development or under easier learning 
conditions.

Chapter 8
General Discussion
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Anticipating goal-directed action is central to social-cognitive functioning in everyday 
life. When we observe another person acting—washing dishes, pouring a glass of wine, 
packing a suitcase—we make predictions about their actions as they unfold. Actions 
are inherently sequential: most of the actions we perform and observe occur within 
continuous sequences. In this thesis, I investigated the role of statistical learning for 
action prediction and learning of new actions. In the following, I offer a summary of 
the main findings and consider their theoretical implications. Finally, I present avenues 
for future work and describe current ongoing work arising from the outcomes of this 
thesis.
Summary
I embarked on this project by developing a new action observation paradigm (the 
‘Toybox paradigm’) to investigate whether toddlers and adults can learn statistical 
regularities in observed action sequences to (1) predict upcoming actions and (2) 
recreate them when acting themselves. This paradigm enabled us to address multiple 
questions that have emerged from prior research. First, previous studies suggest that 
observing actions engages the observer’s own motor system in addition to general 
perceptual and attention processing (Kilner, 2011; Schubotz, 2007), which promotes 
learning above and beyond other forms of observational learning (Hopper et al., 2010; 
Kilner, 2011; Schubotz, 2007). Second, recent work indicates that it is the effects of 
perceived actions that guide action prediction (Aschersleben & Prinz, 1995; Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001; Hoffmann, Sebald, & Stöcker, 2001). In our paradigm, we presented one 
group of observers with an action sequence and a second group with a ‘ghost event’ 
sequence (non-action visual events). The sequence regularities consisted of two action 
pairs, one that caused a distal effect and one that did not. Our indices of learning were 
(1) predictive eye movements towards upcoming actions during observation, and (2) 
whether observers then performed the action pairs following observation. Chapter 2 
reports a study implementing this paradigm with 18-month-old toddlers. Consistent 
with prior research, this study showed that toddlers learned to predict upcoming acti-
ons better when they observed the action events relative to the ghost event sequence. 
They were also more likely to imitate the pair that caused an effect when they observed 
the actor than the ghost events. 
Chapter 3 extended these questions to an adult population, and revealed a slightly 
more complex pattern. Adults learned from both a human action sequence and a 
visual ghost sequence, but learning was enhanced when participants viewed actions 
with contingent effects. Specifically, learning emerged earlier when they observed the 
action sequence relative to the ghost event sequence. Second, they retained explicit 
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awareness of the sequence regularities when they were performed by an actor and 
caused an effect.
Together, results from Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that observers apply their statistical 
learning skills during online observation of action sequences and use this information 
to predict upcoming action steps. Further, observing human action benefits learning in 
several ways. For toddlers, observing an agent seems necessary to successfully perform 
the difficult task of encoding statistical regularities and making correct predictive eye 
movements based on them. Adults can perform this task for both actions and non-
actions; however, as a group they could only transfer this knowledge into their own 
behavior and explicit awareness when they had observed an agent cause an effect. 
One interpretation, which I discuss throughout this thesis, is that our own motor system 
plays a facilitative role during online processing of others’ goal-directed actions.
Chapter 4 followed up on the main finding in Chapter 2, in which toddlers learned 
better from observing a human actor than the ghost events. One interpretation of this 
finding, based on recent theories (e.g., Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007), is that activation of 
the motor system facilitates learning and prediction for observed actions. This inter-
pretation leads to the hypothesis that observers should be better at predicting actions 
with which they have more prior experiences (hence, for which they have a stronger 
representation). In Chapter 4, I tested whether statistical learning for actions in youn-
ger infants (8–11 months of age) is modulated by prior motor experiences. Here, motor 
experience was operationalized as the relative dominance of the observed actions in 
their motor repertoire. As hypothesized, findings revealed an early increase in correct 
predictions for the actions currently more dominant in the infants’ motor repertoire, 
though evidence of learning was less robust than for toddlers (Chapter 2) or adults 
(Chapter 3). This finding extended prior research highlighting the relation between 
infants’ action prediction and motor development (e.g., Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011), by 
showing that this relation also modulates infants’ abilities to encode and predict statis-
tical regularities between actions.
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 7 investigated behavioral indicators of learning, measured by 
anticipatory gaze fixations and action imitation. The remaining chapters of this thesis 
aimed to examine the connection between the brain and behavior, by investigating 
the electrophysiological correlates related to the behavioral findings from previous 
studies. Chapter 5 investigated ERP components in response to violations of learned 
statistical regularities in young infants (8–11 months of age). In this study, I modified 
the ‘Toybox’ paradigm to record EEG and eye-tracking simultaneously during a learning 
phase and a test phase. Infants first observed an action sequence featuring the same 
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statistical regularities—i.e., action pairs—as in the previous chapters. At test, infants 
observed additional ‘deviant’ action pairs that violated those regularities. The main fin-
ding from Chapter 5 was a robust Negative central (Nc) component in response to the 
deviant action-effect pair. The Nc is a marker of infant visual attention (Reynolds, 2015), 
indicating that the deviant action elicited an enhanced attention response relative to 
the expected action. This was supported by their predictive eye movements during the 
learning phase, in which infants also made more correct than incorrect predictive gaze 
fixations for the action-effect pair. Further, consistent with the behavioral evidence 
from Chapters 2, 3, and 7, this study provided clear evidence that action-effects have 
a powerful influence on attention to and learning of observed actions. 
An additional outcome of Chapter 5 was the lack of an N400 effect. Based on prior 
research in which unexpected action outcomes elicited an N400 effect in both adults 
and infants (Reid et al., 2009; Reid & Striano, 2008), we had hypothesized that a violation 
to statistical regularities in action sequences might also elicit a similar effect. Though it 
is difficult to interpret null effects, in this chapter I argue that a likely explanation for this 
null finding is that the deviant action-effect pair did not elicit a semantic incongruence 
effect because infants did not process the action sequence at a semantic level. The N400 
is traditionally associated with semantic processing, generally defined as processing 
‘meaning’ in language or logic (for a review on the N400, see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
Prior studies have shown N400 effects for familiar actions with unexpected outcomes, 
such as bringing a spoonful of food to the head (Reid & Striano, 2008). Brief exposure to 
statistical regularities can support action prediction, as demonstrated throughout this 
thesis, but may be insufficient for infants to attribute ‘meaning’ to an action outcome. 
One speculative possibility, which could be pursued in future research, is that infants 
need to have first-hand experience with an action goal (i.e., it needs to be their own 
goal, as in eating) before semantic networks are activated during processing. 
Chapter 6 investigated the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the ability to anti-
cipate sequential actions using EEG. Based on results from previous chapters showing 
enhanced learning from observing an actor vs. ghost events, and the notion that the 
motor system guides the generation of action predictions (Chapter 4), I hypothesized 
that toddlers would demonstrate greater motor activity during anticipation of an 
action they could predict relative to one they could not. As hypothesized, toddlers 
demonstrated a decrease in power of the mu rhythm—a marker of motor activation—
during anticipation of the predictable actions. These results provide the first evidence 
that information learned via observation of statistical regularities can translate into a 
prediction in the motor system. Further, this finding highlights a potential means by 
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which perception-action links can initially arise during development, and provides sup-
port for motor-based accounts of action perception. 
Finally, social interactions arguably constitute some of our most important real-life 
action experiences. In Chapter 7, I extended the aims of Chapter 2 and 3 by exa-
mining statistical learning in a joint action situation. When watching a joint action, a 
third-person observer needs to track regularities that occur across two actors, such 
as when two people are cooking together. In this study, we manipulated whether 
the social context—that is, whether the actors shared a joint goal or had their own 
individual goals—exerts a top-down influence on how regularities are learnt in tod-
dlers and adults. The findings from this study showed an interesting relation between 
learning and social context in the adult group: within the group of adults who showed 
a higher degree of learning, those who observed the two actors with a shared joint goal 
were better able to predict upcoming actions compared to those who watched the 
same two actors with separate, individual goals. In contrast, social context appeared to 
have no influence on toddlers’ ability to learn the action sequences. This result differs 
from previous studies showing that social information modulates toddlers’ learning 
opportunities in a top-down manner (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013; Hoehl et al., 2014). In 
Chapter 7, I suggest two possible interpretations for these findings: first, social context 
may only influence statistical learning for action sequences above a certain learning 
threshold. Alternatively, lower-level information from statistical regularities may be 
prioritized above higher-level input from social cues for the toddler group. This latter 
possibility is supported by recent work suggesting that infants’ early statistical learning 
skills bootstrap their emerging abilities to process more complex and unobservable 
aspects of human behavior (Ruffman et al., 2012).
Across these studies, action-effects had a robust influence on the outcomes of lear-
ning. Preverbal infants (Chapter 5) only demonstrated neural responses to sequence 
violations when they were associated with an effect, which was consistent with their 
predictive gaze fixations during the learning phase. In Chapter 2, toddlers only showed 
a correspondence between action prediction and performance for the actions—and 
not ghost events—that resulted in an effect. Similarly, adults were more likely to imitate 
the sequence and to retain explicit (i.e., verbal) awareness for actions that resulted in 
effects (Chapter 3). When tracking the regularities across two people, even adults 
only consistently predicted the action-effect pair (Chapter 7). Together, the findings 
from this thesis clearly show that distal effects have a powerful influence on the ability 
to learn and predict the regularities in action sequences. Note that learning was not 
entirely dependent on action-effects, as revealed in toddler and adults’ implicit gaze 
anticipations (Chapters 2 and 3) and in toddlers’ predictive motor activation (Chapter 
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6) even in the absence of action-effects. This finding is consistent with a large number 
of studies showing that humans implicitly encode statistical regularities from very early 
in development in the absence of any additional cues (e.g., Turk-Browne, Scholl, Chun, 
& Johnson, 2008). As discussed in following sections, action-effects may not be critical 
for learning, but may instead guide the outcomes of learning and how knowledge is 
used to modify behavior. 
In sum, results from these studies show that humans—infants, toddlers, and adults—can 
readily encode the statistical regularities between sequential actions and use this infor-
mation to predict upcoming actions. Action-effects consistently played an important 
role by making it possible for younger infants to detect the sequence structure and by 
modulating learning outcomes in toddlers and adults. The findings in this thesis paint 
a story in which the motor system is actively involved in learning statistical structure in 
action sequences, but is also supported by other functional brain regions depending 
on current task requirements (Lingnau & Petris, 2013). In the following sections, I will 
discuss several implications of these findings for current theories of statistical learning 
and motor-based accounts of action prediction. 
The role of statistical learning for action prediction
Predictive gaze
In Chapters 2 to 5, our measure of learning during action observation was focused 
on predictive gaze fixations. Previous experiments on action sequence processing 
have measured learning after it occurred, commonly via segmentation skills or post-
observation familiarity judgments (e.g., Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008; 
Stahl et al., 2014). Segmentation or recognition of an action need not require that the 
observer employs prospective processes during observation, but could rather be based 
on factors such as memory (Dale et al., 2012). Prediction requires a step further: the 
learner must integrate current perceptual information into their internal model of the 
action to generate a prediction about the future, and adapt their behavior to accom-
modate that event (such as programming an eye movement).    
Despite the general finding that visual predictions were more frequently correct than 
incorrect, I found that observers did not always make predictions in the first place. In-
fants and toddlers (Chapters 2, 5 and 6) demonstrated low rates of anticipatory looks, 
a finding which has also been reported elsewhere (Tummeltshammer & Kirkham, 2013). 
Dale and colleagues (2012) reported a similar finding in anticipatory manual responses 
of adults, and suggested that the cognitive system does not necessarily predict upco-
ming events  by default. Rather, without sufficient prior knowledge, people first adopt 
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a neutral position to ‘ready’ themselves for transitioning into prediction once they 
detect the sequence structure. After beginning to make behavioral predictions, they 
start receiving feedback from prediction errors and can then begin to construct a more 
complete model of the sequence (Zacks & Swallow, 2007). Findings from Chapters 2–6 
suggest that predictive behaviors (in our case, implicit eye movements) may only begin 
to emerge once the observer has acquired some knowledge of the statistical structure 
of the environment (Gläscher et al., 2010). Note that throughout the learning process 
prediction generally remains implicit, though it can also become explicit (as discussed 
in more detail in the section Implicit vs. explicit learning, below).
In addition, in young infants, statistical learning and predictive gaze are sometimes 
dissociated from one another, as infants do not continue to attend to deterministic 
events that they have already learned (Tummeltshammer & Kirkham, 2013). This may 
explain the pattern revealed in Chapter 5, in which infants’ correct anticipations initially 
increased and then declined. After observing a few repetitions of the deterministic pair, 
infants no longer continued to gain any new information from predicting the correct 
upcoming target, and stopped anticipating. Though the data in Chapter 5 cannot 
conclusively speak to this possibility, several recent empirical and computational stu-
dies present compelling evidence that infants prefer stimuli offering a medium-level of 
complexity because these offer the optimal opportunities for learning (Kidd, Piantadosi, 
& Aslin, 2012). 
Action Performance
 One of the primary functions of predicting the actions of other people is to 
enable preparation of an appropriate response during social interactions (Paulus et al., 
2013; Sebanz et al., 2006). Csibra (2008) explains that action prediction “will also support 
human-specific phenomena that are not less important than imitation and empathy: 
action coordination and engagement in joint actions” (p. 436). In Chapters 2, 3 and 7, 
I explored whether statistical learning can also manifest in toddlers’ and adults’ action 
performance. Findings from the studies in these chapters reveal a consistent relation 
between uninstructed learning from observation and spontaneous action performance. 
For toddlers (Chapter 2) and adults (Chapter 3, Seven) who observed a human actor 
cause an effect, predictive gaze correlated with the probability of reproducing of the 
action pairs. Thus, in the absence of an explicit task or instructional cue, participants still 
transferred the learned regularities into their own behavior. 
These patterns suggest that mere exposure to statistical regularities can result in new 
knowledge that is accessed and used for action performance, but only under certain 
conditions. Participants did not imitate the regularities that did not cause an effect, 
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nor those in the ghost event condition. In Chapters 2 and 3, I offer an interpretation 
within the broader theoretical framework of reinforcement learning. Researchers have 
shown that rewarding outcomes have a profound and powerful impact on learning 
and action selection across multiple species (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Schultz, Dayan, 
& Montague, 1997). Reinforcement learning is also driven by prediction errors: ‘motiva-
tional’ prediction errors determine the size and direction of how a model is updated 
with new information (Den Ouden, Kok, & de Lange, 2012). For example, a large positive 
prediction error will strengthen the associated action to a greater degree, whereas a 
small negative prediction error will weaken, or inhibit, the associated action to a lesser 
degree. From this perspective, desired action goals serve as motivational cues that 
implicitly guide learning. Together, the findings in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that, even 
from 18 months of age, humans use information from statistical regularities to organize 
their own behavior with respect to action goals. 
Implicit vs. explicit learning
The relation between statistical learning and implicit vs. explicit learning mechanisms 
is a topic of ongoing debate in the adult literature, yet remains complex and poorly 
understood. Stemming from separate research traditions, much prior work has focused 
on the distinction between these forms of learning. Recently, however, it is becoming 
apparent that “it is difficult to find a situation in which only one type of learning is 
engaged” (Sun, Zhang, Slusarz, & Mathews, 2007, p. 34). To fully understand the human 
capacity for learning, it is essential to understand how these different forms of know-
ledge interact during cognitive processing, and how their interaction changes learning 
outcomes. 
Chapter 3 revealed interesting findings regarding implicit and explicit learning outco-
mes. Implicit learning was measured via predictive gaze, which is traditionally conside-
red to reflect learning processes that the observer is not consciously aware of (Marcus 
et al., 2006). Explicit learning was measured via imitation of the action pairs and verbal 
knowledge of the learned structure, which require conscious awareness of what has 
been learned. Adults learned to make correct visual predictions when observing both 
action and ghost sequences, but learning emerged more rapidly when they observed 
the actions. Adults were also more likely to recreate the learned regularities and retain 
explicit awareness of them when they had observed the human actor produce an ef-
fect. Consistent with these results, in Chapter 2 toddlers also learned better when they 
observed a human actor, and their rates of correct visual predictions correlated with 
their action performance only following observation of an actor producing an effect. 
One explanation for these learning benefits is that observing the effects of another 
person’s actions facilitates an ‘implicit-to-explicit’ knowledge extraction (i.e., ‘bottom-up’ 
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learning; Sun et al., 2007). It would be inefficient to explicitly encode and store the 
immense amount of regularities in the environment; therefore, it makes sense that 
much of the statistical information we are exposed to in daily life remains implicit or 
is later forgotten. However, learning about the actions of our conspecifics is critical for 
successful joint coordination and social interaction, which are arguably two of the most 
important behaviors for our species. It is therefore potentially adaptive for learning to 
remain implicit when making visual predictions (Bar, Bartlett, Noe, & Schank, 2009), 
but for our cognitive system to have a mechanism that efficiently transfers learned 
knowledge into explicit awareness in the service of action control. As discussed next, 
this mechanism may involve activation of the observer’s motor system upon observing 
action sequences performed by another person. 
The role of the motor system 
Motor-based accounts of action prediction propose that a common neural architec-
ture underlies the perception and performance of goal-directed action (Flanagan & 
Johansson, 2003; Gallese et al., 1996; Kilner et al., 2007a). The findings in this thesis 
provide evidence across behavioral and neural measures for predictive activation of 
the motor system during learning of action sequences. In Chapter 2, toddlers made 
predictive eye movements to upcoming deterministic actions when they observed 
an actor, but not a ghost event sequence. Under the same conditions, in Chapter 3 
adults transferred learning into explicit awareness only when they observed the action 
sequence. In both chapters, I propose that the motor system is the underlying source 
for the enhanced learning observed in toddlers and adults. Based on these findings, 
in Chapter 4 we predicted that young infants would learn action pairs better if the 
observed actions were more dominant in their motor repertoire, due to stronger input 
from their own internal motor representations. To address this question from multiple 
angles, in Chapter 6 we directly measured motor system activity and found stronger 
activation during anticipation of upcoming deterministic actions relative to random 
actions. Together, the findings in these studies provide converging evidence that the 
motor system is also involved in learning the statistical structure of action sequences, 
particularly when those actions are paired with distal effects. 
Motor experience
The relation between motor experiences and action prediction is well-documented 
(Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Southgate, Johnson, Karoui, 
& Csibra, 2010; Stapel, Hunnius, Meyer, & Bekkering, 2016). Findings from Chapter 4, 
however, did not replicate the clear correspondence between infants’ level of motor 
proficiency and action prediction that has been demonstrated in prior studies. That is, 
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although infants showed a faster increase in correct predictions for the actions more 
dominant in their current motor repertoire, they were still able learn the actions they 
were less proficient at. These findings were partially consistent with our hypotheses, in 
that infants learned their ‘dominant’ actions more efficiently. Note that the primary dif-
ference between this study and the prior research is that here infants were exposed to 
more information than simply the action events—namely, the opportunity to learn the 
statistical structure of the sequence. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, our study 
implemented a graded measure of infants’ motor capabilities, whereas prior research 
has most commonly implemented a binary measure of whether infant could or could 
not perform an observed action (e.g., Senna et al., 2016). Therefore, most infants in our 
study had some degree of prior experience even with the actions less dominant in 
their repertoire. Nevertheless, the predictive eye movements observed in this group of 
infants may not come from activity in their motor system. These findings are consistent 
with the possibility that action prediction is not always the result of an internal motor 
simulation. 
Towards an integrated account: translating visual knowledge into 
motor predictions in infancy
As discussed in the introduction, statistical learning offers a comprehensive theory for 
how humans process and encode information across multiple cognitive domains. Li-
kewise, motor-based theories of action perception offer equally powerful explanations 
for how humans readily process and predict the actions of other people. The question 
of whether and how these two core systems interact with one another during action 
observation was a central theme throughout the studies in this thesis. Under the as-
sumption that prediction is a core function of the human brain, I aimed to approach 
this question by examining the joint role of both statistical learning and motor system 
activity for action prediction. Based on indirect behavioral evidence from Chapters 2, 
3, 4 and 7, we hypothesized that statistical learning—a form of visual experience—can 
provide a source of prior knowledge that the motor system can use to generate an 
action prediction. Chapter 6 provides direct evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
In this chapter, we offer a new explanation in which the motor system can access 
structural knowledge, gained through observational statistical learning, to create new 
action predictions. 
Developmental considerations
Patterns of learning across the studies in this thesis reveal both similarities and dif-
ferences across infants, toddlers, and adults. In general, rates of anticipation increased 
from young infants to toddlers, and were greatest for adults. All age groups successfully 
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predicted the upcoming action that was associated with an effect, although toddlers 
and adults were also able to predict the upcoming action that did not lead to an ef-
fect. Not surprisingly, learning performance was highest across both pairs in the adult 
group. Differences across development were more apparent when considering action 
performance in Chapters 2, 3 and 7. Adults showed the highest rates of performing 
an action pair, particularly when it caused an effect. Toddlers’ action sequences were far 
more limited in their structure, particularly in Chapter 7 in which the experimenter was 
present during the action performance phase. I did not evaluate the action sequences 
of the 8- to 11-month-olds in Chapters 4 and 5, to minimize demands on the younger 
infants, though this would have been interesting to compare with the toddlers and 
adults.
Taken together, the evidence from the studies presented here illustrates a potential 
developmental pathway. Statistical learning skills, already robust by 8 months of age, 
can support learning of action sequences and prediction of upcoming actions. Infants, 
with limited prior experiences and cognitive resources, rely on cues from action-effects 
to detect the statistical regularities in action sequences (Chapter 5). In the first year 
of life, the motor system and other domain-general processes outside of the motor 
system are not yet fully integrated (Chapter 4). As infants mature into toddlerhood and 
gain new perceptual and motor experiences, they can learn the statistical regularities 
in the absence of any effect, at least implicitly (Chapter 2), and can transfer knowledge 
acquired via visual statistical learning experiences into predictions generated in the 
motor system (Chapter 6). In the second year of life, toddlers still prioritize informa-
tion from statistical regularities and action-effects over subtler social cues from verbal 
dialogue and mutual gaze between joint actors (Chapter 7). Children may not be able 
to combine multiple sources of information in action sequences until 3–5 years of age 
(Buchsbaum et al., 2011; Freier, Cooper, & Mareschal, 2015). As adults, observers can 
flexibly combine information from prior knowledge about social context and statistical 
regularities as they learn. Finally, input from the motor system and the occurrence of 
action-effects enables adults to transfer knowledge from implicit to explicit awareness. 
Looking forward: directions for future research
In the ‘wild’
The statistical regularities that I presented to observers in all the studies in this thesis were 
limited to simple, deterministic action pairs within sequences of six possible actions. In 
real life, the statistical structure in the actions that infants encounter in their natural en-
vironments is much more complex. Recently, researchers have applied new empirical 
methods to characterize the statistical structure of infants’ visual environments (Clerkin, 
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Hart, Rehg, Yu, & Smith, 2017). This work has revealed unexpected insights into infants’ 
everyday learning experiences, and also highlighted a marked difference between the 
statistical structure presented to infants in standard laboratory experiments and in their 
natural environment. This is almost certainly the case for actions as well. An important 
next step is to similarly characterize the actual statistical information that people en-
counter in the actions of others around them—e.g., parents, siblings and peers—and 
whether the findings reported in this thesis generalize to naturalistic contexts. 
Another important future challenge is to examine the role of action prediction while 
infants are freely interacting in their environment. Infants can clearly predict others’ 
actions and their effects in controlled experiments (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014), but 
do they actually do so in the ‘wild’? If so, does the ability to anticipate others’ actions 
during everyday interactions relate to other important developmental domains, such 
as infants’ emerging joint attention skills and word learning? Recent methodological 
advances has made it possible to ask these kinds of research questions while infants 
are freely moving in the environment (Yu & Smith, 2011), which has the potential to 
test important theories of infant development outside of the laboratory. For instance, 
in ongoing work I am currently pursuing this topic by investigating anticipatory eye 
movements while infants play with novel toys together with a parent in a natural, 
uninstructed play session.
Probabilistic structure
The studies presented here examined statistical structure that was characterized by 
deterministic (1.0) vs. random (0.167) transitional probabilities. In the real world, ac-
tion steps probably range from a high to low probability, with very few being truly 
deterministic. As discussed in the introduction, one recent fMRI study (Ahlheim et al., 
2014) presented adults with an extended learning phase in which they observed an 
action sequence that featured transitional probabilities ranging from 0.25–0.75. At test, 
after learning had occurred, brain activity was measured while they observed the same 
sequence, and was found to correlate with the strength of each action’s probability. In 
ongoing work, we are adapting this paradigm for use with EEG in order to investigate 
the temporal dynamics of online learning as it unfolds. We expect that neural responses 
will be modulated by an upcoming action’s probability in a parametric manner, and 
that this pattern will emerge over time as observers gain knowledge of the action 
sequence structure. 
Implications for clinical populations
Findings from the current thesis raise questions that could provide insights for atypical 
developmental populations. For instance, one interesting and counterintuitive finding 
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that has emerged from research on infants with profound sensorineural hearing loss is 
that early auditory deprivation results in pervasive and profound impairments in visual 
statistical learning skills. The ‘auditory scaffolding hypothesis’ proposes that the cogni-
tive system requires early experience with sound—an inherently sequential signal—to 
develop normal sequence learning abilities (Conway, Pisoni, & Kronenberger, 2009). An 
inability to learn the statistical regularities in observed actions, which depend on visual 
statistical learning skills, could help to explain why deaf infants also exhibit impaired and 
less successful social interactions from very early in life (Tasker, Nowakowski, & Schmidt, 
2010). Although this clinical population is small6, these infants have a significant poten-
tial for improved outcomes given sufficient intervention within a critical time window. 
Therefore, there is a great need to better understand the effects of deafness on the 
non-auditory cognitive and social development in these infants (Pisoni, Kronenberger, 
Chandramouli, & Conway, 2016). Children with autism spectrum disorders are another 
clinical population that struggles to smoothly coordinate their actions and achieve joint 
engagement with others, which is critical for healthy social and linguistic development 
(Cejas, Barker, Quittner, & Niparko, 2014). Thus, the findings from this thesis raise new 
research questions that are relevant for these clinical populations, such as how early 
learning abilities might predict later development of social-communicative behaviors. 
Conclusion
This thesis presents a set of experiments that investigated the contribution of statistical 
learning to action prediction during observation of continuous action sequences. 
The findings from these studies support a model in which statistical learning skills 
can support action prediction in infants, toddlers and adults. Specifically, new action 
knowledge can be acquired through detecting the transitional probabilities between 
sequential actions and their associated effects. Once these regularities are learned, the 
motor system can access this new knowledge and form accurate predictions of future 
action events. Given the assumption that prediction is a core faculty of the human 
brain, the study of action prediction skills and how they relate to important outcomes 
in healthy social and cognitive development is an important and valuable line of re-
search to continue to expand. 
6 Congenital hearing loss affects one to three of every 1,000 live born infants (Vohr, 2003)
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Glossary
Action understanding. In the context of this thesis, action understanding refers to 
the ability to recognize a series of movements as relating to a proximate goal, such as 
reaching for a cup in order to grasp it (Steinhorst & Funke, 2014). This definition equates 
understanding with recognition (e.g., Gallese et al., 1996; Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, 
Gallese, Buccino, & Mazziotta, 2005). 
Action-observation network (AON). A network of cortical regions that produce 
similar activation patterns during the observation and execution of goal-directed ac-
tion, for instance, when watching someone else reach for an apple and when reaching 
for one’s own apple (Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004; Schubotz, Wurm, 
Wittmann, & von Cramon, 2014).
Action. A set of human movements that are initiated by a motivated subject (i.e., 
one who has an intention), organized toward a goal, and guided by information (von 
Hofsten, 2004).
Action prediction. A prediction about the future state(s) of an observed or a self-
produced action. In the experimental paradigms presented in this thesis, action 
prediction is defined as a prediction about which object was to be acted upon next, 
following a current ongoing action step (e.g., an anticipatory saccade or predictive 
neural activation).
Action-effects. The sensory consequences of an action. In this thesis, action-effects 
were the turning on of a distal light that was caused by a sequence of object-directed 
actions.
Event. I adopt the definition from Event Segmentation Theory of “a segment of time 
at a given location that is conceived by an observer to have a beginning and an end” 
(Zacks & Tversky, 2001, p. 17).
Event-related potential (ERP). A neural response that is the direct result of a specific 
sensory, cognitive, or motor event, measured via EEG.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A neuroimaging procedure that 
measures brain activity by detecting changes associated with blood flow. This tech-
nique relies on the fact that cerebral blood flow and neuronal activation are coupled.
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Mirror neuron. A neuron that fires both when a monkey performs an action and ob-
serves the same action performed by a conspecific (Gallese et al., 1996). Thus, it ‘mirrors’ 
the behavior of the other.
Motor system. Cortical regions in the brain that is active during both observation and 
execution of a goal-directed action. The motor system is hypothesized to contribute 
to action prediction and to contain mirror neurons (though the existence of mirror 
neurons in humans has not yet been empirically demonstrated).
Motor representation. I adopt the definition of a motor representation as the pattern 
of neural activity that relates to the goal of an action and of the motoric strategy to 
achieve that goal (Jeannerod, 1990). 
Mu rhythm. An EEG measure of motor system activation, which is typically suppressed 
(i.e., has a reduced power spectrum) during action execution or observation. Due to this 
characteristic, mu rhythm suppression is used as a measure of motor system activation.
Negative central (Nc). An infant ERP component which manifests as a negative 
deflection occurring between 400-800ms post-stimulus and is most prominent over 
frontal-central electrodes. It is sensitive to stimulus familiarity/novelty and is thought to 
relate to the amount of attention directed to the stimulus.
N400. An ERP component with a negative peak amplitude at 400ms post-stimulus for 
adults (500-800ms for infants) and is most prominent over central-parietal electrodes. 
Its amplitude increases in response to words or other meaningful stimuli that violate 
an expected semantic context. For instance, upon hearing the sentence “I always drink 
coffee with hot sauce”, a more negative N400 would occur in response to the word “hot 
sauce” than if the final word was replaced with “cream”.
Prediction error. A mismatch between the brain’s prior expectations and reality (Den 
Ouden et al., 2012). Prediction errors are used to update the brain’s internal model of 
the environment, and are thus a fundamental learning signal.
Predictive coding. A framework in which the brain is thought to primarily function as 
a ‘prediction machine’ (Clark, 2013). Its (the brain’s) main goal is to minimize prediction 
error at multiple levels of a cortical hierarchy. This framework claims to offer a unifying 
model of perception and action (Friston, 2010).
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Reinforcement learning (RL). A form of learning by direct interaction with the en-
vironment. In RL, an agent (a person, a computer agent, etc.) selects actions based on 
the consequences of prior experiences and the chances of maximizing some type of 
cumulative reward. 
Semantic processing. Commonly defined as the processing that occurs as we hear a 
word and encode its meaning.
Social context. The nature of the goal shared between two people which characte-
rizes their interaction, such as whether they share a common goal or have their own 
independent goals.
Statistical learning. The ability to extract statistical regularities from sensory input to 
learn about the environment. Although now thought to be a global learning mecha-
nism, it was initially identified in human infant language research (Saffran et al., 1996).
Transitional probability. The probability that a certain action or event will occur next 
based on what is currently happening.
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Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience
For a successful research Institute, it is vital to train the next generation of young sci-
entists. To achieve this goal, the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour 
established the Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience (DGCN), which 
was officially recognised as a national graduate school in 2009. The Graduate School 
covers training at both Master’s and PhD level and provides an excellent educational 
context fully aligned with the research programme of the Donders Institute. 
The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international students in 
biology, physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioral science, medicine and rela-
ted disciplines. Selective admission and assessment centers guarantee the enrolment 
of the best and most motivated students.
The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% of PhD alumni 
show a continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top institutes worldwide, 
e.g. Stanford University, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, UCL London, MPI 
Leipzig, Hanyang University in South Korea, NTNU Norway, University of Illinois, North 
Western University, Northeastern University in Boston, ETH Zürich, University of Vienna 
etc.Positions outside academia spread among the following sectors: - specialists in a 
medical environment, mainly in genetics, geriatrics, psychiatry and neurology,- speci-
alists in a psychological environment, e.g. as specialist in neuropsychology, psycholo-
gical diagnostics or therapy, - higher education as coordinators or lecturers. A smaller 
percentage enters business as research consultants, analysts or head of research and 
development. Fewer graduates stay in a research environment as lab coordinators, 
technical support or policy advisors. Upcoming possibilities are positions in the IT sector 
and management position in pharmaceutical industry. In general, the PhDs graduates 
almost invariably continue with high-quality positions that play an important role in 
our knowledge economy.
For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defenses please visit:
http://www.ru.nl/donders/graduate-school/phd/
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